The ICC is a court of last resort for genocide prosecutions, with primary jurisdiction given to states unless they are unwilling or unable to prosecute. Furthermore, the evidential and substantive barriers to a genocide conviction have resulted in declination of genocide prosecutions. The Prosecutor in 2006 found that in regards to the Situation in Darfur, Sudan, there are “reasonable grounds to believe that the individuals identified have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes,” but that there was insufficient grounds for genocide due to the lack of genocidal policy.3 In 2009, although the Prosecutor filed a charge of genocide against Sudan President Omar al-Bashir, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber initially rejected the charge on evidentiary grounds before an arrest warrant was later issued.4

Of the thirty-one cases before the ICC since its inception, none but the al-Bashir case have included a charge of genocide, despite numerous counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity laid against individual perpetrators. This evidences the high threshold required to overcome the prescriptive barrier in the language of the charge; that is, the requirement for intent to destroy. Due to the lack of precedent created by the ICC, the Court will have to look to the persuasive, but non-binding, jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR in interpreting and practically applying the elements of the crime.

The contentious material elements of genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute, in relation to the intention requirement, are that the perpetrator intended to destroy wholly or partially the protected group, and that the unlawful conduct “took place in the context of a manifest pattern of similar conduct directed against that group or was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”5 This specific mental element must therefore coincide with an evidentiary burden demonstrating a widespread, systematic, or general campaign of destruction from which specific genocidal intent can be inferred, in the absence of direct evidence from statements or policy instructions.6

The ICTR has relied on a reasonable inference approach to finding intent, drawing from the duration, intensity, and effect of unlawful conduct meeting the physical acts (for example, targeted killings, causing serious harm, or forceable transfer of children).7 The Tribunal held in Karemera et al. that the “scale of the assaults and the brutal and systematic manner” created the only reasonable inference that the perpetrators possessed the requisite specific intent, attributing it to the military commanders.8 This methodology was affirmed in Muvunyi, in which the Tribunal found that “in the absence of direct evidence, a perpetrator’s genocidal intent may be inferred from relevant facts and circumstances […] provided that it is the only reasonable inference.”9

Although attributing specific intent based on inference from factual circumstances, the “only reasonable inference” threshold is a high one, similarly applied by the ICTY.10 However, the ICTY in Blagojević considered that awareness of the destruction of the protected group did not amount to the requisite intention; the destruction must be the “aim of the underlying crime,” thereby distinguishing specific intent from traditional intent analysis for the purpose of attributing mens rea.11

One of the more exhaustive formulations of the kind of pattern of conduct creating the reasonable inference of genocidal intent comes from the ICTR in Gacumbitsi. The Tribunal considered holistically “deeds, utterances, and general context” giving rise to the necessary inference, with the latter being inferred from the scale of atrocities, and the systematic direction of acts against victims deliberately targeted on account of their membership whilst excluding members of other groups.12

The Tribunal did not consider a numeric threshold of victim harm as necessary to establish the existence of genocidal intent—only the intent itself to, at least in part, physically destroy the group—notwithstanding the scale of atrocities being a relevant factor.13 In relation to the nature of acts leading to a reasonable inference, the Tribunal reaffirmed precedent to sum a list of relevant factors creating possible grounds for genocidal intent:

the physical targeting of the group or their property; the use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted group; the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury; the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of killing.14

In doing so, the Tribunal found grounds for a genocide conviction, and furthermore held that the specific intent in the actus reus of the crime “is in itself” evidence establishing the mens rea element of intent to perpetrate those acts.15 However, the Tribunal in Sikirica, whilst upholding this reasoning, noted the “need to distinguish between the individual intent of the accused and the intent involved in the conception and commission of the crime.”16 As such, for specific genocidal intent to be inferred and attributed to an individual perpetrator, such as a Head of State, there must be a criminal enterprise aimed at the objective of destroying a protected group. The aim must be reasonably inferred from the factual circumstances of the act themselves, and attributable to both the executors of the acts and the perpetrator alleged to be responsible.

III. Evidence of Alleged Acts of Genocide Perpetrated by Israel

The physical grounds for genocide alleged in the claim filed against Israel focus predominantly on the alleged targeted killings and serious harm perpetrated against Palestinian civilians in Gaza. Although focussing on the physical elements of the actus reus first, it must necessarily follow that the perpetration of those acts be committed against Palestinian civilians in an attempt to, at least in part, specifically destroy Palestinians as an ethnical group.17 The claim seeks to establish three of the culpable acts giving rise to genocide under Article 6 of the Rome Statute: targeted killings, infliction of serious harm, and infliction of conditions calculated to bring about physical destruction.

A. Targeted Killings and Infliction of Serious Harm

Whilst the ICTR did not require a quantitative threshold of civilian killings to give rise to culpability, the extent of harm goes to the scale consideration outlined by the Tribunal in Gacumbitsi and to whether the killings may properly be viewed as systematic, pattern-forming, and deliberate. As such, although the extent of harm does not itself form a material physical part of the actus reus of genocide, it is a relevant consideration for the factual circumstances necessary to reasonably infer destructive intent. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports over 18,000 Palestinian casualties in Gaza, along with over 49,000 injuries and destruction of critical infrastructure, including 18 hospitals.18 These figures are consistent with international media estimations, although have not been independently verified.19

A number of these fatalities include civilians and children, and a number of protected properties destroyed include hospitals and civilian infrastructure. The Palestinian Ministry of Health alleges that approximately 8,000 children have been killed, with the vast majority of deaths and injuries being protected civilians and not Hamas combatants.20 The verification of these figures—likely impossible whilst the Israel–Hamas conflict is active—will become an important investigative duty for the Prosecutor if (and only if) he accepts the grounds for a genocide charge.

It is arguable that the civilian death and destruction to civilian infrastructure form part of the incidental consequences of a lawful military operation against Hamas, in de facto control of Gaza and allegedly disguising itself amongst the civilian population. In support of this theory, Israel may point to the unlawful attack perpetrated by Hamas on October 7, 2023. The attack intentionally targeted civilians in a densely-populated area, resulting in significant loss of life and kidnapping of hostages, in grave violation of international humanitarian law. This particular attack, one of many perpetrated by Hamas combatants, involved not only bombardment (a means of attack that cannot adequately distinguish military from civilian targets in urban areas, violating the principle of distinction and proportionality), but targeted killing, kidnapping, and perpetration of sexual crimes intentionally and directly committed by Hamas combatants. Although acts of reprisal for an unlawful attack can never be taken against civilian populations under Article 51(6) of Additional Protocol I, it is certainly a relevant consideration in Israel’s military policy against Hamas control centers in Gaza.

However, the indiscriminate and disproportionate infliction of harm to civilians in a military operation is a violation of established laws and customs of international law, and a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute. Article 51 of Protocol Additional I to the Geneva Conventions provides for the prohibition on indiscriminate attacks, which it defines as those that, inter alia, are not directed at a specific military objective, employ a means of combat that cannot be directed at such an object, or employ a method of combat that cannot limit the effect of the attack to military objectives as required.21 As well as specifically outlining that attacks that may be expected to cause incidental harm in excess of the advantage conferred are prohibited, Article 51 also prohibits bombardment that treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects.22

As such, the attack perpetrated by Hamas is almost certainly a violation of international humanitarian law. So too are rocket attacks that do not, or cannot, distinguish between military and civilian objects in densely population areas. Furthermore, to the extent that attacks on the Gaza Strip are taken in retaliation to those attacks, attacks against civilian populations by way of reprisal are prohibited under the Geneva Conventions.23 Where evidence is presented that incidental death and destruction to the civilian population outweighs any apparent military objective, which is likely difficult to establish in the case of bombardment of a concentrated civilian area alleged to contain some relatively under-resourced Hamas combatants proportionate to the civilian population, Israel must show that such a military objective was legitimate and proportionate. Under Article 57(1) of Additional Protocol I, the burden of proof would be on Israel to demonstrate that constant care was adequately taken.

Significant verified evidence demonstrates Israeli forces’ reckless disregard and intentional targeting of protected persons,24 the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross have reported attacks on protected personnel,25 and indiscriminate carpet-bombing has destroyed civilian housing, religious buildings, hospitals, and U.N. safe zones.26 The estimated scale of civilian harm, likely amounting to crimes against humanity and violations of peremptory norms of international humanitarian law notwithstanding the genocide allegation, prima facie gives rise to culpability for the physical component of the actus reus.

B. Infliction of Conditions Likely to Bring About Physical Destruction

The claim against Israel argues that Israel’s military policy in isolating Gaza amounts to the infliction of conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the Palestinian people. This claim seeks to use the blockage of food, water, electricity, fuel, and humanitarian aid, as well as the establishment of physical barriers leading to and from Gaza, as grounds for the physical component (independent of the specific intention element) of the actus reus under Article 6(c). It is necessary to determine whether these grounds are prima facie met, as well as whether the scope of “infliction” includes both direct acts (i.e., destroying aid supplies) and indirect acts or omissions (i.e., not permitting aid to travel through Israeli-controlled routes), with the latter implying a duty of responsibility from Israel to the Palestinian citizenship during conflict.

Much of the law on destructive conditions of life stems from the prosecution of crimes related to concentration camps, where physical detention and an active system of oppression inflicts such conditions on a group of persons directly.27 This scenario is distinguished from the Situation in Palestine, where although the population in Gaza is subject to attack and isolation, the Palestinians are not held under the direct control of Israeli forces. However, case law from the ICTY and ICTR has found that “the creation of circumstances” leading to death over time meets the requisite threshold.28 It is arguable, therefore, that indirect acts and omissions, within the context of a sustained pattern of systematic conduct, result in the broad creation of circumstances that inevitably lead to death.

The ICTY in Stakic considered that acts fulfilling these criteria include “subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and denial of the right to medical services,” along with creating circumstances where a lack of housing, clothing, and hygiene would lead to death.29 This reasoning was affirmed by the ICTR in both Rutaganda and Akayesu, which in citing the criteria established by the ICTY, set the “minimum standard” as an objective quantification of the circumstances of life.30 Under this minimum requirement, the conditions of life are prima facie considered unlawful due to the inevitability of physical destruction.31

This is consistent with the elements of the crime of genocide, which provide that “the deliberate deprivation of resources essential to survival” satisfies the physical element of Article 6(c). However, there is a “calculation” element to the actus reus that must be read alongside the specific intention requirement of the broader crime of genocide. As such, to be culpable, Netanyahu must be held responsible for the intentional infliction of circumstances that are both calculated to bring about physical destruction and perpetrated with the aim of destruction.

Notwithstanding the mental element that will be considered separately due to its underlying policy nature, it is at least arguable at the pre-trial stage that Israeli forces have created circumstances in which minimum standards of life have been deprived. The World Health Organization has recognised by special resolution the deprivation of humanitarian relief, impediment of medical personnel, and attacks on protected health workers in violation of international humanitarian law.32 The Israeli Defence Minister has stated that “no electricity, no food, no water, and no fuel” will be accessible to Gaza, imposing a “complete siege” and creating circumstances in which minimum standards are deprived.33 Due to the attribution of the order to the Israeli Government, it is likely that this statement meets the necessary policy intent and calculation requirements under Article 6(c).

Whilst Israel may invoke the right to self-defence and point to Hamas’ control of the area as grounds for the policy—given that there is no requirement to provide assistance to the civilian population of the opposing party during armed conflict—the disproportionate implications of the isolation are certainly enough to bring about death over time. The United Nations has reported that Israel’s active policy of bombardment in civilian-populated areas, including hospitals, shelters, and United Nations refuges, is directly causing circumstances in which critical resources are inaccessible.34 Furthermore, the United Nations has reported 1.5 million civilians displaced due to targeted or incidental aerial strikes on housing and shelters, which the ICTY and ICTR considered relevant factors in assessing conditions of life, leading to overcrowding and a disease risk.35 Although Israel’s omission of supplying resources to Gaza likely would not be a persuasive consideration as to whether Israel sought to deprive civilians’ minimum standards of life, Israel’s military policy that circumstances of deprivation and displacement may (at least for the purpose of investigating the claim filed).

IV. Evidence of Specific Genocidal Intent

As aforementioned, the physical elements of the actus reus must be accompanied by specific genocidal intent; i.e., the intention underlying the culpable acts must be the partial or total destruction of the Palestinian people. This concept of specific intent forms part of the act of genocide itself, after which the mens rea must be established for criminal liability, although the existence of specific genocidal intent accompanying the acts perpetrated necessarily implies intent to perpetrate those acts themselves.36 If applying the previous reasoning from the ICTY and ICTR, that specific intent must be discernible from official policy or statements in the first instance, after which the ICC will determine whether it is possible to infer it from a systematic pattern of conduct.

A. Direct Evidence of Specific Genocidal Intent

Express policy statements regarding the extent of destruction aimed at the Palestinian people themselves, by virtue of their status as Palestinian, are limited. Direct evidence in the form of rhetoric may be broadly conceptualized as utterances or policy documents that demonstrate genocidal motivation to destroy a group, including through dehumanizing language,37 discriminatory anger or disgust,38 and an intent to spare no quarter (particularly against civilians and children).39 Derogatory rhetoric is not determinative nor decisive in attributing genocidal motivation, but is a relevant to it.40

The most relevant example of direct evidence of genocidal motivation comes from Israel’s Defence Minister in ordering a “complete siege” of Gaza: “We are fighting against human animals.”41 Such descriptive language of the “other” is certainly dehumanizing and derogatory. However, it is tenuous as to, firstly, whether it is specifically attributable to the Palestinian people as an ethnic group and not Hamas as an organization; and, secondly, whether it may be legitimately attributed to Israel and Netanyahu. However, the latter could be applied through command responsibility in failing to exercise control with awareness of culpable acts, as was the case with the ICC’s arrest warrant for Putin.42

The reference to a “complete siege” is not unlawful itself, unless demonstrative of a policy of no quarter in ordering the execution or disproportionate collateral harm to non-combatants. Whilst such a pattern of conduct may be inferred from the destruction of civilian areas, protected buildings, and civilian life, there is limited evidence that this was the specific intent of the Israeli forces. The International Federation for Human Rights has asserted that Israel’s military command has demonstrated the specific genocidal intent element through public statements, including the aforementioned dehumanizing rhetoric, as well as intent to “turn Gaza into a desert island” and focus on “damage not accuracy.”43

Such statements, if applied to the population in Gaza as a whole and not isolated to legitimate Hamas-occupied areas (which is practically inferable from the pattern of conduct following the Hamas attack on Israel), certainly imply violations of the principles of non-indiscriminate attacks and proportionality customary in international humanitarian law. However, given the high threshold required for a determination of genocide underlying other war crimes or crimes against humanity, it is arguable that Israel’s policy declarations do not themselves amount to direct evidence supporting specific genocidal intent, but are rather relevant factors in a broader consideration of the systematic pattern of conduct, per the Popović judgment.44

B. Indirect Evidence from Which Specific Genocidal Intent is the Only Reasonable Inference

The previously discussed case law from the ad hoc tribunals demonstrate the high burden of proof required by the Court to infer specific genocidal intent from factual circumstances. In particular, the precedent thus far requires that the pattern of conduct leads to specific genocidal intent as “the only reasonable inference.” However, non-determinative but relevant statements, such as those attributable to Israel’s Ministry of Defence, will undoubtedly form part of the broader determination of specific genocidal intent.

Furthermore, it is within the ICC’s power to attribute specific intent to Netanyahu through the chain of command. The ICTR considered ministerial position and power to exert political influence as appropriate factors for a determination of responsibility.45 Furthermore, the ICTY confirmed in Krstic that: “The inference that a particular atrocity was motivated by genocidal intent may be drawn even where the individuals to whom the intent is attributable are not precisely identified.”46 In doing so, the ICTY inferred genocidal intent on the part of the perpetrator through command responsibility, despite any record of statements indicating that the killing of Bosnian Muslim men in Srebrenica was motivated by specific genocidal intent. The Krstic judgment is specifically relied on by Devers as precedent supporting the claim of genocide filed at the ICC.47

The ICTY has affirmed that if the culpable acts forming the physical elements of the actus reus of genocide are satisfied, and “the evidence supports the inference that the crime was motivated by the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group, a finding that genocide has occurred may be entered.”48 This particular ratio must also be read against the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals that such an inference must be “the only reasonable” one that may be drawn from the circumstances.

It is demonstrable fact that a pattern of conduct—carpet bombing, airstrikes on civilian centers, destruction of hospitals, killing of medical and humanitarian personnel, attacks on critical infrastructure, and policy of isolation from essential resources—cumulatively satisfy the physical elements of genocide in the first instance. Verified evidence, either from United Nations personnel or direct photography, provides multiple accounts of Palestinian civilians and children targeted by virtue of their ethnic status as Palestinian.49 Taken as a whole, and contextualized in light of its disproportionality vis-à-vis the threat posed by Hamas and the non-discrimination between identified Hamas targets and civilians, the systematic pattern of conduct is actively and directly destroying the Palestinian people by virtue of their status as ethnically Palestinian. The assertion is supported by United Nations special experts, who have indicated that the physical components of Israel’s “complete siege” are indicative of those of genocide.50

The inference of specific genocidal intent from the statements and pattern of conduct attributable to Israel is the most contentious issue of the claim. The aforementioned pattern of violent conduct, the systematic and deliberate nature of the culpable acts, and albeit limited instances of dehumanizing rhetoric and expression of a “no quarter” policy must, considered as a whole, imply specific genocidal intent as “the only reasonable inference.” However, such an inference is complicated by the fact of Hamas’ attack on Israel on October 7 and the alleged use by Hamas of civilian centers and infrastructure as military objects. Whether Israel’s proposed claim of self-defence or pursuit of lawful military objectives in the armed conflict has merit under the rules of international humanitarian law, the reasonable belief that it does may negate a finding of specific genocidal intent. That is, even the unlawful position that Israel is lawfully acting in self-defence or against a lawful military target may not imply genocidal intent, if such held belief is what motivates Israel’s policy.

However, the sustained attacks on Gaza following the October 7 terror attacks against Israel ought to also be read as part of the ongoing history in the region. A disproportionate balance of both soft and hard power, economic and social conditions, and access to military resources is a relevant consideration in assessing the objective reasonableness of Israel’s systematic military conduct. This is particularly the case in light of the objective disproportionality of civilian death and destruction of both protected and critical infrastructure necessary for minimum standards of life. Moreover, the above legal conceptualization is underscored by the social, ethnical, and religious tension behind the crisis and the description of Israel’s policy towards the people of Gaza expressed by the Ministry of Defence.

V. Conclusion

The success of the genocide claim filed by Lawyers for Gaza will turn on whether the ICC can find and hold specific genocidal intent as the only reasonable inference from the pattern of conduct perpetrated by Israel against the Palestinian people. It is important to note that such a determination does not detract from the alleged crimes of war and against humanity that Israel has cause to argue (although jurisdictionally not as a State Party to the ICC). Furthermore, the progression of the claim filed to its determination at pre-trial stage does not indicate the culpability or responsibility of Netanyahu, but rather the prima facie grounds supporting the charge.

It is likely, or at least strongly arguable, that multiple counts of the physical elements of genocide are satisfied. The magnitude, severity, and systematic repetition of civilian killings, destruction of protected objects, and the creation of circumstances in which minimum essential standards of life are materially causing the partial destruction of the Palestinian people (evident in the verified figures on death and displacement). Such acts are committed unlawfully, and strongly presumed to be committed with knowledge of their effects and intent to commit them.

Whether specific genocidal intent may be attributed to Prime Minister Netanyahu will be determined by the Court, no doubt under significant political and social pressure. The Court may seek to set strong precedent against evidence of genocidal motivation in military policy, or may hold the standard of genocide determinations more strictly than the precedent set by the ad hoc tribunals. However, for the purpose of hearing and investigating the claim filed before the Hague by Devers, there is reasonable grounds to infer that Israel’s systematic and manifest pattern of conduct directed at the Palestinian people is intended to cause—at least in part—their destruction, and calculated to bring about that end.

Whether the charge is accepted, let alone a prosecution successfully instigated, remains to be seen; but the crisis in occupied Palestine merits the strong consideration by the Prosecutor that the threshold for genocide has, unfortunately, been met.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   Lawyers for Gaza Victims File Case at International Criminal Court, Al Jazeera, Nov. 15, 2023, [hereinafter Lawyers for Gaza Victims], available online. ↩

2. 2.

   Rome Statute, Art. 6. ↩

3. 3.

   Luis Moreno Ocampo, ICC Prosecutor, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593, ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 2006), available online, archived. ↩

4. 4.

   Al Bashir Case, ICC, available online (last visited Jan. 7, 2024). ↩

5. 5.

   International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, ICC-ASP/1/3, Adopted and Entry into Force 9 September 2002, updated at Kampala, 31 May–11 June 2010 (Jun. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes], available online, archived. ↩

6. 6.

   Id. ↩

7. 7.

   The Prosecutor v. Édouard Karemera, Matthieu Ngirumpatse, ICTR-98-44-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 1635 (ICTR TC III, Feb. 2, 2012), available online. ↩

8. 8.

   Id. ¶ 1642. ↩

9. 9.

   Prosecutor v. Tharcisse Muvunyi, ICTR-00-55-A-T, Judgement, ¶ 29 (ICTR TC III, Feb. 11, 2010), available online. ↩

10. 10.

    Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, Judgement, ¶ 970 (ICTY TC III, Sep. 1, 2004), available online. ↩

11. 11.

    Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojević and Dragan Jokić, IT-02-60-T, Judgement (ICTY TC I, Jan. 17, 2005), available online. ↩

12. 12.

    Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Gacumbitsi, ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgement, ¶ 252 (ICTR TC III, Jun. 17, 2004), available online. ↩

13. 13.

    Id. ¶ 253. ↩

14. 14.

    Id. ↩

15. 15.

    Id. ¶ 287. ↩

16. 16.

    Prosecutor v. Duško Sikirica, Damir Došen, and Dragan Kolundžija, IT-95-8-T, Judgement on Defence Motions to Acquit, ¶ 549 (ICTY TC III, Sep. 3, 2001), available online. ↩

17. 17.

    Rome Statute, supra note 2, at Art. 6. ↩

18. 18.

    Press Release, OCHA, Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel—Reported Impact Day 66 (Dec. 11, 2023), available online (last visited Jan. 6, 2024). ↩

19. 19.

    Press Release, OCHA, Data on Casualties, available online (last visited Jan. 6, 2024). ↩

20. 20.

    Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Gaza’s Death Toll Tops 10,000; UN Calls it a Children’s Graveyard, Reuters (Nov. 6, 2023), available online. ↩

21. 21.

    Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jun. 8, 1977) [hereinafter Additional Protocol I], available online, archived. ↩

22. 22.

    Id. ↩

23. 23.

    Id. ↩

24. 24.

    Mohammed Hussein & Mohammed Haddad, Know Their Names, Al Jazeera (Dec. 12, 2023), available online. ↩

25. 25.

    Al-Mughrabi, supra note 20. ↩

26. 26.

    Michelle Nichols, UN Chief Says Gaza Becoming a “Graveyard for Children”, Reuters, Nov. 6, 2023, available online. ↩

27. 27.

    Prosecutor v. Brđanin, supra note 10, ¶ 691. ↩

28. 28.

    Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakić, IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 517 (ICTY TC II, Jul. 31, 2003), available online. ↩

29. 29.

    Id. ↩

30. 30.

    Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 52 (ICTR TC I, Dec. 6, 1999), available online. ↩

31. 31.

    Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶ 506 (ICTR TC I, Sep. 2, 1998), available online. ↩

32. 32.

    World Health Organization & Health Cluster, Public Health Situation Analysis: Hostilities in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nov. 5, 2023) [hereinafter Public Health Situation Analysis], available online. ↩

33. 33.

    Israeli Defence Minister Orders “Complete Siege” on Gaza, Al Jazeera, Oct. 9, 2023, [hereinafter Complete Siege], video. ↩

34. 34.

    Public Health Situation Analysis, supra note 32. ↩

35. 35.

    Id. ↩

36. 36.

    Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, supra note 12, ¶ 287. ↩

37. 37.

    Prosecutor v. Mikaeli Muhimana, ICTR-95-1B-T, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 496 (ICTR TC III, Apr. 28, 2005), available online. ↩

38. 38.

    Ildéphonse Nizeyimana v. The Prosecutor, ICTR-00-55C-A, Judgement, ¶ 122 (ICTR AC, Sep. 29, 2014), available online. ↩

39. 39.

    Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara, Drago Nikolić, Radivoje Miletić, Vinko Pandurević, IT-05-88-A, Judgement (ICTY AC, Jan. 20, 2015), available online, archived. ↩

40. 40.

    Id. ¶ 470. ↩

41. 41.

    Complete Siege, supra note 33. ↩

42. 42.

    Press Release, ICC, Situation in Ukraine: ICC Judges Issue Arrest Warrants Against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekeyevna Lvova-Belova (Mar. 17, 2023), available online. ↩

43. 43.

    Fédération Internationale des Droits de l’Homme, Resolution on Israel’s Unfolding Crime of Genocide and Other Crimes in Gaza and Against the Palestinian People (Nov. 2023), available online, archived. ↩

44. 44.

    Prosecutor v. Popović et al., supra note 39, ¶ 470. ↩

45. 45.

    Prosecutor v. Callixte Nzabonimana, ICTR-98-44D, Judgement and Sentence, ¶ 92 (ICTR TC III, May 31, 2012), available online. ↩

46. 46.

    Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstić, IT-98-33-A, Judgement, ¶ 34 (ICTY AC, Apr. 19, 2004), available online. ↩

47. 47.

    Lawyers for Gaza Victims, supra note 1. ↩

48. 48.

    Prosecutor v. Krstić, supra note 46, ¶ 34. ↩

49. 49.

    Hussein & Haddad, supra note 24. ↩

50. 50.

    Press Release, UNISPAL, Gaza: UN Experts Decry Bombing of Hospitals and Schools as Crimes Against Humanity, Call for Prevention of Genocide (Oct. 19, 2023), available online. ↩