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- Jordan Murphy: The Extent to Which Cyberwarfare May Constitute Crimes Under the Rome Statute and Conditions for Accountability The International Court of Justice held in 1996 that international humanitarian law applies to all means of warfare, including those of the future.1 Such a concept must be applicable to the Rome Statute; if means and methods of war change, so too must the laws regulating them. The regulation of cyber... (more)
- Rory Razi: Cyber Attacks and the Crime of Aggression With rapidly advancing technology comes the disastrous reality of cyber attacks. This comment explores whether cyber attacks can be prosecuted at the International Criminal Court (ICC) as crimes of aggression. Section I discusses the Iran Stuxnet cyber attack. Section II, explores creative interpretation of the Rome Statute, Art. 8 bis, and... (more)
- SimonRuhland: Economic Cyber Crimes and the Rome Statute Summary This comment examines the possibility to prosecute perpetrators of economic cyber attacks under the Rome Statute. It considers economic cyber attack to be cyber attacks on financial institutions, businesses, or individuals with the primary goal of financial enrichment. The comment first assesses the possibility of prosecution under Article 8 and... (more)
- danielkim0610: Defining the Unique Issues Prosecuting Criminal Cyber Defense Actions Under the Rome Statute Presents: A Lost Cause? Cybersecurity has launched itself to the spotlight within both the scope of governmental organizations protecting national security and private industry keeping their own systems intact. Societal dependence on technology has brought with it the magic of efficiency, cost-effectiveness and widespread digital penetration on a scale... (more)
- Pankhuri97: Incorporation of Cyberwarfare in the Rome Statute: A Futile Endeavour Introduction How wars are conducted has evolved throughout history with nations adopting more and more efficient and sophisticated means of causing mass destruction. We are witnessing a transition from traditional weapons such as ammunition to cyber weapons. The Tallinn attack of 2007, the Georgia hack of 2008 and the Stuxnet worm detected in 2010 are already some... (more)
- Jeng2023: Tackling Territoriality: Fitting Cyber Crimes into the Crime of Aggression Introduction Territoriality has always been a key issue in national sovereignty. Wars have been fought over borders of nations, as territorial disagreements are often the precursor to war.1 This has led to conclusions where: “if you want to avoid war, learn how to settle territorial disputes non-violently.”2 However, the uniqueness of cyber activities... (more)
- JohnG: Distinguishing Cyberwarfare in the Law of Armed Conflict I. Introduction The dawn and parabolic expansion of the Internet over the last half-century revolutionized how individuals, businesses, organizations, and states interact with one another. As states and their militaries have become increasingly interconnected and dependent on these technologies, a new realm of warfare has evolved beyond the conventional battlefields of air, land,... (more)
- Smithp2022: Social Media May be Used to Commit Genocide Under the Rome Statute I. Introduction As technology progresses, cyber crime grows as a concern on a national, transnational, and international level. As the International Criminal Court pursues its goals of holding actors accountable for criminal violations of international law in 2022 and beyond, it will have to contend with a world that depends more and more on technology in all... (more)
- mschneer: Accountability for NotPetya: Why the International Criminal Court Can, and Should, Prosecute the Perpetrators of the NotPetya Cyber Attack as a War Crime I. Introduction In June 2017, a popular Ukrainian tax accounting software called M.E.Doc underwent a routine software update. Unbeknownst to the thousands of Ukrainians who use this software, that update served as the entry point for a destructive malware that would soon gain access to... (more)
Comment on the Cyberwarfare Question: “To what extent and under what conditions might cyber operations or cyberwarfare constitute crimes specified in the Rome Statute?”
Definition of "cyber operations" versus its sub category "cyber warfare" is pertinent for it enables recognizing, conceptualizing and setting up indicators to measure State (or inter-State) cyber operations; as distinct from State (or inter-State) Military self-defense operations from cybercrime (organized crime). In all three lines of operations civilians (a specific population or sub-set of population) are targets and victims.
Use of "Cyber operations" concept enables one to shift focus to risk analysis of full scale weaponization of Rome Statute via Integrated eGovernance using Knowledge Management as defined by.articles 73 "Third Party Documents" integrated with article 30 "Mind Element' for structural and sustained operations against ethnic or minority populations.
Knowledge Management, as it pertains to use of State Governments collecting, harvesting, archiving Sensitive Personal Information of all Citizens and Residents within a region or territory, mainly via Consortia-based contractual agreements with Third Party service providers; the 3td Party providing (total solutions) Knowledge Management Services meaning Electronic Document and Archives Management (EDMA) hand-in-hand with Customer & Content Relationship Management (CRM) solutions with technical operational capacities for real-time, on the fly, 24/7 micro-targeting all decisions and Decision Recommender Systems (DSS) regarding individuals and ethnic or minority groups enables the "Third Party" holdings of, and total control of "memory" which means total control of "legal evidence".
Article 73 this refers to documents, documentation and archives that a State, signatory to Rome Statute Jurisdiction, contracts out to a 3rd Party (either another State, integrated eGovernance other party or a technology & securities consultancy firm) in which the operative word is "secrecy" meaning the 3rd Party can not be forced to inform the Prosecutor or ICC of its methods algorithms or its potential legal evidence simulation digital platforms and archives collections based on Parallel and Multiverse (document universe) constructions using Artificial Intelligence (AI) based self-learning simulation (digital platforms) that are rendered under "commercial and trade agreement IPR-protection" - the before mentioned argument of secrecy of "cyber operational methods in use".
When one combines Rome Statute article 73 "Third Party Document and Archives' with Article 30 "Mind Element"; the act of knowing, knowingly doing, acting with knowledge, with integrated knowledge (management), with intent and with knowledge of deploying and operationalizing structural discrimination; crimes against humanity, war crimes, crimes of aggression and hate crimes as sustained strategy, operations and targeting against ethnic and minority groups with full knowledge of sustained depletion of resources, of living environments and of full scale isolation and life-cycle control of an ethnic or minority group inclusive of control of cross-generational heredity (pertaining to control of genomics & origins, stripping of property and assets, destruction of memory via archives control) then one has arrived at the true "cyber operations in use by integrated eGovernance".
The problem in dialog and discussion forums at ICC, Eurojust and other forums is that integrated eGovernance and integrated eJustice platforms are in control of 3rd Parties and Legal Profession lobby groups who also devise and set up "learning and advisory" forums for the specific purpose of controlling directionality of opinion formation - to divert attention from core issues in Crimes Against Humanity & War Crimes - by hacking into International Criminal Laws, such as Rome Statute to weaken it and weaponize laws turning advisory boards and the ICC Court into "cyber theaters" in which the voiceless, attacked by cyber operations and locked out of digital access, are controlled by the 3rd Party, not to be heard and denied a say.
A reasonable start is therefore to define terminology, such as "cyber operations", "Third Party", "Knowledge and Archives Management", "Legal Evidence", "Documents", "Dual Use operations and documents", "Parallel Use operations and documents", "Integrated eGovernance", "Government & 3rd Party holdings and control of Targeted individuals", etc. It should be clearly recognized that integrated eGovernance holding and controlling collective and individual memory (documents, archives, legal evidence) is NOT a "neutral entity" but a power construct that serves the most powerful optimizing all governance, communication and law revisions processes to serve its position.
Having said the above, Rome Statute article 72 "National Security" and or article 51 "Self Defence" may be used by States and powerful entities to justify their actions and for arguments of immunity from being prosecuted. For example a State might contract out ethnic and minority group cleansing from a 3rd Party and agree with 3rd Party that certain persons with certain profiles are used for HumanLab medical, psycho-social or neuro-cognitive experiments then culled and eliminated from the general population as of no utility; and The State could argue the operations to be for "national interest" or "of general good". For example Nazi Germany argued elimination of disabled persons, mentally ill persons and Jews is of national interest of pure and healthy Aryan race.
In a modern version of similar lines of thought, Member State of EU, State of Finland engaged in a HumanLab experiment codified in Law; Finlex 1350/2014 identifying minority (elderly, disabled, mentally ill)and special minority groups (ethnics, asylumn seekers, terrorists) for individual targeting, costs elimination and denials, -of-services without due process and to be sustained 2015- (to date). Central to HumanLab contracts is cyber operations using 3rd Party Document and knowledge management (Rome Statute article 73 and 30) to plan structural processes and decision-making algorithms and systems that will produce desired outcomes of "targeted eliminations" of the undesirable, feeble, non-pure population segments. The contracts for experiments were made by Finnish Finance Ministry and Local/Regional Governments (many of which operated as Consortia). In most cases, IT companies such as CGI (Canada) provided electronic Document and Archives processing tools for "local operators" within local government regions given "free hands" and "Criminal immunity" to achieve contractual economic goals. The results have been horrific. Evidence of operations though will not be found in 3rd Party documents or archives as part of the "contractual deals" was for each targeted Customer, the Customer narrative Relationship manager responsible for "steering" the EDMA/CRM of a targeted individual,. group or segment was responsible for securing full co-operation of all personnel in Administration and governance to agree of operational strategy, methods and narrative (alternative story line) to be written down collectively as legal evidence. The cyber operations this taking The form of Government steering of local government Consortia 'insider group" activating near community gang stalking targeting individuals for denials of service, denials of due process, enslavement, disappearances and elimination akin to model Social Credit-scheme and Extrajudicial Trials used in China,US and EU. Such methods are at Times referred to as legitimate, legalized "hybrid-economic-acts" when in fact these measures are aimed at elimination of minority and special minority groups otherwise known as eugenics or Intelligent design -selection methods for elimination or other uses.
Added to the above example from modern Day Finland, is Social and Welfare Law STM (2019) Third Party Secondary Use of Sensitive Data and its Commercialization. In essence Consortia Government has placed Citizens and Residents into Secondary legal position in relation to Universal Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as well as Rome Statute) and The Consortia eGovernment into Primary Legal position. To be specific, Sipilae Administrative Government in 2019 (after 5 year Trial phase) enslaved its population to be used at Will of Consortia eGovernance without any choice, Options, due process or Fair Trials with The Government having "holdings" of its Customers (being all Citizens and Residents, their Sensitive data and resources) and having Rights to "own and commercialize" thereof and parts of.
I have provided a modern day case example from Europe, Member State Finland - a seemingly widely respected functioning democracy and free society based on social Welfare and Rule of Law that is ethnically a monoculture, known for obedience to authority, known to lack diversity in opinion formation, analysis and dialog of complex issues.
My comment may be provocative. Particularly, it is so given the known and documented information I have submitted to Member State Finland legal authorities in 2014, 2016 and beyond of "cyber operations living HumanLab environments against minority and special minority groups"
To recap: To what extent does integrated eGovernance Use Third Party Documents (article 73) and integrated Knowledge Management (article 30) target minority and special minority groups for sustaining/sustained outcomes of Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes, Elements of Crimes and Crimes of Aggression by placing ethnic and minority groups Universal Human Rights and Freedoms into Secondary and Subservient position to the 3rd Party? - that is my question.
As a case example, I offer Member State Finland Finlex 1350/2014 in context of Third Party Secondary Use of Sensitive Personal Data and its Commercialization without choice, consent, being informed and by targeted individuals being labelled of "legal incapacity" for self-determination by means of cyber operations or one-sided Consortia declarations of "feeble mindedness or other incapacity" to bring a case to International Criminal Courts.
In anticipation that my dialog is not blocked by cyber operators, I submit my comment with a question I ask to be raised in 2022 into major level question and for experts to engaged this emergent topic with vigor and above all integrity and courage.
I thank for opportunity to comment, Tiina Ison from Lappeenranta, Finland