II. Legitimacy of the Court

Current ICC outreach efforts threaten the Court’s longevity and legitimacy. Legitimacy is central to the Court’s efficacy.

If the ICC is to prosper, it must build its legitimacy among relevant audiences—states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), affected communities, and the global community.... I use the term herein to refer to the perception among relevant audiences that the ICC’s actions are worthy of respect.... Indeed, the globalization of communications increasingly means that an institution’s legitimacy depends on the opinions of ordinary citizens around the world.3

Outreach delegitimizes the ICC because it threatens the view of the Court as neutral and non-political, it sets up incomplete systems across nations, and creates unsustainable expectations that do not demand national-level leadership.

Court leaders often tout the neutral, non-political role of the ICC in promoting international justice. But outreach can easily be seen as promoting or favoring one group over another, which undermines the view of an impartial, fact-seeking court. Outreach across diverse nations and States Parties requires international diplomacy and engagement in extensive political relations. Effective outreach requires a high degree of political glad-handing, networking, and convincing governments and societies to support the Court, which is not the fundamental role of the ICC or any court of justice.

The countries where outreach is most needed often have the most complicated political situations, lacking infrastructure and facing rampant violence or war. Outreach to these areas becomes even more sensitive, requiring the Court to engage in complicated economic and political negotiations, which is counter to its Rome Statute mandate. These actions ultimately undermine the necessary view of the Court as a legitimate and non-western imperialist entity.

For an organization to be legitimate in the sociological sense employed herein, it must be ‘identified with purposes and goals that are consistent with the broader norms and values of its society.’…The ICC currently suffers from low purposive legitimacy—it lacks both a defined community to which it is responsible, and accepted values or goals associated with its work. The ICC’s deficiencies in these regards distinguish it from national courts…4

Continued or increased reliance on the Court for outreach means that States Parties are not forced to take active roles in outreach, creating impractical and unsustainable precedents which damage the Court’s reputation. When the ICC primarily performs outreach, nations and local groups are not forced to carry the responsibility of helping their citizens understand the Court’s role. Instead, a reliance and expectation may develop that this function belongs to the ICC alone, regardless of whether the Court can realistically sustain the outreach given its current resources. By focusing on and requiring successful outreach, which is impossible to comprehensively undertake everywhere needed, the goal of ending impunity for war criminals becomes intrinsically and unfortunately tied to the success of the outreach. Thus the Court’s responsibility for outreach sets up the institution for failure, delegitimizing the Court.

If the ICC is the leader of outreach, inappropriate and unrealistic expectations are also set in countries where the Court serves as a model for future national judicial institutions. In many situation countries where outreach is performed there is a lack of any cohesive court system. The ICC is the very first Court that a society encounters and may serve as a model for future efforts toward complementarity. ICC outreach sets a disconcerting precedent and unrealistic expectations in countries where the Court serves as a model for future national institutions. ICC outreach leaves critical holes in efforts to legitimize the Court. No matter how much outreach the Court attempts, there are always gaps in information that threaten to delegitimize the Court. For places under initial investigation, such as Colombia or Côte d’Ivoire, the Court does not even have the ability to engage in active outreach.

The communication gap left by the Court is filled by others with their own interests, manipulating the name of the Court, very often with clear political purposes. Besides problems of credibility, it is also a concern that absence of official information has led to unrealistic expectations, ending finally in disappointment amongst those for whom the International Criminal Court represented hope.5

Outreach corrupts the ICC’s mission and message. The Preamble of the Rome Statute states that:

[T]he most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation6

Spending significant and ever-expanding time on outreach and teaching basic jurisprudence to rural populations undercuts the ICC’s international justice focus of ending impunity for war criminals. Outreach is notably both time and resource-heavy. It requires adequate funding and staff support, as well as extensive planning and implementation to address the diverse needs across nations.7

The ICC was “established to help end impunity for the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”8 The Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”) and signatories to the Rome Statute did not express an intention that the ICC be responsible for educating millions of people in diverse communities about the foundations of international criminal law. Indeed the Rome Statute contains no provision expressing an outreach role for the Court.9 As the Court prosecutes the most serious crimes against humanity, where local systems of justice cannot or will not prosecute perpetrators, its legitimacy hinges on fulfilling the mandate from the ASP, and not engaging in a global outreach fight. With only two current prosecutions and vast challenges in prosecution, perhaps the Court is better served by focusing resources on its current trials.10

Finally, the media also shapes any outreach of the ICC, so efforts may not even remain impactful. In large part, no matter how many communities understand the Court’s goals, the media will play a significant role in the world’s view of the Court, its efficacy, and thus its future. The media’s role is so pervasive in the way that the Court is viewed, that whatever attempted outreach, local and international media will determine how it is perceived, undercutting the ICC’s efforts.11 In many countries, there are even extensive misinformation campaigns in the face of outreach and even the politicization of the Court’s message. Effective prosecution, not broader outreach, would be most effectual in combatting these media issues.12 Indeed, some scholars argue that “[d]espite this increased focus on raising public awareness about transitional justice mechanisms, understanding of the role, impact and effectiveness of various outreach strategies remains limited.”13

III. Outreach Amongst the Court’s Organs

There is no appropriate ICC organ to undertake massive outreach efforts. Each organ of the Court has different needs and constraints. “Any attempt by the international justice community to establish parallel efforts would cause confusion, create inefficiencies, and take longer to produce results.”14 There are a wide variety of organizations across countries that are working to support the goals of the court, build judicial infrastructure and promote human rights. These organizations work with diverse populations and effectively address the individual needs of communities. At the ICC, each organ of the Court has different messaging needs and constraints.

The Registry. The Registry is the court organ tasked with the outreach function. The Registry’s responsibilities are vast. It is the “Registry’s responsibility to ensure, inter alia, adequate judicial cooperation with States, protection of victims and witnesses, safety and security of the Court’s operations, detention of suspects and accused individuals, courtroom services, field operations, assistance and support to the Office of the Prosecutor, the defence and to the victims participating in the proceedings and outreach to affected communities”15

Although current efforts fall under the Outreach Unit of the Public Information and Documentation Section of the Registry,16 the Registry should not perform outreach because of its vast responsibilities. The Registry has an oversight role in both assuring suspects have criminal defense through the Office of Public Counsel for Defence, and supporting victims through the Office of Public Counsel for Victims. While these offices are structurally independent, the fact that the Registry has oversight for the office providing defense counsel to suspects, and at the same time is engaging in significant outreach with victims and communities, creates the appearance of bias. The same office that handles defense can be seen in local communities as pushing the prosecutorial aspects forward for victims and working on the “good side.”

The Registry’s work is tied to defense. Depending on the view held, the defense’s role is either a form of zealous advocacy of their client or uncovering the truth through trial process.17

Since allegations of so-called “victor’s justice” have haunted virtually every accountability process since Nuremberg, there is a visceral power in their invocation that could corrode every facet of the trial. In purely legalistic terms, authentic justice must be the product of an “impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure.....Notwithstanding the interposition of an independent judiciary, defense attorneys stand between their clients and the raw political whims of powerful states that organize and fund the system of modern international criminal justice. They accordingly have an essential role in ensuring both the fairness of proceedings and the perception of that fairness.18

On the other hand, the Registry must also protect victims. Outreach should be a depoliticized relaying of factual information, impartial and separate from the Court’s organs. When outreach occurs under this Registry umbrella, the Court’s neutrality is tainted. The Registry could potentially restructure, with outreach as a completely independent organ, but still, it may appear non-neutral or valuing victims over justice. The other possible organs of the Court that might perform outreach are the Presidency, the Judicial Division, and the Office of the Prosecutor. However, these organs currently do not, and should not, engage in extensive outreach.

The Presidency. The Presidency consists of three judges responsible for the ICC’s overall administration. These judges cannot be responsible for outreach efforts, from a practical resource perspective, as well as a desire for these judges to remain neutral.

Judicial Division. Outreach is inappropriate for Judges to undertake due to bias or the appearance of bias, ethical ramifications, and the importance of a neutral judiciary. Eighteen judges responsible for conducting the proceedings of the Court at different stages cannot appear biased in making their critical decisions during trials, regardless of actual bias.

Judges have broad authority to manage the proceedings and the presentation of evidence. Under Article 69(3) of the ICC Statute, the court has ‘the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the determination of the truth.’19

Outreach to victims and communities would almost certainly create an appearance of bias. Judges are responsible ethically for important trial decisions, including confirming charges, and must be a paragon of independence. Outreach to leaders, governments, and citizens threatens this ethical norm.

Office of the Prosecutor. Outreach is an inappropriate project for the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) whose focus should remain prosecuting suspected war criminals and which must remain independent to pursue this goal. The independence of Prosecutors is critical in order to pursue and achieve this mission.20 Outreach efforts mean that the OTP would be required to form relationships in various countries that defeat the independence of the OTP.

ICC prosecutors have obligations regarding the collection and disclosure of evidence that are more significant than those of prosecutors in the American system. They must look for exonerating as well as incriminating evidence21

The OTP’s needs and messages related to prosecuting suspects are very distinct from the needs and messages required for outreach efforts.

Given the independence of the Prosecutor, the OTP’s messages concerning investigation of cases before the Court may differ from messages issued by the Registry, both in terms of timing and content.22

IV. International Law and Legal Norms

Outreach by the Court is counter to international ethical norms and the development of international jurisprudence. “International criminal justice’s modern origins are usually traced to the military tribunals set up by the victorious allies after World War II.”23 The Rome Statute’s ratification has moved the concept and formation of international criminal law toward a more concrete, yet evolving, body of law.24 Article 21 of the Rome Statute lays out the applicable sources of law in a hierarchal order. The Rome Statute itself and applicable elements of crime and rules of evidence and procedure govern first. Then treaties and principles of international law come into play, followed by general principles of law derived from national legal systems. Separate from the Rome Statute, the sources of international law are generally defined in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Article 38 identifies four sources, including international conventions, international custom, general principles of law recognized by civilized nations, and the judicial decisions and teachings of highly qualified publicists.25 Generally, these sources are not hierarchal, but international conventions (i.e. treaties) and customs typically carry the most weight. In the instance of international ethical legal norms, there are not any wholly overarching international treaties or conventions that apply. However, international efforts can look to the general principles and norms arising out of national legal systems, even with significant differences between systems, such as civil versus common law ones. “International legal norms are applied and interpreted within a multicultural diaspora.”26 Laurel Baig argues that international legal ethics must be of its own creation, in order to address the particularities of international law.

In my view, international legal ethics cannot merely be borrowed from national jurisdictions. Instead, international ethical norms must address the unique realities of international legal practice.27

Likewise, international criminal law is not bound by one single legal source or overarching code, particularly when it comes to norms of behavior and ethics.28 Baig continues:

A clear set of rules would assist all international criminal lawyers in their daily practice. A shared set of principles of professional conduct would go a long way towards creating common expectations among the various legal professionals in international criminal law. The process of preparing a shared code would create an opportunity to assess whether ethical norms in national systems would advance or impede the goals of international criminal law.29

The ICC is governed by a code of conduct that includes notions of independence and impartiality, which may be defeated by ICC-led outreach.

The Codes of Conduct adopted so far at international criminal courts largely reflect national ethical rules. The ICTY and ICTR Codes were influenced primarily by the American Model Rules, and the ICC Code was in turn a blend of the ICTY and ICTR Codes and the ethical rules of inquisitorial systems.30

When examining potential sources of international legal ethics, as well as various national norms, independence and neutrality are key concepts.

As the International Criminal Court (ICC) was taking form and coming into actuality in early 2003, the International Criminal Bar promulgated a sample Code of Conduct to inform the set of ethical standards for counsel that would be developed by the Court. The cornerstone of the ethical edifice was the clear recognition that the ‘system of international justice based on the Rule of Law rests on three pillars: an independent judiciary, an independent prosecutor and an independent legal profession.’31

Outreach however, may lead to bias, the appearance of bias, and engaging in complicated political situations, which runs against these international norms.

The International Criminal Court has adopted specialized codes of conduct to govern the behavior of various players within the Court. The Assembly of State Parties adopted the Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel.32 Article 6 states that “Counsel shall act honourably, independently, and freely.” The Code also provides for confidentiality and that counsel may only advertise if information is accurate and “respectful of counsel’s obligation regarding confidentiality and privilege.” Article 16 further requires that counsel make efforts to ensure that no conflict of interest arises. “[T]he ICC Code of Conduct, echoing French ethical rules, requires attorneys to take a “solemn undertaking” that they will perform their duties with “integrity and diligence, honourably, freely, independently, expeditiously, and conscientiously.”33

Likewise, the Court also has a Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor that dictates independence, confidentiality and in particular impartiality (including “refraining from expressing an opinion that could, objectively, adversely affect the required impartiality”).34

Article 10 of The ICC Code of Judicial Ethics states that:

Judges shall not engage in any extra-judicial activity that is incompatible with their judicial function or the efficient and timely functioning of the Court, or that may affect or may reasonably appear to affect their independence or impartiality.... Judges shall not exercise any political function.35

These individual Court actors represent the Court generally, and the codes that the ASP adopted seem to hold independence and neutrality in high regard as a legal and ethical norm. This suggests that engaging in community and international outreach, regardless of the branch and particularly in situation countries, may easily cause conflicts of interest or the appearance of a non-neutral Court. International norms mandate the independence of court organs, the appearance of which is defeated when any Court actor partakes in outreach efforts.

While there is not a specific international treaty governing all international legal criminal ethics, as previously mentioned, the United Nations, one of the foremost leading international institutions, also provides guidelines that serve as a global norm for the roles of the Judiciary, prosecutors, and lawyers generally. In 1985, the UN endorsed the Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, finding that:

The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.36

While judges are afforded freedom of expression, “judges shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.”37

The UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers allow lawyers more freedoms, stating:

Lawyers like other citizens are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly. In particular, they shall have the right to take part in public discussion of matters concerning the law, the administration of justice and the promotion and protection of human rights and to join or form local, national or international organizations and attend their meetings, without suffering professional restrictions by reason of their lawful action or their membership in a lawful organization. In exercising these rights, lawyers shall always conduct themselves in accordance with the law and the recognized standards and ethics of the legal profession.38

Various non-governmental organizations and inter-governmental organizations have provided legal ethical guidelines for Courts. The International Commission of Jurists,39 the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe,40 and the International Bar Association, among others, all have guidelines that dictate the independence for Court actors, and deemphasize outreach.

In international law, often ethical and legal norms vary greatly across nations, with particular differences between civil law and common law jurisdictions. These systems generally arise out different origins; codified civil law, based on “statutes, administrative law, and custom” is easily distinguished from common law, which arises out of “ a mix of judicial systems, customs, and statutes.”41 These systems boast differences in the education and training of attorneys as well, lending to different legal and ethical norms. Common law examples tend toward rules, versus civil law ethics codes that refer more to standards.42 Terms such as professional independence and confidentiality, and even the role of a lawyer vis-à-vis a client, lead some to argue that a global theory of ethics is not realistically achievable.43 Others, such as some of the international organizations above, argue that international standards are critical in international law. In many established countries around the world, domestic courts do not engage in outreach and publicity efforts, in order to ensure the legal legitimacy of judicial systems.

V. Conclusion

The ICC is not the proper institution to undertake comprehensive outreach to promote the Court. While this article is not intended as an in-depth examination of who should undertake outreach, it is important to examine a few potential key partners of the Court. A “greater network of international organizations, aid agencies, and other donor and implementing bodies offers extensive programs already in place around the world, as well as vast experience and expertise in fostering the rule of law.”44

States Parties, NGO’s, IGO’s, Coalitions, and efforts supporting state-based outreach and national court building are better suited than the organs of the ICC to perform outreach and responding to the ever-increasing, diverse outreach needs.

The key implication for the ICC and any other transitional justice mechanism is that outreach must be local. The content, strategies and mode of communications must be tailored to the needs and expectations of heterogeneous communities and target groups in unique contexts, especially to those who are unlikely to be reached by traditional media.45

Supporting and emphasizing local outreach efforts is the only effective way for global citizens to learn about the Court’s work in manners tailored to their needs. Addressing cultural, linguistic, political and societal differences, in order to promote justice, must be a community effort. And building national court systems is critical for worldwide justice efforts.

[I]t is clear that the ICC will only ever be able to process a handful of cases at a time.…[W]ithout a proliferation of other credible forums, there will be insufficient justice for the victims of most international crimes, even where the ICC has launched investigations. Fulfilling the Rome Statute’s aspiration that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished” requires broad efforts to enable local justice mechanisms to address war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.46

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   See Outreach, International Criminal Court, available online (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). ↩

2. 2.

   See Patrick Vinck & Phuong N. Pham, Outreach Evaluation: The International Criminal Court in the Central African Republic, IJTJ (Nov. 13, 2010). Oxford Journals paywall, EBSCO Host paywall. ↩

3. 3.

   Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 Mich. J. Int’l L. 265, 267-68 (2012), available online. ↩

4. 4.

   Id. at 276. ↩

5. 5.

   See Lecture by Sonia Robla, Chief of ICC’s Public Information and Documentation Section, The role of effective communications in fulfilling the ICC’s mandate: challenges, achievements and the way ahead, (Supranational Criminal Law Lectures, Leiden University, Mar. 17, 2010) at 2, available online. ↩

6. 6.

   See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. ↩

7. 7.

   Indeed, the Court should place its limited resources toward the Office of the Prosecutor’s prosecutorial mission, not an outreach mission. The Court recently touted its outreach progress, stating (Robla, supra note 5, at 1):

   Our people, working in difficult situations, very often arrive in a village with a generator and a projector to screen images from the courtroom. With a megaphone they answer questions and address concerns of hundreds citizens during town-hall style meetings. Informative sessions are conducted in nearly 10 languages […] Creative tools such as theatre pieces, tailored publications, videos and radio programs have been developed and used. Women, the army, police, victims, displaced population, the legal community, members of Parliaments, NGO representatives, refugees, diasporas, journalists, all have been approached by outreach teams of the Court.

   While this work is impressive, it also illustrates the extent to which outreach has become a prominent mission of the Court, threatening the OTP’s prosecutorial mission. Outreach uses the limited resources of the Court, requires a great deal of time and staff investment, and does not necessarily provide a long-lasting or comprehensive legitimization of the Court. ↩

8. 8.

   See About the Court, International Criminal Court, available online (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). ↩

9. 9.

   See Rome Statute, supra note 6. ↩

10. 10.

    See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Legal Ethics in International Criminal Defense, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 685, 691 (Dec. 14, 2009), available online:

    From a legalist perspective, the main function of trials is to determine individual culpability and assess appropriate punishment through a fair process. Punishment of the guilty, in turn, serves the goals of retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation. ↩

11. 11.

    See Robla, supra note 5. ↩

12. 12.

    See Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Budget and Finance Team, Comments on the Proposed Programme Budget for 2014 of the International Criminal Court and other matters (Sep. 5, 2013) at 4, available online:

    In addition…despite widespread misinformation and politicization of the discourse on the work of the ICC in Kenya, only limited additional resources appear to have been requested to expand outreach to victims and affected communities. This is all the more important as civil society actors which assist the ICC with outreach or otherwise support the work of the Court in Kenya may see their ability to assist the Court in relation to outreach decrease as a result of ongoing campaigns to discredit them in Kenya and increased tensions on the ground. Outreach in other situations like Libya has also lagged behind. ↩

13. 13.

    See Vinck & Pham, supra note 2. ↩

14. 14.

    See Eric A. Witte, Open Society Justice Initiative, International Crimes, Local Justice: A Handbook for Rule-of-Law Policymakers, Donors, and Implementers, at 21 (2011), available online. ↩

15. 15.

    See Proposed Programme Budget for 2014 of the International Criminal Court, ICC-ASP/12/10 (Jul. 29, 2013), at 71, available online [hereinafter Proposed 2014 Budget]. ↩

16. 16.

    See Outreach, supra note 1. ↩

17. 17.

    See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 10, at 700-701 (2010):

    Zealous advocacy is a central ethical principle for criminal defense attorneys in most adversarial systems.…there is no question that they must pursue their client’s cause with zeal and act as true partisans…Some inquisitorial systems not only do not require aggressive defense, but also tend to expect the defense to cooperate in the administration of justice and the revelation of the truth. ↩

18. 18.

    Michael A. Newton, Evolving Equality: The Development of the International Defense Bar, 47 Stan. J. Int’l L. 379, 379 (2011), available online:

    Defense counsel in international criminal proceedings face extremely difficult challenges that are intrinsic to the modern systems of internationalized accountability; yet their professionalism and performance represent perhaps the most determinative dimension for evaluating the overall fairness of what is commonly considered “justice” for grievous atrocities. ↩

19. 19.

    See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 10, at 704. ↩

20. 20.

    Requiring the OTP to pursue any outreach also stretches Prosecutors too thinly, when they already lack resources to comprehensively pursue current and new cases and investigations. Illustrating the extensive responsibilities of the OTP (Proposed 2014 Budget, supra note 15):

    The Court anticipates that in 2014 it will be dealing with eighteen cases in eight situations. In nine of the cases judicial activities will be ongoing at the Court at the Pre-Trial, Trial and Appeals stages of the proceedings with the accused either in custody or available upon summons to appear. In addition to its investigations and judicial proceedings […] the Office of the Prosecutor continues to monitor other situations in preliminary examination… ↩

21. 21.

    See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 10, at 703. ↩

22. 22.

    Proposed 2014 Budget, supra note 15, at 46. ↩

23. 23.

    Mirko Bagaric & John Morss, In Search of Coherent Jurisprudence for International Criminal Law: Correlating Universal Human Responsibilities with Universal Human Rights, 29 Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev. 157 (2006). ↩

24. 24.

    Id. at 158-59:

    More recently, the move towards a systematic and coherent body of international criminal law gained considerable momentum following the ratification of the Rome Statute, which entrenched a number of substantive offenses, established rules for prosecuting and punishing international crimes, and established the International Criminal Court (ICC). This growing interest in, and acceptance of, international criminal law, belies the fact that it is a body of law that is neither clearly defined nor articulated. ↩

25. 25.

    See Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, International Court of Justice, available online; (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). ↩

26. 26.

    Alexander Boldizar & Outi Korhonen, Ethics, Morals and International Law, 10 EJIL 279, 281 (1999), available online. ↩

27. 27.

    Laurel Baig, International Criminal Law and Legal Ethics: The Need for Shared Expectations, 103 ASIL 256, 258 (2009), available JSTOR paywall. ↩

28. 28.

    Id. at 256:

    [W]ithin a domestic legal system, all lawyers share a common set of norms, which should provide a common understanding of the basic rules of expected conduct. When one moves to the international arena, this common ground disappears. ↩

29. 29.

    Id. at 259. ↩

30. 30.

    See Iontcheva Turner, supra note 10, at 743. ↩

31. 31.

    Newton, supra note 18, at 382:

    The independence, ethical excellence, and fearless representation of the defense lawyers must remain an indispensable element of authentic enforcement efforts. Indeed, the abandonment of appropriate efforts on behalf of defendants facing trials in the international criminal justice system, whether the result of professional fecklessness or personal pressures, would transform those proceedings into an organized sham capable of achieving only a shadow of justice while undermining the core human rights of those who will face charges under its authority. ↩

32. 32.

    Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, International Criminal Court, Resolution ICC-ASP/4/Res.1 (Dec. 3, 2005), available online. ↩

33. 33.

    Iontcheva Turner, supra note 10, at 706. ↩

34. 34.

    Code of Conduct for the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (Sep. 5, 2013), available online. ↩

35. 35.

    Code of Judicial Ethics: International Criminal Court, Coalition for the ICC, available online (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). ↩

36. 36.

    Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, United Nations: Office for the High Commissioner of Human Rights, available online (last visited Mar. 10, 2014). ↩

37. 37.

    Id. ↩

38. 38.

    Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Sep. 7, 1990), available online. ↩

39. 39.

    International Principles on the Independence and Accountability of Judges, Lawyers and Prosecutors, International Commission of Jurists (2007), available online. ↩

40. 40.

    Charter of Core Principles of the European Legal Profession and Code of Conduct for European Lawyers, Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (2013) available online. ↩

41. 41.

    Elayne E. Greenberg, The Ethical Compass: The Globalized Practice of Law: Part Two, 4(3) N.Y. Disp. Resol. Law. 10 (2011), available online. ↩

42. 42.

    Id. at 11:

    While the ABA Model Rules speak in terms of rules, the civil law ethic codes refer to more general articulated standards and norms. Although both ethic codes appear to articulate similar core values such as professional independence, confidentiality, and conflict-free representation, the actual interpretation of these words and the order in which they are prioritized are different and require a more nuanced understanding of the legal system and broader culture in which they live. ↩

43. 43.

    Id. ↩

44. 44.

    Witte, supra note 14, at 21. ↩

45. 45.

    See Vinck & Pham, supra note 2. ↩

46. 46.

    Witte, supra note 14, at 17. ↩