II. Background

The subsequent section addresses the differences and similarities between the ICC and the International Court in terms of its role, approaches, and goals in order to identify potential for collaboration and complementarity.

A. Prosecutorial Differences Between the Inter-American Court and the International Court

Although the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is not a criminal court, it arguably functions as a “quasi-criminal court.”3 Another difference between the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the ICC is that the former holds individuals responsible, while the latter holds states accountable for their crimes. However, through two “interpretive twists,”4 the Inter-American Court has used the remedies of its sentences to order states to investigate, prosecute, and punish human rights violators, as well as monitoring the state’s compliance of its recommendations to determine whether progress has been made in the state’s domestic criminal processes.5 As a result:

[S]tates have launched new criminal investigations, exhumed mass graves, moved cases from military to civil jurisdiction, overturned amnesties, bypassed statutes of limitations, and created new institutions and working methods to facilitate prosecution of such crimes.6

Unlike the ICC, the Inter-American Court does not prosecute the crimes itself, but rather leaves such work to the domestic systems of its state parties at the state’s own financial cost.7 However, in its sentence, the Inter-American Court may review whether national criminal procedures comport with inter-American system standards of human rights,8 as well as provide specific suggestions to enhance domestic procedures. As such, it “is taking on a quasi-criminal jurisdiction.”9

Furthermore, human rights courts have been known to “engage earlier and in an ongoing way; they approach problems armed with a broader range of tools.”10 Accordingly, the Inter-American Court stays involved throughout the process by monitoring the states’ performance, as well as by engaging with the parties, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the State, and the victims and their representatives to gather information, through request for information or hearings for the compliance reports.11 On the other hand:

[W]hen an international criminal court opens a case, it acts more like a deus ex machina12 the court is an outside actor, stepping in as if from above to fix a problem that local officials have been unable to address.13

Furthermore, another important aspect of the Inter-American Court’s approach is that it:

[F]oster local processes of justice, memory, and judicial reform. They are able to pair restorative justice and victim-centered remedies with retributive justice.14

As such, the Inter-American Court has the potential of being an efficient complementary forum for the resolution of international crimes as will be illustrated below.

B. Goals of Regional Human Rights Institutions and International Courts

International courts can accomplish a range of goals, including:

[A]ssembling a historical record of unimaginable crimes, developing international criminal law, helping victims heal, achieving justice, building the rule of law, promoting reconciliation in polarized societies, making peace between warring factions, and preventing atrocities.15

In its Preamble, the ICC particularly noted that it has the goal “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to the prevention of such crimes.”16

In contrast, regional human rights institutions, such as the Inter-American Commission, have explicitly stated that they seek to promote and protect human rights in region.17 Similarly to the ICC, the Inter-American Court has made prosecution of serious crimes a part of its agenda.18 Overall, the two most important shared goals by both the regional human right institutions and the ICC are accountability and prevention.19

III. Analysis

This section compares the procedural phases of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the ICC to illustrate that the Inter-American Court is a fair and effective alternative forum to address international crimes. Prior to delving into such analysis, it is important to note that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is the first instance forum in the Inter-American System. Human rights cases in the Inter-American System are first brought to the Commission. If the parties are unable to reach a friendly statement and the state party in question has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, then the case could be heard by the Tribunal. As such, the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court will be compared and contrasted to the ICC together.

A. The Decision of which Forum to Bring a Case

When evaluating where to bring a case, victims of human rights violations and their representatives have several options, including the United Nations Special Mechanisms, the ICC, and the Regional Courts, such as the Inter-American Commission and Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The availability of the above-stated routes will depend on the individual case, procedural rules, and membership of the victim’s state. For the purposes of this comment, the focus is on a general summary of two routes: The Inter-American System and the ICC one.

In the Inter-American System, it is important to note that the case begins at the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights level. Accordingly, “[a]ny person or group of persons or nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more of the Member States of the OAS” can bring a petition before the Inter-American Commission alleging a violation of a protected right by one of the Inter-American human rights instruments.20 After several procedural steps, the case goes to the admissibility stage, then to the merits stage.21

Prior to its decision on the merits, the Commission will set a time for the parties to express whether they wish to engage in a friendly settlement and it puts itself at the disposal of the parties.22 The Commission might stop the friendly settlement interventions between the alleged victim and the state member in dispute if it determines that the case will not be resolved through this process or one of the parties:

Does not consent to its application, decides not to continue it, or does not display the willingness to reach a friendly settlement based on respect for human rights.23

If a friendly settlement is reached, then the Commission will adopt and publish a report.24 On the other hand, if such settlement is not reached, the Commission will continue to process the case and reach the merits stage.25

Furthermore, the parties will have the opportunity to submit observations on the merits to lay out their legal arguments and present evidence. Then, in case it finds a violation of human rights, the Commission will consider all the arguments and draft a preliminary report with recommendations to the state.26 The state will have to report on the actions it has taken to comply with such recommendations and the petitioner will have to inform the Commission whether it would like the case to be sent to the Inter-American Court and present information to support such position.27

However, it is important to note that not every state has accepted the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court pursuant to Article 62 of the American Convention.28 If the member state has accepted the jurisdiction and the state has not complied with the recommendations of the Commission, then the Commission will submit the case to the Inter-American Court where the case will later be adjudicated.29 For the states that have not accepted the contentious jurisdiction of the Court, the process will not move forward to the Court and the Commission will issue a final report with its conclusions and recommendations if the matter has not been resolved within a timeframe of three months.30 Furthermore, the Commission will take into account the status of compliance when deciding whether to publish the report and where.31

In contrast, in the ICC, the case can be referred by a state party, by the United Nations Security Council, or the Prosecutor may consider a case proprio motu.32 Such considerations take place during the preliminary examination stage in which the Prosecutor will determine whether jurisdiction and admissibly grounds, discussed below, have been met.33 Moreover, investigators will “travel to the country to interview victims, witnesses, and sometimes suspects. They may visit crime sites and gather physical evidence.”34 After such preliminary evaluation, which can last many years, the Prosecutor can decide whether to end the case or move it to the next stage—the investigation—and eventually indict suspects.35 Moreover, it is important to note that according to Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the Security Council may request the Court to defer an investigation or prosecution for twelve months.36 Such request can be renewed.37

As indicated above, both routes are very long and time consuming, but the Inter-American System is particularly victim-centered. It provides an opportunity for victims to be heard and participate, as well as providing channels of communications for all parties involved throughout all the procedural stages. Whether the case can be heard by either institution will depend on the jurisdiction and admissibility rules, discussed below.

B. Jurisdiction

According to Article 1 of the Rome Statute, the ICC can exercise jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of international concern.”38 Article 5 of the same instrument states the crimes that fall under the jurisdiction of the Court such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.39 Furthermore, there are preconditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, such as the crimes must have been committed in the territory of state party to the Rome Statute, by a national of a state party of the same instrument,40 or the case must have been referred by the United Nations Security Council.41

On the other hand, according to the Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Commission can consider “alleged violations of the human rights enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights and other applicable instruments, with respect to the Member States of the OAS.”42 Although the human rights violations addressed by regional institutions, such as those of the Inter-American system, are not named genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression as in the Rome Statute, they still involve crimes that fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICC, including “killings of civilians, widespread torture, mutilation, forced disappearances, and arbitrary detention against large numbers of people.”43 Such crimes involve the right to life and right to human treatment, for instance.

C. Admissibility

Article 17(1) of the Rome Statute sets forth, in part, the following rules of inadmissibility:

1. The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;

2. The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute; […]

4. The case is not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.44

In contrast, the Inter-American Commission admissibility rules are set in Articles 31 and 33 of its Rules of Procedure. Pursuant to Article 31, the Commission can hear cases when domestic remedies have been exhausted, but provides the following exceptions:

1. the domestic legislation of the State concerned does not afford due process of law for protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated;

2. the party alleging violation of his or her rights has been denied access to the remedies under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or

3. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the aforementioned remedies.45

Although the rules of inadmissibility of both courts are slightly different, they both position themselves as courts of second instances and attempt to provide a forum where victims can adjudicate their cases when justice has failed them domestically.

Furthermore, in terms of the subject matter of the cases, Article 33(a) of Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights further limits the type of cases that the Commission may consider by excluding those which are:

[P]ending settlement pursuant to another procedure before an international governmental organization of which the State concerned is a member; or, essentially duplicates a petition pending or already examined and settled by the Commission or by another international governmental organization of which the State concerned is a member.46

However, Article 33 clarifies that the Commission can hear the above-stated cases in two circumstances:

1. [T]he procedure followed before the other organization is limited to a general examination of the human rights situation in the State in question and there has been no decision on the specific facts that are the subject of the petition before the Commission, or it will not lead to an effective settlement; or,

2. the petitioner before the Commission or a family member is the alleged victim of the violation denounced and the petitioner before the other organization is a third party or a nongovernmental entity having no mandate from the former.47

These specific subject matter limitations of the Inter-American system are not present in the Rome Statute. This comment argues that such standard could be a useful tool for the ICC to incorporate in its practice when considering issues of complementarity under Article 17 of the Rome Statute.

D. Criticism of the ICC and Opportunities Ahead

The ICC has received several criticisms, including for its Africa biases and its poor prosecution record for its inability to secure convictions or even prosecute individuals from powerful nations.48 In terms of prosecutions, in the nineteen years since the Court began to sit, the ICC prosecutors have convicted eight defendants and acquitted four defendants.49 Moreover, some cases before the ICC also involved witness intimidation and indictees evasion of capture which essentially dissolved the case.50 Furthermore, the ICC has received criticism for bringing his case to trial without sufficient evidence to prosecute, such was the case of Côte d’Ivoire relating to the former President Laurent Gbagbo.51

When comparing regional human rights institutions with the ICC, it is notable that:

[S]o far, regional institutions have been more effective than international criminal tribunals in combatting mass atrocities and securing criminal accountability for them.52

In particular, the sentences of the Inter-American Court have had an impact “nearly as significant as that of the ICC, ICTY and ICTR combined, despite its relatively modest budget.”53

Such results are particularly impressive when considering that the ICC’s budget is far higher than the other regional institutions.54 In the time period ranging from 2011–2018:

[T]he ICC cost about fifteen times as much as the Inter-American Commission and the African Court, twenty-four times as much as the African Commission, and thirty-three times as much as the Inter-American Court.55

As a result of the arguably inefficiency of the ICC, James L. Cavallaro and Jamie O’Connell recently have made the persuasive argument that the ICC should consider changing its strategy and adopt an approach more like that of regional human rights institutions and courts.56 Some of these aspects may include:

[B]ehind-the-scenes pressure on States and parties to conflict, to highly visible country visits and reports, and from the creation of special investigative bodies to international litigation and broad reparations measures.57

More specifically, the ICC should:

[D]evote less attention and fewer resources to directly investigating and prosecuting cases and more to catalyzing and supporting actions within States—by investigators, prosecutors, judges, executive-branch actors, and civil society—that yield criminal accountability for perpetrators and reduce the chances that mass atrocity will occur.58

They argue that evidence “suggests these local processes tend to have more profound and durable effects, provoke less resistance, and cost less than purely international legal processes.”59

Additionally, it is important to acknowledge the important and relevant knowledge of international criminal law that the Inter-American system has acquired due to its regional political and socio-economic circumstances. The system is no stranger to mass atrocities perpetuated by military regimes and/or civil conflicts, which occurred in several countries across the region, such as Argentina, Peru, Colombia Guatemala, and El Salvador.60 Such experience is demonstrated by the strong and comprehensive Inter-American system jurisprudence relating to atrocity and accountability.61 In particular, it has developed human rights standards relating to “law on forced disappearance amnesties, the victim’s right to the truth, and the right to judicial process.”62 Additionally, the system has also made overall contributions to state’s processes and reforms of accountability.63 Some of these measures include:

[H]igh-profile criminal prosecutions, including in Argentina, Chile, and El Salvador [; …] state-sponsored truth commissions; constitutional and statutory reforms; and legislative initiatives including reparations to victims of mass atrocities in numerous countries.64

As demonstrated, the Inter-American system’s work is very relevant and overlaps with the ICC’s work which makes it worthwhile to explore ways for the systems to support and exchange relevant information with one another.

In addition to learning and partnering with the ICC, the issue could explore the opportunity to consider finding complementarity with the Regional Human Rights systems in certain circumstances. An argument for complementarity between the ICC and Inter-American system is developed below.

E. The Case for Complementarity

The ICC should consider incorporating the duplication of procedures rules, which can be found in Article 33 of Inter-American Commission Rules of Procedure, into its interpretation of Article 17(1)(c) which states that the Court finds that cases are not admissible when “[t]he person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under Article 20, paragraph 3.”65 As previously mentioned, Article 33 of the Inter-American Commission rules of procedures considers that a case is inadmissible when it is either pending settlement before another international governmental organization in which the state to the dispute is a member or it duplicates a petition already examined by the Commission or another international governmental organization unless the procedure in question involves merely a general examination of the human rights situation rather than specific facts.66 The other exception is when “the petitioner before the Commission or a family member is the alleged victim of the violation denounced and the petitioner before the other organization is a third party or a nongovernmental entity having no mandate from the former.”67

Accordingly, this comment suggests that the ICC should not move forward with cases involving the same facts and parties to the dispute, including victims and the State members, that are before the Inter-American system, the Commission or the Court, when they have already decided that human rights violations have occurred, have issued recommendations to State parties and are currently monitoring the state’s compliance. As previously mentioned, the Inter-American Commission and Court spend a lot of time monitoring the situation, engaging with the parties and several relevant stakeholders, and asking states for updates on compliance of their recommendations. Due to all this ground work that can take many years, it is important to give the Inter-American system the opportunity to see the case through at that stage of the case. In such a scenario, this comment suggests that the ICC should take an indirect approach and collaborate with the Inter-American system rather than moving to the investigation and prosecution stages.

There are several reasons to support the argument in favor of complementarity.

1. First, the Inter-American system procedural process provides due process guarantees, plenty of opportunity for parties to engage, and for the evidence to be reviewed. Although bringing up a case before Inter-American system is a long process, it is a process that has proven to be effective, in terms of both results and costs.68

2. Second, albeit indirectly, the regional human rights systems have been more effective in securing accountability for atrocities than the ICC.69

3. Third, similar to the ICC, the Inter-American system has also made a commitment to combat crimes.70

4. Fourth, the Inter-American System shares several of the ICC’s goals such as prevention and accountability for atrocity.71

5. Fifth, this approach can bring several benefits to the ICC. It will clear some of the Court’s docket which will enable it to take the indirect approach, suggested by James L. Cavallaro and Jamie O’Connell, which could potentially permit that staff time and financial resources to be invested into building rapport in the region, including through:

   [M]eetings with national politicians, contributions to training programs for local prosecutors on how to build mass atrocity cases, strategy sessions with local and international NGOs, and TV and radio interviews to explain to journalists and the public how atrocities begin and how they may be averted.72

One of the concerns which can be anticipated in this complementarity system relates to due process. Some might challenge the idea and claim that an indirect prosecution of the defendant by the Inter-American Court, which would essentially entail the Court ordering the State to conduct such proceedings domestically, would be sufficient to fulfill the Article 20 part of Article 17(1)(c) of the Rome Statute because that person was not directly prosecuted by the Court. Additionally, some might argue that the defendant could not be afforded due process guarantees by such indirect prosecution since the defendant did get “standing […] even as its decisions directly affect their rights and freedom.”73 However, it is important to note that even though the Inter-American Court or Commission is not directly prosecuting the defendant, it is monitoring such prosecution and exerting pressure on the state to prosecute the defendant in domestic courts directly. This is arguably what states are expected to do anyways as a forum of first instance. Only if they are “unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution”74 or the state decides not to prosecute, among other requirements, can the case potentially be open for review by the ICC.75 Thus, the Inter-American system essentially provides further due process protections, because of its monitoring and follow-up, than would be available to the defendant in his domestic system.

In terms of the Inter-American Court’s “quasi-criminal review,” Huneeus, an international law expert, highlighted that it was perceived by many as “an illegitimate expansion of the Inter-American Court’s mandate.”76 However, she stated that “after some initial resistance, states have accepted the evolution of the Court’s supervision of compliance with its rulings.”77

In the alternative to interpreting Article 17(1)(c) to enable complementarity with a regional human rights system, this comment suggests that the ICC should hold off on opening an investigation and give the Inter-American system a chance to complete the case before their bodies. Although prosecuting an individual is a very important goal, it is also important to effectuate changes and reforms within the national processes to prevent the same crime. Both the past history of the ICC in terms of their preliminary examination of Colombia, as well as Article 16 of the Rome Statute78 indicate that the drafters of the Rome Statute believed and acknowledged that there are circumstances in which it is important to let local developments play out without direct intervention from the ICC. Although an action before the Inter-American system would also constitute international intervention in a sense, it would be a regional one that specifically works with local actors to ensure legal accountability.

Although this comment argues that in certain cases the ICC should not pursue certain cases that are being handled by the Inter-American system, it does not mean that the ICC should not stay involved if it determines that this is a case of high interest. Despite the international community’s criticisms of the ICC, a threat of prosecution by the ICC still remains a powerful tool to exert pressure on states. The ICC could leave a case in preliminary examination for many years, as it did in Colombia, to influence change from within without having to prosecute the case itself.79 Additionally, the ICC could also issue public statements voicing concerns about a particular situation,80 which would help raise awareness of the situation and put pressure on states. This would make the ICC an incredibly ally to the Inter-American Court, as well as further build a strong rapport with regional human rights institutions.81

As Huneeus pointed out, a partnership with the Inter-American system can be highly beneficial to the ICC in terms of regional legitimacy, exit strategy, and restorative justice, and.82 In terms of regional legitimacy, the Inter-American System has a deeper knowledge of the customs, laws, and legal systems of the region.83 In regards to exit strategy, Huneeus argues that the ICC would likely only prosecute high level officials, but the Inter-American system “could monitor the state, pressure it to take on the remainder of cases, and continue its involvement even after the ICC closed its case, making it easier for the ICC to exit.”84

The ICC can also learn about the concept of restorative justice from the Inter-American system as it has developed, through the years, unique, victim and reconciliation focused remedies from which the ICC can draw.85 Some of these unique remedies includes “ordering states to conduct rituals of remembrance, such as to construct shrines and memorials, and to hold public ceremonies in which states officially apologize to the victims.”86 Additionally, the Inter-American Court “orders remedies that seek rehabilitation of the victims and, more generally, both the construction of a historical record and societal acknowledgement of the crimes.”87 As such, “it has ordered states to enhance victim participation in the criminal proceedings, to continue the search for victims of forced disappearance, to apologize officially to victims and their relatives, and to construct memorials, among other remedies.”88

Lastly, the Inter-American Court has established the concept of transformative reparations, which was announced in the landmark Cotton Field case. The court recognized a context of structural discrimination against women and stated that “the reparations must be designed to change this situation, so that their effect is not only of restitution, but also of rectification.”89

IV. Conclusion

As demonstrated in this comment, the possibilities of collaboration between the Inter-American system are endless. The ICC could benefit from closely evaluating the Inter-American system approach as a second instance forum. It is important for the ICC to consider that courts cannot end impunity, ensure accountability, and prevent mass atrocities from recurring or happening at all on their own. In order to be successful, the Court will need the collaboration of several actors, such as civil society, the state, and the support of the international community. The Inter-American system’s experience has shown how investing in relationships and building capacity on the ground can lead to strong and cost-effective results.

Interpreting the complementarity rules to incorporate regional human rights institutions in certain circumstances could be a new way of collaborating. As such, this comment argued that where the Inter-American system has already adjudicated a case, with the same facts and parties to the dispute, and such case is currently in the monitoring stages, the ICC should find that case inadmissible because complementarity has been satisfied under Article 17(1)(c). Alternatively, in such cases, the ICC should defer a decision on preliminary examinations to give the Inter-American system more time to pressure the state in securing a domestic conviction.

Such approach can be highly beneficial to the Inter-American Court, the victims, and the ICC. The Inter-American Court will benefit since “its orders and supervision would, at times, be backed by the threat of direct prosecution by the ICC.”90 Moreover, the victims would benefit by having the case continue in the system since the Inter-American system process is very victim-centered and the Inter-American Court is known for providing innovative reparations, including transformative reparations, to victims. Lastly, such approach can also be beneficial to the ICC because by deferring some cases to the regional human rights systems, it would free resources that would otherwise be allocated to individual cases or trial costs. Such resources can potentially be invested in building rapport with state members and capacitating domestic institutions.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   See Alexandra V. Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (Jan. 2013), available online, archived, doi; James L. Cavallaro & Jamie O’Connell, When Prosecution is Not Enough: How the International Criminal Court Can Prevent Atrocity and Advance Accountability by Emulating Regional Human Rights Institutions, 45 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2020), available online, archived. ↩

2. 2.

   Huneeus, supra note 1; Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1. ↩

3. 3.

   See Huneeus, supra note 1. ↩

4. 4.

   Id. at 1. ↩

5. 5.

   Id. ↩

6. 6.

   Id. at 2. ↩

7. 7.

   Id. ↩

8. 8.

   Id. ↩

9. 9.

   Id. ↩

10. 10.

    Alexandra V. Huneeus, The Shared Goals but Distinct Roles of Criminal and Human Rights Court, 111 ASIL Proceedings 108, 108–09 (2017), available online, doi. ↩

11. 11.

    See Huneeus, supra note 1, at 2. ↩

12. 12.

    See Merriam Webster, Deus ex Machina, available online (last visited Jul. 2, 2022)

    (defining the term as a character or thing that suddenly enters the story in a novel, play, movie, etc., and solves a problem that had previously seemed impossible to solve). ↩

13. 13.

    Huneeus, supra note 10, at 109. ↩

14. 14.

    Id. ↩

15. 15.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 8. ↩

16. 16.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, as amended [hereinafter Rome Statute], Preamble, available online. ↩

17. 17.

    What is the IACHR?, OAS, available online (last visited Jul. 2, 2022). ↩

18. 18.

    See Huneeus, supra note 1, at 1. ↩

19. 19.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 9–10. ↩

20. 20.

    Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, OAS, Article 23 (Dec. 2000, as amended Oct. 2002) [hereinafter IACHR Rules of Procedure], available online. ↩

21. 21.

    Id. Art. 37. ↩

22. 22.

    Id. Art. 38(2). ↩

23. 23.

    Id. Art. 41(4). ↩

24. 24.

    Id. Art. 41(5). ↩

25. 25.

    Id. Art. 41(6). ↩

26. 26.

    Id. Art. 43. ↩

27. 27.

    Id. ↩

28. 28.

    Id. Art. 44. ↩

29. 29.

    Id. ↩

30. 30.

    Id. Art. 45. ↩

31. 31.

    Id. ↩

32. 32.

    Rome Statute, supra note 16, at Arts. 12, 13, 14. ↩

33. 33.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 11. ↩

34. 34.

    Id. at 12. ↩

35. 35.

    Id. ↩

36. 36.

    Rome Statute, supra note 16, at Art. 16. ↩

37. 37.

    Id. ↩

38. 38.

    Id. Art. 1. ↩

39. 39.

    Id. Art. 5. ↩

40. 40.

    Id. Art. 12. ↩

41. 41.

    Id. Art. 13. ↩

42. 42.

    IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 20, at Art. 27. ↩

43. 43.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 9. ↩

44. 44.

    Rome Statute, supra note 16, Art. 17. ↩

45. 45.

    IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 20, at Art. 31. ↩

46. 46.

    Id. Art. 33(1). ↩

47. 47.

    Id. Art. 33(2). ↩

48. 48.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 3–4. ↩

49. 49.

    See State of Defendants, ICC, available online (last visited Jul. 2, 2022).

    (Under “State of Defendant”, check either “Convicted” or “Acquitted” and wait for page to refresh). ↩

50. 50.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 58. ↩

51. 51.

    Id. at 61. ↩

52. 52.

    Id. at 7. ↩

53. 53.

    Id. at 46. ↩

54. 54.

    Id. at 59. ↩

55. 55.

    Id. ↩

56. 56.

    Id. at 6. ↩

57. 57.

    Id. at 4. ↩

58. 58.

    Id. at 7. ↩

59. 59.

    Id. at 6. ↩

60. 60.

    Id. at 44–45. ↩

61. 61.

    Id. at 45. ↩

62. 62.

    Huneeus, supra note 1, at 7. ↩

63. 63.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 45. ↩

64. 64.

    Id. ↩

65. 65.

    Rome Statute, supra note 16, at Art. 17(1)(c). ↩

66. 66.

    IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 20, at Art. 33. ↩

67. 67.

    Id. Art. 33(2). ↩

68. 68.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 6. ↩

69. 69.

    Id. at 7. ↩

70. 70.

    Huneeus, supra note 1, at 1. ↩

71. 71.

    Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 9–10. ↩

72. 72.

    See Id. at 64. ↩

73. 73.

    Huneeus, supra note 1, at 14. ↩

74. 74.

    Rome Statute, supra note 16, at Art. 17. ↩

75. 75.

    Id. ↩

76. 76.

    Huneeus, supra note 1, at 12. ↩

77. 77.

    Id. ↩

78. 78.

    See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at Art. 16. ↩

79. 79.

    See Cavallaro & O’Connell, supra note 1, at 12. ↩

80. 80.

    Id. at 24. ↩

81. 81.

    IACHR Rules of Procedure, supra note 20, at Art. 33. ↩

82. 82.

    Huneeus, supra note 1, at 43. ↩

83. 83.

    Id. at 42. ↩

84. 84.

    Id. at 43. ↩

85. 85.

    Id. ↩

86. 86.

    Id. at 23. ↩

87. 87.

    Id. ↩

88. 88.

    Id. ↩

89. 89.

    See González et. al. v. Mexico (“Cotton Field”), Judgment: Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs ¶ 450 (IACHR, Nov. 16, 2009), available online. ↩

90. 90.

    Huneeus, supra note 1, at 23. ↩