Efficiency Lecture Question
In what ways could the ICC’s bureaucracy, finances, judicial election process, and relationship with the States Parties be reformed to increase its efficiency as an instrument for international justice?
Comment on the Efficiency Lecture Question: “In what ways could the ICC’s bureaucracy, finances, judicial election process, and relationship with the States Parties be reformed to increase its efficiency as an instrument for international justice?”
I very much agree that the ICC's relationship with world powers like the US and China is a crucial weak point in its current ability to pursue its goals. Thus, the question of whether the ICC would be able to acquiese to the demands of these nations while maintaining its non-partisan status and objectivity, or more importantly whether it's even possible to reconcile the differing desires of the powers, is an extremely important one. I did the best I could to cull information about the US's and China's reasons for not complying with the ICC, and found the following: according to the Washington Post, "Former U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Rome treaty on Dec. 31, 2000, but President George W. Bush renounced the signature, citing fears that Americans would be unfairly prosecuted for political reasons." Given this rationale, it may be difficult to get the US on board without compromising the ICC's original vision. As far as China, despite a surprising vote in favor of referring Qaddafi in 2011, in 2012 they vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions on Syria and have been extremely uncooperative in general with the ICC. Based on these considerations, it seems that one of the ICC's greatest challenges for the next ten years will be to try and get these nations on board.
Comment on the Efficiency Lecture Question: “In what ways could the ICC’s bureaucracy, finances, judicial election process, and relationship with the States Parties be reformed to increase its efficiency as an instrument for international justice?”
I very much agree that the ICC's relationship with world powers like the US and China is a crucial weak point in its current ability to pursue its goals. Thus, the question of whether the ICC would be able to acquiese to the demands of these nations while maintaining its non-partisan status and objectivity, or more importantly whether it's even possible to reconcile the differing desires of the powers, is an extremely important one. I did the best I could to cull information about the US's and China's reasons for not complying with the ICC, and found the following: according to the Washington Post, "Former U.S. President Bill Clinton signed the Rome treaty on Dec. 31, 2000, but President George W. Bush renounced the signature, citing fears that Americans would be unfairly prosecuted for political reasons." Given this rationale, it may be difficult to get the US on board without compromising the ICC's original vision. As far as China, despite a surprising vote in favor of referring Qaddafi in 2011, in 2012 they vetoed three UN Security Council resolutions on Syria and have been extremely uncooperative in general with the ICC. Based on these considerations, it seems that one of the ICC's greatest challenges for the next ten years will be to try and get these nations on board.