In Part II, I will discuss the four possible mechanisms under the Rome Statute for deferral to AJM. Next, in Part III, I will argue that when considering AJM in lieu of criminal prosecution, the OTP should first consider:

1. gravity of the crimes;

2. the stability of the country; and

3. the will of the people.6

If a proposal survives these preliminary considerations, the OTP should then evaluate the objectives that either criminal prosecution or AJM may advance. Depending on the particular circumstances of the conflict, and the various needs and interests of actors involved, some objectives may be prioritized over others. If the OTP determines that AJM advance international criminal justice objectives, and perhaps do so more effectively, it should seriously consider deferral.

In Part IV, I propose that, as the ICC looks ahead towards its next ten years, it should consider a more open-minded approach to AJM. Empowering domestic mechanisms may not only serve individual victims’ needs for justice, but may also enhance the ICC’s effectiveness by outsourcing its workload, and improve its legitimacy by allowing for non-western approaches to delivering justice.

I. Refocusing the ICC’s Objectives in Light of its Limitations

Even if it is recognized that international criminal trials may not serve victims’ needs for justice, there is ambiguity regarding how AJM comport with the Rome Statute. John Dugard argued the international community’s decision to establish the ICC indicates that “justice, in the form of prosecution, must take priority over peace and national reconciliation.”7 Some argue this tension between objectives can lead to the justice-peace dilemma: forcing the ICC to choose between achieving justice through criminal prosecution or restoring peace to a suffering community.8 Different conflicts, and different actors, may have different needs. For example, when the President of the Democratic Republic of Congo decided to engage with Bosco Ntaganda, a rebel leader indicted by the ICC, he asserted:

Why do we choose to work with Mr. Bosco, a person sought by the ICC? Because we want peace now. In Congo, peace must come before justice.9

The Rome Statute unequivocally specifies a mandate for criminal prosecution. The Rome Statute’s Preamble sets forth the ICC’s objectives, including to end impunity for perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community, ensure effective prosecutions, contribute to the prevention of these crimes, and ensure respect for and the enforcement of international justice.10 Further, it provides that the ICC shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions over those responsible for these crimes.11 In addition to these objectives set forth in the Preamble, since the Rome Statute’s adoption, the ICC has aimed to include victims in trial proceedings, engage with the communities affected by crimes, provide victim reparations, and ensure lasting peace.12

As the ICC looks ahead to the next ten years, it should recognize the challenges and limitations it has faced as an international criminal court and consider whether AJM may be sufficient in lieu of prosecution to help advance its objectives. Some critics argue that the ICC has attempted to pursue too many objectives, for example: “trying to meet the needs of victims in a trial that is instead conceptualized around finding guilt for a perpetrator” or “producing/presenting ‘universal’ values and standards while also meeting the particular needs of the victims of the particular conflict at hand.”13 Further, the ICC’s failure to achieve all of these objectives has fueled criticisms and decreased its legitimacy.

An international criminal trial is an important mechanism for holding perpetrators accountable to the international community, especially when the accused believe their actions were justified. It may also aid a country emerging out of conflict by assigning individual culpability for crimes, rather than casting blame on an entire population.14 It may signify the end of an oppressive regime and the beginning of a new regime, or deny impunity for the most heinous crimes and perhaps deter future criminals.15

Still, the ICC is constrained in significant ways that impede its effectiveness. First, due to limited financial resources and restricted jurisdiction, the ICC can only investigate and prosecute a number of perpetrators, while mass atrocities usually involve large numbers of actors with varying degrees of involvement.16 For the perpetrators the ICC does decide to pursue, it is difficult to effectuate arrest, collect hard evidence, and gather witness testimony.

Secondly, because of a criminal trial’s adversarial nature, the intent of the prosecution is to establish guilt of the accused. As a result, facts and testimony are marshalled to establish culpability, but not to create a complete, unbiased, and historical account of events. This may be particularly harmful in situations where the conflict involved actors that were both victims and victimizers: for example, child soldiers who were kidnapped and coerced to join a rebel group, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and then forced to commit violent crimes against civilians. Establishing culpability of a perpetrator in this situation would fail to take into account the circumstances that drove his behavior.

In addition, the ICC focuses predominately on the accused and their direct victims, excluding a large number victims of the conflict from the proceedings. And, while an international criminal trial may hold the perpetrator accountable to the international community and impose punishment, this result does not necessarily help heal and rebuild a broken community. This is especially true where the victims are unfamiliar with the westernized concept of a criminal trial and when their communities have been destroyed as a result of the conflict. There may be many perpetrators who were not tried, but may be able to help the community heal.17 However, these perpetrators are unlikely to initiate doing so on their own.

Keeping in mind these limitations, the ICC should consider how AJM may compliment and advance its objectives. These objectives include not only ending impunity and ensuring effective prosecutions, but also rebuilding and reconciling communities, providing justice to individual victims, and ensuring lasting peace. When the ICC is evaluating whether to defer to AJM, it must consider the needs and interests of various actors, including individual victims, affected communities, the state(s) involved, the region, international community, and humanity.18 It must balance these needs and interests, determine what international criminal justice objectives may be served, and make choices regarding whether AJM may be appropriate in lieu of criminal prosecution.19

II. Compatibility of Alternative Justice Mechanisms with the Rome Statute

As a preliminary matter, the ICC must be able to defer to AJM under the Rome Statute. The Rome Statute, even if it articulates a preference for criminal prosecution, may still allow for deferral to AJM. The Statute leaves open four major possibilities:

1. United Nations Security Council deferral (Article 16);

2. ne bis in idem (Article 20);

3. prosecutorial discretion (Article 53); and

4. complementarity (Article 17).20

Under Article 16, the United Nations Security Council can request the ICC suspend its investigation or prosecution if it is a threat to international peace.21 This may be inappropriate when the crimes require criminal prosecution under treaty law, but this will be explored in Part III. Under Article 20, the principle of ne bis in idem precludes the prosecution of individuals for the same crime twice; here, AJM would be treated as prior prosecution, thereby thwarting any subsequent ICC proceedings.22 However, because this provision requires trial by another court with due process and criminal responsibility, it would be difficult to qualify AJM as a prior prosecution.23

In addition, under Article 53, the Prosecutor may decide to decline to investigate or prosecute the case in the “interests of justice.”24 When determining whether to open an investigation, the Prosecutor must evaluate whether:

1. there is a reasonable basis to believe a crime within the jurisdiction has been committed;

2. the case is admissible under Article 17; and

3. “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims,” the investigation would not serve the interests of justice.25

After an investigation, the Prosecutor may decline to prosecute if:

1. there is an insufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons;

2. the case is inadmissible under Article 17; or

3. “taking into account all the circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime,” a prosecution is not in the interests of justice.26

Here, the Prosecutor is given tremendous discretion in terms of what may affect the interests of justice and may choose to defer to AJM on this basis. Additional factors to consider may include: whether there is a duty to prosecute the crime under treaty law, whether there is a justice-peace dilemma, and what are the individual victims’ needs for justice.

Lastly, but perhaps most significantly, under Article 17, AJM could be interpreted to satisfy the complementarity principle, thereby rendering the case inadmissible to the Court.27 The complementarity principle provides that the ICC should complement, but must not supplant, a domestic criminal justice system.28 However, the ICC’s jurisprudence has indicated that not all domestic proceedings are sufficient to render a case inadmissible.29 The ICC may only intervene when the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely investigate or prosecute a case.30 The ICC has not made clear whether domestic proceedings outside of a state’s criminal justice system may be sufficient to qualify as either an investigation or prosecution, but there are many reasons why AJM should.

A broad reading of Article 17 could find that AJM constitutes genuine investigation, prosecution, or a decision not to prosecute, while a narrow reading may find that AJM would not satisfy any of these.31 The Prosecutor may find a State is unwilling to act genuinely if:

1. it is shielding the accused from criminal responsibility;

2. there is an unjustified delay in proceedings; or

3. the state’s proceedings are inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.32

Considering a truth commission that investigates a perpetrator’s actions, holds him individually accountable for his crimes, documents a historic account of his wrongs, and imposes a punishment, the prosecutor may determine that it constitutes a genuine investigation, prosecution, or investigation, and also a decision not to prosecute. A less clear situation may be a tribal ceremony that publicly shames a perpetrator, forces him to confess his wrongs and beg forgiveness, and imposes no punishment. In either of these scenarios, the Prosecutor may decide that the State is shielding the accused from responsibility or that their mechanism is inconsistent with an intent to bring the accused to justice. Here, justice may imply different meanings to different actors.

Given these possibilities, it seems that deferral to AJM may be most feasible under Article 53 or Article 17. When determining whether to interpret one of these provisions to allow deferral to AJM, the OTP should consider a number of factors, discussed in the next section.

III. Determining Whether to Defer to Alternative Justice Mechanisms

If a State proposes to forgo prosecution in favor of AJM, the OTP should first consider three preliminary factors:

1. the gravity of the crimes committed;

2. the stability of the State proposing the AJM; and

3. the will of the people.33

The OTP should then consider whether AJM advance international criminal justice objectives, including retribution, deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice.34 The OTP should only defer to AJM if these objectives are advanced comparably to criminal prosecution.35 In some cases, AJM may advance these objectives even more effectively than criminal prosecution. Deferral to AJM not only allows communities to take ownership in the process, but it also may encourage a State “to use autochthonous forms of justice and peace that could lead to greater confidence in the government.”36 There may be competing objectives, and it will be the Prosecutor’s role to decide which may take priority over others.

To illustrate how competing objectives may materialize, it is helpful to consider the LRA conflict, where AJM were suggested as an alternative to criminal prosecution. In response to years of horrific attacks against civilians by the LRA, a small rebel group in northern Uganda, the Ugandan government attempted peace negotiations and eventually granted amnesty and a reintegration package for rebels fighting against the government.37 Because these efforts were unsuccessful, Uganda’s President Museveni asked the ICC to investigate and prosecute the LRA.38 Although Museveni initially indicated that LRA leaders would be denied amnesty, he subsequently offered immunity and asked the ICC to drop its charges against LRA leaders if they agreed to Ugandan alternative justice mechanisms.39

The OTP was forced to either issue the arrest warrants, and risk prolonging the conflict, or drop the charges, and trust a truth commission and/or traditional mechanisms to hold the accused accountable. Under Ugandan’s alternative, the accused LRA leaders would not face criminal prosecution, but, instead, a truth commission and/or tribal justice known as mato oput, which Museveni argued would effectively hold the accused accountable and offer victims compensation.40 While the arrest warrants might signal the gravity of these crimes to the international community, and perhaps eventually led to retribution and deterrence, the traditional mechanisms might bring peace to the region, reveal a complete account of what happened, provide justice for individual victims, and reintegrate communities.

A. Preliminary Considerations: Gravity of the Crimes, Stability of the State, and the Will of the People

1. Gravity of the Crimes

First, under treaty law and arguably customary international law, the crimes of genocide, torture, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions require criminal prosecution.41 However, crimes against humanity and war crimes do not require criminal prosecution under international law.42 The OTP should therefore only consider deference to AJM for crimes against humanity and war crimes that do not constitute grave breaches. Beyond this threshold determination, the OTP should also consider the scale and nature of the crimes, the manner of their commission, and their impact.43

In the LRA conflict, the accused were charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity, predicated on cruel and inhuman treatment short of torture; thus, Uganda may be required to prosecute some, but not all, of these crimes under treaty law.44 Moreover, the crimes’ scale, manner, and impact are alarming: they have lasted for decades, displaced millions, and included abducting children, forcing them to become soldiers or sex slaves, and forcing abductees to mutilate, maim, rape, and kill.45

2. Stability of the State

Secondly, a State must be stable, or at least working towards a restoration of order, for it to have the capacity to effectively implement AJM. Stability includes: a governing document approved in a democratic order, demonstrated respect for human rights, and a functioning judicial system.46 When Museveni requested that the Prosecutor drop the ICC charges, the Ugandan government was arguably stable enough to support AJM, although there was still doubt whether the accused would actually be forced to participate in the proceedings.

3. The Will of the People

Third, the ICC should consider the will of the people affected by the conflict. This includes not only the victims, but anyone else in society who may have been impacted, and may require outreach across the State. The ICC has made tremendous efforts to include victims in its proceedings, but it is limited by its geographical distance from communities affected and the reluctance of victims to participate in unfamiliar trial proceedings.

To ascertain the will of the people, one scholar suggests the ICC build upon its current national outreach efforts and add a referendum.47 The national outreach program, through radio and television programs, should inform the public about the role of the ICC, as well as alternative options for accountability.48 A challenge here, however, will be securing sufficient funding to support such a large campaign that reaches the entire population. Moreover, even when the OTP engages in comprehensive efforts to hear input from victims, the results may not be clear.

In regards to the LRA conflict, the OTP conducted over twenty-five missions to Uganda to hear from the local communities.49 Nonetheless, the will of the people was uncertain regarding whether criminal prosecution or AJM was preferred. Mato oput comes from the Acholi tribe in northern Uganda, and involves drinking a bitter brew as part of a long process and ritual ceremony to reconcile broken relationships between clans.50 The process may take years, even decades, and requires that the perpetrator admit his wrongs and show remorse, the truth of what happened is established, and compensation is given to victims.51

Individuals within the tribe expressed conflicting views about whether mato oput is favorable to criminal prosecution and, in addition, many Ugandan victims are not Acholi and have different tribal practices.52 Data from the region indicated that “AJM is supported, but not necessarily to the exclusion of prosecution.”53 Moreover, mato oput was never intended to deal with mass atrocities, particularly where many victims do not know their attackers, and also where the perpetrators believe their actions were justified.54 Another limitation of the process is that is often excludes women and, throughout the conflict, women suffered tremendous violence and suffering.55 Although there was no clear consensus regarding the will of the people, mato oput may have been adapted to better serve the victims’ desires.

B. Advancing International Criminal Justice Objectives

If AJM satisfy the preliminary considerations, then the Prosecutor should consider how they might advance several international criminal justice objectives. For each objective, I will briefly explore how both criminal prosecution and AJM may advance it. For a proposed AJM to be sufficient, it should advance each of these goals comparably to criminal prosecution.

1. Retribution

Retribution generally refers to individual culpability and punishment. It is based on the idea that both victims and society want those who have committed crimes to be held accountable and punished accordingly.56 This is frequently cited as a central rationale for criminal prosecution, especially where perpetrators are accused of the gravest crimes of concern to the international community: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes of aggression.57 This objective is often critiqued in this context, however, because of the extreme selectivity of the accused and the tremendous challenge to effectuate arrest. This weakness materialized in the LRA conflict when, after issuing arrest warrants, none of the accused were actually captured. Here, pursuing criminal prosecution hardly advanced any retributive objective.

AJM may further retribution if it requires a perpetrator to fully disclose his crimes and accept responsibility for his actions; enforces some form of punishment, such as community services, fines, reparations, shaming, or removal from office; and if that punishment is somewhat proportional to the crime, as long as not: “woefully short of […] the ICC’s disproportionately weak punishment.”58 In many traditional justice mechanisms, shame plays an important role in administering individual accountability. Both mato oput and fambul tok (“family talk” in Sierra Leone) involve perpetrators standing publicly in front of their community, confessing their wrongs, and asking for forgiveness.59 The same may be argued for truth commissions. Although there may be no punishment in truth commissions, mato oput would include victim reparations. The most frequent criticism is that AJM are insufficient to hold accountable and punish offenders guilty of the most heinous crimes.

2. Deterrence

Deterrence refers to the prevention of future crimes, including both general deterrence (preventing crimes by others) and specific deterrence (preventing additional crimes by the accused). Both international criminal trials and AJM have uncertain deterrent effects. It is not clear whether a trial in the Hague for a crime of genocide will prevent future perpetrators from committing genocide, or preent that particular perpetrator from committing genocide again once he is released. Likewise, it is not clear whether AJM will deter future crimes outside of that community, or even within it. In either mechanism, “deterrence requires a rational actor making calculated decisions based, in least in part, on the likelihood of such as ICC prosecution or AJM”; yet it is unlikely that the perpetrators of the gravest crimes in the world consider the consequences before committing them.60 Nonetheless, AJM may have deterrent effects when perpetrators truly feel shame over their actions.

3. Expressivism

Expressivism refers to a “moral message generally consistent with societal values” issued by a respected voice of authority to a general audience.61 The ICC advances expressivist objectives through investigating and prosecuting crimes and thereby signaling to the global community that such crimes are morally condemnable. Some scholars have even argued:

Individual criminal trials—whether national, international, or a hybrid—have become the benchmark of accountability against which all other forms of reckoning, such as truth commissions, must be judged.62

Even if the ICC is limited in the number of perpetrators it can pursue, its efforts to investigate and prosecute those individuals serve an important symbolic function.

Similarly, AJM may have an expressivist function by sending a message to the affected community that the crimes at issue were morally wrong, however it is less certain whether this message would resonate with the global community. Even within the community, victims and perpetrators may be able to reconcile, but it not clear if AJM would effectively communicate any moral condemnation.

4. Restorative Justice

Restorative justice includes objectives such as reconciliation, restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation. The ICC advances restorative justice through its unprecedented inclusion of victims in trial proceedings and establishment of the Trust Fund for Victims.63 It advocates for those affected by crimes to have a sense of ownership in the process, engages with affected “communities directly, in local languages, holding conversations and consultations, responding to questions, addressing concerns and providing people with information,” and works with local intermediaries who support its efforts in the field.64 Nevertheless, it is limited by its physical distance from affected communities, as well as the hesitation of many victims to come forward and participate in legal proceedings.

AJM, on the other hand, may advance restorative justice through establishing an accurate and historical account of the events, face to face reconciliation between victims and perpetrators, reparations for victims, and community reintegration. Truth commissions are particularly useful for uncovering a complete, accurate, and unbiased historical account of what happened. In most post-conflict situations, victims want a historical account before any retribution. In addition, AJM may have tremendous healing power. With fambul tok in Sierra Leone, relationships that had been destroyed during the civil war were mended once perpetrators participated in the ceremony and admitted that their actions were wrong and condemnable. Two reconciled best friends shared:

We have something the war did not destroy. That is the cultural of forgiveness.65

IV. Next Steps Towards Evaluating Alternative Justice Mechanisms

While a criminal trial serves the important objectives of holding the worst perpetrators accountable and symbolizing the gravity of these abuses to the international community, AJM may compliment these objectives and serve others. An ideal approach to achieving justice may include a combination of criminal prosecution for the most culpable perpetrators, truth commissions, and traditional justice mechanisms. For example, after the civil war in Sierra Leone, a High Court tried the top commanders, while a truth commission aimed to gather a historical account of the conflict. On top of these efforts, John Caulker, a Sierra Leone human rights activist, asked communities what they needed in order to heal? In response, he implemented fambul tok to reconcile and rebuild broken communities.66

In the LRA conflict, the OTP opted to proceed with its arrest warrants, arguing that the LRA’s attempts to reach a peace deal in exchange for amnesty amounted to blackmail. Although prosecution would continue with the top leaders, lower level perpetrators could face Ugandan alternative justice mechanisms instead.67 The ICC’s insistence on criminal prosecution dissuaded the accused from cooperating in peace negotiations, and as of today, none of the accused have been captured and tried. This situation exemplifies not only the challenges the ICC faces in ensuring effective prosecutions, but also how AJM may be more effective in particular circumstances. Nonetheless, one could argue the ICC’s arrest warrants still had important symbolic value to the global community, particularly because of how grave the crimes were, and may have satisfied victims of the conflict who preferred criminal prosecution to traditional mechanisms.

The differing concepts of justice around the world make the ICC’s job of achieving it all the more complicated. This is especially true in light of its financial and jurisdictional limitations and its foundation as a criminal court. Not only may the ICC’s encouragement of and deferral to AJM in appropriate circumstances better serve victims’ needs for justice, but it would also improve the effectiveness of the ICC and increase its legitimacy in the eyes of the affected communities. For these victims, justice in The Hague may mean little, but justice through a ritual in their community may mean a lot more. Criminal prosecution is still central to the ICC’s mandate and should be pursued enthusiastically to end impunity and act symbolically. AJM, however, may be deferred to in particular circumstances where international criminal justice objectives may be better served. Through these efforts, over the next ten years, the ICC can better serve justice to many around the world.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   Marieke de Hoon, The Future of the International Criminal Court: On Critique, Legalism and Strengthening the ICC’s Legitimacy, 17 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 591, § 2 (2017), available online, doi. ↩

2. 2.

   Id. ↩

3. 3.

   Allen S. Weiner, Ending Wars, Doing Justice: Colombia, Transitional Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 52 Stan. J. Int’l L. 211, 222 (Aug. 25, 2016), available online. ↩

4. 4.

   Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 69 (2003), available online. ↩

5. 5.

   (Although amnesties are often discussed in the context of AJM, they are beyond the scope of this comment. I will instead focus on two categories of AJM, truth commissions and traditional justice mechanisms, that ensure some degree of accountability, even if it is informal). ↩

6. 6.

   Elizabeth B. Ludwin King, Does Justice Always Require Prosecution? The International Criminal Court and Transitional Justice Measures, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 85, § 5 (Jan. 1, 2013), available online. ↩

7. 7.

   Linda M. Keller, Achieving Peace with Justice: The International Criminal Court and Ugandan Alternative Justice Mechanism, 23 Conn. J. Int’l L. 209, 237 (2008), available online. ↩

8. 8.

   See Weiner, supra note 3. ↩

9. 9.

   King, supra note 6, at 93. ↩

10. 10.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9, as amended [hereinafter Rome Statute], Preamble, available online. ↩

11. 11.

    Id. ↩

12. 12.

    Interacting with Communities Affected by Crimes, ICC, [hereinafter Interacting with Communities], available online (last visited Jun. 23, 2018). ↩

13. 13.

    de Hoon, supra note 1, § 3; see also Nancy A. Combs, From Prosecutorial to Reparatory: A Valuable Post-Conflict Change of Focus 36 Mich. J. Int’l L. 219 (2015), available online. ↩

14. 14.

    King, supra note 6. ↩

15. 15.

    Id. at 91. ↩

16. 16.

    See de Hoon, supra note 1. ↩

17. 17.

    Id. ↩

18. 18.

    Id. ↩

19. 19.

    Id. ↩

20. 20.

    Keller, supra note 7, at 238. ↩

21. 21.

    Rome Statute, supra note 10, at Art. 16; see also id. ↩

22. 22.

    Rome Statute, supra note 10, at Art. 20; see also Keller, supra note 7, at 238. ↩

23. 23.

    Rome Statute, supra note 10, at Art. 20. ↩

24. 24.

    Id. Art. 51; see generally Thomas Hethe Clark, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Amnesties, and the “Interests of Justice”: Striking a Delicate Balance, 4 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 398 (Jan. 2005), available online. ↩

25. 25.

    Rome Statute, supra note 10, at Art. 53. ↩

26. 26.

    Id. ↩

27. 27.

    Id. Art. 17; see also Keller, supra note 7, at 238; King, supra note 6, at 111. ↩

28. 28.

    Keller, supra note 7, at 252. ↩

29. 29.

    See Kaveri Vaid, What Counts as “State Action” Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute? Applying the ICC’s Complementarity Test to Non-Criminal Investigations by the United States into War Crimes in Afghanistan, 44 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 573, 574 (2012), available online. ↩

30. 30.

    Rome Statute, supra note 10, at Art. 17. ↩

31. 31.

    See Keller, supra note 7, at 255. ↩

32. 32.

    Rome Statute, supra note 10, at Art. 17. ↩

33. 33.

    King, supra note 6. ↩

34. 34.

    Keller, supra note 7, at 260.

    (“There is general agreement that the purpose or mandate of the ICC, at least in theory, includes retribution, deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice, especially reconciliation.”). ↩

35. 35.

    (Several comprehensive and thoughtful frameworks have been proposed to evaluate AJM, with many similarities amongst them. I found a combination of proposals by Linda M. Keller and Elizabeth B. Ludwin King to cover the factors I believe are central to considering AJM’s compatibility with the ICC. I have proceeded with an analysis here to demonstrate one framework that may serve as a guide). ↩

36. 36.

    King, supra note 6, at 91. ↩

37. 37.

    Keller, supra note 7. ↩

38. 38.

    Id. ↩

39. 39.

    Id. ↩

40. 40.

    Id. ↩

41. 41.

    King, supra note 6, at 88–89. ↩

42. 42.

    Id. ↩

43. 43.

    Id. at 114. ↩

44. 44.

    See Keller, supra note 7. ↩

45. 45.

    Id. at 1. ↩

46. 46.

    King, supra note 6, at 109. ↩

47. 47.

    Id. at 112. ↩

48. 48.

    Id. ↩

49. 49.

    Id. ↩

50. 50.

    See Keller, supra note 7, at 231. ↩

51. 51.

    Id. at 230–31. ↩

52. 52.

    Id. ↩

53. 53.

    Id. ↩

54. 54.

    Id. at 232–35. ↩

55. 55.

    Id. at 232–33. ↩

56. 56.

    Weiner, supra note 5, at 214. ↩

57. 57.

    See generally Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, International Criminal Law for Retributivists, 35 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 969 (Oct. 13, 2014), available online. ↩

58. 58.

    Keller, supra note 7, at 267. ↩

59. 59.

    Id. at 230–37; Fambul Tok (Catalyst for Peace 2011), paywall. ↩

60. 60.

    Keller, supra note 7, at 272. ↩

61. 61.

    Id. at 273–74. ↩

62. 62.

    de Hoon, supra note 1. ↩

63. 63.

    Interacting with Communities, supra note 12; see also Victims Voices, ICC, available online (last visited Jun. 23, 2018); Trust Fund for Victims, ICC, available online (last visited Jun. 23, 2018). ↩

64. 64.

    Interacting with Communities, supra note 12. ↩

65. 65.

    Fambul Tok, supra note 59. ↩

66. 66.

    Id. ↩

67. 67.

    Keller, supra note 7, at 250. ↩