

## The Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Speakers Series 2012-13

# The International Criminal Court: The Next Decade

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#### CONTACT INFORMATION

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#### TODAY'S AGENDA

- I. OVERVIEW OF SERIES AND PLANNED ONLINE DEBATES
- II. POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
- III. BACK TO PROFESSOR STACY

#### SPEAKERS SERIES SCHEDULE

#### January 15

Richard Dicker

Director

International Justice Program Human Rights Watch

#### January 22

Jim Fearon

Stanford Political Science, Civil War/Conflict

#### January 29

Cherif Bassiouni

Chairman

**Drafting Committee** 

United Nations Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court

#### February 5

Ambassador David J. Scheffer
Special Expert to the Secretary-General on the
U.N. Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials

#### February 12

Carla Ferstman

Director of REDRESS

Doctor of Philosophy student, Oxford

#### February 19

William Pace

Convenor for the International NGO Coalition for the ICC (CICC)

#### February 26

Shamila Batohi

Senior Legal Advisor

Office of the Prosecutor, ICC

#### March 5

Richard Steinberg

Director

Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Project, UCLA Helen Stacy

Director

Program on Human Rights, Stanford Center on Democracy,

Development and the Rule of Law

Each Lecture will be followed immediately by a Voluntary Dinner & Framing Exercise and then an Online Debate

#### **VOLUNTARY DINNER & FRAMING EXERCISE**

Duration: 30-45 minutes

Location: Bechtel S-I5I

Led by: Dr. Diane Steinberg

#### ONLINE DEBATE

StanfordHumanRights.com

Begins Each Thursday Morning

Enrolled Students Must Post
Three Thoughtful Comments During the Quarter





### UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW

Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Project







Fatou Bensouda ICC Prosecutor

Topic for June 2012 - October 2012

#### Current Question on Mass Rape

Can the International Criminal Court (ICC) sustain a conviction for the underlying crime of mass rape without testimony from victims?

Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Rome Statute provides, "the Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well-being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses.... The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of such crimes." Sexual and gender based violence and crimes against children are highlighted. Pursuant to Rule 87 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, L ("Rules"), a Chamber may order certain measures, such as the use of face and voice distortion, pseudonyms and closed sessions, to protect the identity of victims from the public. Such measures have been adopted by the Chambers of the ICC. However, notwithstanding, eliciting victim testimony is especially difficult given the cultural stigma that may attach to victims of rape in some cultures. Where testifying as a victim might precipitate discrimination, severe social stigma, exclusion from one's community, or even physical harm, these measures may not alleviate the concerns of victims. Requiring victims to testify in the face of threats of violence, foreclosure of the opportunity to marry, or the possibility of being convicted of adultery might place too great a burden on victims; and some might be unwilling to come forward even where widespread abuses have occurred. Accordingly, it has been argued that the Office of the

Prosecutor must be empowered to

#### SITE INDEX OF ALL ISSUES



#### The Mass Rape Issue

Can the International Criminal Court (ICC) sustain a conviction for the underlying crime of mass rape without testimony from victims?

The Opinions of the Invited Experts



Askin



de Brouwer



Hagan





MacKinnon

Wedgwood

Discussion

**Background Materials** 



#### Special Lecture Debate: Politics and International Justice

To what extent should the ICC Office of the Prosecutor consider or engage in politics to advance international justice?

Discussion

Background Materials

This online debate, online course, and the associated lectures are products of a collaboration between UCLA School of Law; the Stanford Program on Human Rights; and Stanford's Division of International, Comparative & Area Studies. The collaborators are grateful to Sanela Diana Jenkins for her generous support.





JOIN THE DISCUSSION

Special Lecture Series
DEBATE CURRENT
LECTURE ISSUE

#### WHAT'S YOUR OPINION?

Participate in a debate on key issues in International Criminal Law and help us shed some light on tough legal issues faced by the Prosecutor of the ICC. What you say here matters. The Prosecutor is listening.

#### INTRODUCTION TO FORUM



Click for a Video Introduction by ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda.

This Forum is run by Dr. Richard H. Steinberg of the Sanela Diana Jenkins Human Rights Project at UCLA School of Law with the support of the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The purpose of the Forum is to allow members of the legal community, governments, academics, and others to debate complex issues of international criminal law faced by the Office of the Prosecutor in the course of its work at the ICC. Membership and participation in this Forum are open to everyone. We welcome you to express your opinion, and we request a civil debate which directly addresses the legal issue set forth in the current question. (more)









Special Lecture Series

DEBATE CURRENT LECTURE ISSUE



Dr. Richard H. Steinberg Professor of Law

Lecture Topic beginning January 8, 2013

#### Current Question on Politics & the ICC

To what extent should the ICC Office of the Prosecutor consider or engage in politics to advance international justice?

#### BACKGROUND MATERIALS — LECTURES

Richard Steinberg Lectures on Politics and the ICC



No Additional Background Materials Yet.

This online debate, online course, and the associated lectures are products of a collaboration between **UCLA School of Law**; the **Stanford Program on Human Rights**; and **Stanford's Division of International, Comparative & Area Studies**. The collaborators are grateful to **Sanela Diana Jenkins** for her generous support.

HOME: SITE INDEX OF ALL ISSUES

NEWEST: MASS RAPE ISSUE

PREVIOUS: REPARATIONS QUESTION

DISCUSSION OF LECTURE TEST

▶ BACKGROUND FOR LECTURES

THE STATUTE OF ROME

SIGN-IN OR REGISTER

ABOUT US

FORUM POLICIES

SEARCH

Go

- I. THE DOMINANT PARADIGM
   A Legal Culture of International Justice
- II. POLITICS—FOR BETTER OR WORSE
- III. ACCOUNTING FOR POLITICS Five Operating Principles
- IV. "JUSTICE DIPLOMACY"

  Engaging with the Great Powers and Situation Countries
- V. CONCLUSION

  An Emerging Era of Justice Diplomacy?

Established by the Rome Statute in July 2002

#### 121 State Parties:

- All of South America, most of Europe, half of Africa
- But not: US, China, Russia, India

Oversight by the Assembly of States Parties

### A COURT OF LIMITED JURISDICTION:

#### SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION:

• Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes

#### TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION:

- National of a State Party (or state accepting jurisdiction)
- Crime on the Territory of a State Party (or state accepting jurisdiction)
- Referral by the UN Security Council

#### TEMPORAL JURISDICTION:

Only crimes committed after I July 2002

#### **COMPLEMENTARITY:**

• A court of last resort, investigating and prosecuting only where national courts have failed.

#### THREE ORGANS:

#### JUDICIAL DIVISIONS (CHAMBERS):

18 Judges

Pre-Trial Chamber, Trial Chamber, Appeals Chamber

### OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR (OTP):

Mme. Fatou Bensouda

Trial Attorneys, Investigators, JCCD (Jurisdiction, Cooperation, Complementarity)

#### REGISTRY

Court Administration, Defense Counsel, Detention Unit, Etc.

#### **ACTIVITY:**

18 Preliminary Examinations

7 Investigations (All in Africa)

30 Public Arrest Warrants

8 On-Going Trials


I Conviction; I Acquittal

- ELEMENTS: Main focus of OTP work is to identify, charge, arrest, and try those most responsible
  - No impunity for such persons
  - Legal/formal reasoning and evidence should motivate OTP behavior
  - Peace-making and reconciliation should be left to other actors
  - Political considerations should not enter into OTP decisions

I shall not be involved in political considerations.

I have to respect scrupulously my legal limits.

—Luis Moreno-Ocampo4 February 2010



#### THIS STANCE HAS SERVED THE OTP WELL IN ITS FIRST DECADE

- Built institutional structure
- Assembled a strong staff
- Cooperation with most States Parties
- Cooperation with some other countries
- By legal measures, the OTP has begun establishing a successful record



THE ICC IS NOW RECOGNIZED AS A LEGAL INSTITUTION FIRMLY ENTRENCHED IN THE INTERNATIONAL LANDSCAPE

IRONY: While the OTP culture has favored justice over politics, the sharpest and most persistent criticism of the OTP is that it is playing politics.

### The New York Times

















### THE OTP'S SUCCESS DEPENDS ON THE POLITICAL DECISIONS OF STATES TO:

- Permit investigations and evidence-gathering
- Provide a safe environment for investigators
- Effectuate arrests
- Fund its work
- Help legitimate its work
- Pressure parties in a situation to cooperate with the OTP
- Provide evidence
- Not interfere with its work


### POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTP ACTION—FOR BETTER:

- Remove reprehensible and powerful figures from the situation
- Focus world attention on and constrain freedom of action of the accused
- Lower the morale of followers of the accused and may cause their surrender



### POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTP ACTION—FOR WORSE:

 Legal/rational basis for investigations may result in patterns that give rise to claims of bias—the Africa perception problem



### POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTP ACTION—FOR WORSE:

 Investigations or arrests may consolidate power for an autocratic leader and diminish the OTP's legitimacy



### POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF OTP ACTION—FOR WORSE:

 Fugitives may react to an arrest warrant by renewed commitment to fight rather than to make peace



#### **IMPLICATIONS:**

 Like it or not, the OTP is now a major international political actor, engaging in "High Politics"



#### **IMPLICATIONS:**

- OTP actions are evaluated in political terms:
  - Removal of bad actors from the scene
  - Promoting peace in situation countries
  - Promoting reconciliation in situation countries

- I. Protect the ICC's legitimacy
  - Stand for no impunity
  - Act only under the color of law and consistently with it
  - Exercise agency through prosecutorial discretion

2. Simultaneously pursue not only criminal justice, but also peace and reconciliation

3. Whenever crimes are taking place, voice concern or act.



The Engagement-Intensity Spectrum: OTP's Toolbox

4. Consider consequences for the Great Powers and Situation Countries


5. Build greater institutional capacity to analyze politics and engage diplomatically

#### ENGAGING WITH SITUATION COUNTRIES

Intensify positive complementarity efforts

#### ENGAGING WITH SITUATION COUNTRIES

### Pursue expansive outreach in situation countries



#### **ENGAGING WITH SITUATION COUNTRIES**

### Analyze the political consequences of reparations



#### ENGAGING WITH SITUATION COUNTRIES



#### ENGAGING WITH THE GREAT POWERS— JUSTICE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

#### Take into account the stance of powerful states

The Great Powers Oppose ICC Engagement

The Great Powers are Divided (e.g., Gaza)

The Great Powers Favor Justice (e.g., Libya)

The OTP Should Not Engage (or Engage Only with Minimal Intensity)

Nuanced & Contextualized Justice Diplomacy is Required

The OTP Should Engage with Intensity

**Voice Concern** 

**Preliminary** Investigation Notify **Examination** Warning

Seek Warrant

Arrest

Imprison Try

### ENGAGING WITH THE GREAT POWERS— JUSTICE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT


# Facilitate Peace: Stipulate that the peace-making efforts of perpetrators is a basis for mitigation in sentencing




ENGAGING WITH THE GREAT POWERS—
JUSTICE AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

Bargaining for peace

Voice Concern Notify Warning Preliminary Examination Investigation Warrant Seek Warrant Try Imprison



#### **CONCLUSION:**



NOTE: THIS STANCE IS CONTESTED

Many argue that the ICC should remain a purely legal institution, avoiding politics completely.

Three Main Reasons:

LEGITIMACY
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

#### FIRST ONLINE DEBATE:

To what extent should the ICC Office of the Prosecutor consider or engage in politics to advance international justice?