Comment on the Oversight Question: “This debate addresses a constitutional issue: What is the proper balance between the independence of the International Criminal Court (the “Court”) and the oversight role of the Assembly of States Parties (the “Assembly”) regarding the Court’s administration under Article 112 of the Rome Statute?”
Alma Pekmezovic:The ICC Prosecutor has recently submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to authorize an investigation into crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire. The post-election violence in the Ivorian territory led to serious crimes including murder of civilians, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary detentions and the use of child soldiers.
The decision of the ICC Prosecutor to act on his initiative and ask the Pre-Trial Chamber for permission to investigate the human rights violations in...(more)
BBM:It is essential that the ICC maintain its independence, actual and perceived. The role of ASP having oversight over the Court to facilitate efficiency and economy is a poor idea, although pursuant to Art. 112 (4).
The dangers as I see it, are lack of independence, and the ICC taking on a role similar to the ICJ with respect to its advisory opinions. As we know the ICJ finds itself in a catch 22 situation with requests for advisory opinions put forward by the UNGA. In this case the ICJ...(more)
Operational Mandate’s proposed oversight mechanism is a constitutional restriction of prosecutorial independence.
Article 112(4) of the
grants the Assembly of States Parties (“Assembly”) the discretion to “establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and...(more)
may not be needed for financial supervision or administrative management of the ICC, but it would be significantly beneficial to the Court for oversight of misconduct and making recommendations to the ASP.
The general concept of judicial or prosecutorial independence is often cited as a justification to minimize the need for oversight of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “...(more)
The Independent Oversight Mechanism will consume the resources of the International Criminal Court and will adversely affect the court’s ability to perform its functions effectively.
The Independent Oversight Mechanism as envisaged by the
could potentially serve an important function in enhancing the International Criminal Court’s efficiency and economy. However, the mechanism...(more)
The creation of the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM) presents a new set of challenges and opportunities for the International Criminal Court (ICC). In order to capitalize on the benefits that the
may be able to provide, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) must ensure that it is built upon a solid foundation: a properly tailored mandate. The
provision that allowed the
During the Ninth Session of the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), the Independent Oversight Mechanism (“IOM”) became operationalized in its investigative function. However, the
IOM, as it is currently structured, would be redundant in light of existing institutional checks in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).
IOM’s functions are...(more)
There are two dominant theories that inform the current debate. The first theory focuses on agency costs, while the second makes the concept of trusteeship the focal point of the analysis. In this essay, I will argue that the agency framework is not appropriate in the context of the
The Trusteeship Model
Under the trusteeship model, trustees are actors who are given authority to make meaningful...(more)