A. Jurisdiction

The ICC has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression, with a particular focus on crimes committed on the territory of state parties or by their nationals. Nevertheless, the ICC’s jurisdiction may extend beyond the territory of state parties in cases referred by the U.N. Security Council or at the discretion of the Prosecutor. This expansive jurisdiction has prompted concerns about the sovereignty of states, particularly those of China.1

1. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

i. Disagreement with Criminalization of Non-International Armed Conflicts

China fundamentally disagrees with the ICC’s criminalization of acts committed in non-international armed conflicts, as outlined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute.2 While the ICC aims to hold individuals accountable for crimes such as targeting civilians or using child soldiers in NIAC, China argues that these conflicts are inherently domestic matters that should be resolved by states without external interference. Unlike international armed conflicts, which involve cross-border hostilities, NIAC typically arise within a state’s borders and, in China’s view, fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of national authorities.

China perceives the ICC’s focus on NIAC as a mechanism that could facilitate external interference, particularly by Western powers, under the guise of international justice. This concern is heightened by the ICC’s history of investigating internal conflicts in African states, such as those involving the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda and militant groups in Mali. By prosecuting crimes in NIAC, the ICC imposes international standards on what China regards as internal issues, potentially destabilizing fragile political contexts and exacerbating conflicts.

The broad criminalization of NIAC-related actions also raises significant sovereignty concerns. China argues that this framework risks labeling state actors engaged in legitimate counterinsurgency efforts as perpetrators of international crimes. Such accusations could undermine a state’s ability to maintain internal order and peace, particularly in regions facing separatist movements or insurgencies. For China, this represents a direct challenge to its principle of non-interference3 and reinforces its skepticism toward the ICC as a neutral arbiter of justice. These concerns underscore China’s broader critique of the ICC as an institution that prioritizes universal jurisdiction over the sovereign rights of states.

Lastly, China is particularly concerned that NIAC-focused investigations could target state actors dealing with separatist movements in regions such as Xinjiang or Tibet. The ICC’s broad jurisdiction and prosecutorial discretion pose a risk of framing China’s domestic counterinsurgency efforts as international crimes, subject to external scrutiny. This concern aligns with China’s long-standing resistance to the concept of universal jurisdiction in human rights contexts, which it views as undermining state sovereignty and legal independence. Such potential implications deepen China’s critique of the ICC as an institution that prioritizes external intervention over respecting sovereign equality.

ii. The Exclusion of Other Transnational Crimes

The jurisdiction of the ICC is insufficiently expansive, with a focus on crimes aligned with the value system of Western countries. This excludes crimes such as drug trafficking, international terrorism, transnational organized crime, and environmental crime. This omission has been a source of frustration for some developing countries, particularly those in the Caribbean region, which have advocated for their inclusion in the jurisdiction of the ICC.4 China has also expressed concern that such selective jurisdiction limits the ability of the ICC to address crimes that have a significant impact on developing countries and diminishes its relevance in global justice.

2. Territorial Jurisdiction

The ICC’s territorial jurisdiction extends to crimes committed on the soil of state parties, even if the accused is a national of a non-party state. China criticizes this as a violation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states: “A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”5 For China, this sets a troubling precedent, as it risks undermining sovereign equality in international law. China upholds the principle of non-interference in state affairs as a cornerstone of international law.

Notwithstanding the stipulation in Article 12(1) of the Rome Statute that a State Party ”accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5,”6 it is evident that the precondition of consent is not absolute. Indeed, Article 12(2), provides that: In accordance with the stipulations set forth in Article 12(2), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are parties to the Statute or have accepted the Court’s jurisdiction:

(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft; (b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.7

In accordance with this paragraph, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a person from a non-contracting country who has committed crimes, even in the absence of consent from their State, provided that the State where the crime was committed is a party to the Statute or is willing to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Such an approach would be at odds with the long-established principle of the relative effectiveness of treaties, which has been universally acknowledged and adhered to by the international community.

3. Trigger Mechanism

In accordance with Article 13 of the Statute,8 the ICC’s commencement mechanism is primarily constituted by three main avenues: firstly, situations may be referred to the Court by States Parties; secondly, situations may be referred to the Prosecutor of the Court by the Security Council; and thirdly, the Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu. In regard to the right of a State party to refer a situation, a non-State party is precluded from preventing another State party from referring a case to the ICC, even in the event that the suspect in question is a national of a non-State party. With regard to the right of the United Nations Security Council to refer a situation, it may concern either a State party to the Statute or a non-State party. In either case, the consent of the State in question is not required. The Prosecutor is empowered to investigate or prosecute offenses committed in the territory of a non-State party or by a national of a non-State party. This enables the jurisdiction of the ICC to be extended to nationals of non-States parties, thereby binding third parties. However, this is not contingent on the strict adherence to the voluntary acceptance of its jurisdiction by States, which limits the practical application of the principle of complementarity of its jurisdiction, because if the ICC decides that the national court is unwilling or unable to prosecute, the ICC Prosecutor gains the right to investigate the case, regardless of the state’s consent.

The Darfur situation in Sudan marked a pivotal moment in the ICC’s history, as it was the first case referred to the Court by the United Nations Security Council and the first formal investigation involving a non-State Party. Despite the ICC issuing an arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on charges of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, Sudan, as a non-State Party, refused to cooperate. Bashir continued to serve as president and travel internationally without facing arrest, even in State Parties to the Rome Statute. This non-compliance was supported by both the Arab League and the African Union, which criticized the ICC’s actions as undermining the sovereignty of African nations and urged that any future prosecution of African heads of state be coordinated with the African Union.9 This led to a temporary strain in relations between the ICC and African countries, highlighting tensions over jurisdictional authority and state sovereignty.

China abstained from voting on Security Council Resolution 1593, which referred the Darfur situation to the ICC. China raised concerns not only about the jurisdictional relationship between the Court and non-State Parties but also about the enforcement challenges related to the arrest warrant. Additionally, China emphasized that the Bashir case raises broader questions about the immunity of heads of state. The potential erosion of the traditional principle of immunity and the risk of sitting heads of state being subjected to judicial jurisdiction could have profound implications for national sovereignty.10 China argues that these developments warrant serious attention, as they may fundamentally alter the balance between international accountability and the respect for state sovereignty.

B. Admissibility

The principle of admissibility underpins the ICC’s jurisdiction, ensuring that the Court acts as a complementary institution to national judicial systems rather than supplanting them. Two critical components govern admissibility: the principle of complementarity and the gravity threshold. Together, these elements determine whether a case is appropriate for ICC intervention, yet they have been a focal point of criticism, particularly from non-party states such as China.

1. The Complementarity Principle and Sovereignty Concern

The principle of complementarity, as set out in the tenth preambular paragraph and in Article 1 of the Statute, precludes the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over a case once the State with jurisdiction over the case has initiated domestic judicial proceedings.11

This principle of complementarity of the ICC may appear to respect the primacy of domestic jurisdiction; however, its implied right of review by the ICC may be perceived as an infringement upon the sovereignty of other nations. Article 17 of the Statute suggests that the ICC may conduct reviews of ongoing judicial proceedings in national courts to ascertain whether a State’s judicial system is ‘unwilling’ or ‘unable’ to hold individuals criminally responsible.12 In other words, the ICC is empowered to assess and determine the criminal accountability of any State, including non-parties, for international crimes.13 The ICC is empowered to ascertain whether the proceedings conducted within the state in question are inconsistent with the objective of bringing the individual in question to justice, unduly prolonged, or not conducted in an independent or impartial manner. This is a basis for the ICC to exercise jurisdiction if it has determined that there has been improper behavior on the part of the domestic courts. This provision of the Statute undoubtedly transforms the ICC into a supranational world judicial institution, which is also in conflict with the principle of sovereignty upheld by the Chinese Government. According to the fundamental theory of modern international law, there was no supranational judicial body above a sovereign State.

Furthermore, developing countries, with limited judicial resources or infrastructure, are more likely to be deemed “unable” to prosecute effectively. This creates a scenario where such states are disproportionately subject to ICC scrutiny, potentially undermining their sovereignty and eroding confidence in their legal systems. For example, the ICC’s investigations into Sudan and Uganda have illustrated how states with weaker legal institutions become frequent subjects of ICC proceedings, reinforcing perceptions of judicial inequity.

Lastly, China critiques the ICC’s reliance on Western legal norms in applying complementarity. Legal traditions differ significantly across regions, and the ICC’s framework often imposes standards that align with Western jurisprudence, ignoring cultural and legal diversity. This approach risks alienating states with alternative legal traditions, further undermining the Court’s universal legitimacy.

2. Gravity Threshold and Prosecutor’s Power

The gravity threshold is another key element of admissibility, requiring the Prosecutor to demonstrate that a case involves crimes of sufficient gravity to warrant ICC attention. While intended to limit the Court’s focus to the most serious crimes, the threshold grants significant discretion to the Prosecutor. China argues that this discretion lacks transparency and opens the door to politically motivated decisions. For instance, the ICC’s decision to pursue investigations in Afghanistan and Ukraine has been criticized for aligning with broader geopolitical interests while avoiding comparable scrutiny of Western-backed conflicts. This selective application of the gravity standard raises concerns about the ICC’s impartiality and reinforces perceptions of political bias.

In summary, while the principles of complementarity and gravity are fundamental to the ICC’s mandate, their implementation disproportionately affects developing states and reflects an implicit prioritization of Western legal norms. For China, these issues highlight the need for greater sensitivity to sovereignty, legal diversity, and transparency in the ICC’s admissibility criteria.

C. The Role of United Nations Security Council

The United Nations Security Council (S.C.) holds significant influence over the ICC’s jurisdiction through its powers to refer cases and defer investigations under the Rome Statute. While intended to integrate international justice with global peace and security efforts, these powers have frequently been criticized for politicizing the ICC’s operations, favoring the interests of powerful states, and undermining the Court’s impartiality.

1. Selective Referrals

The S.C.’s referral power allows it to bring situations before the ICC, including those involving non-party states, as seen in the cases of Sudan (Darfur) and Libya. These referrals extended the ICC’s jurisdiction to non-signatories, overriding principles of state consent. However, the S.C. has often refrained from acting in politically sensitive cases involving powerful states or their allies. For example, no action has been taken regarding U.S. actions in Afghanistan or allegations of war crimes in Israel/Palestine, despite repeated calls for accountability. Such selectivity undermines the ICC’s neutrality, creating a perception that it serves Western geopolitical interests rather than acting as a truly impartial judicial body.

Recent S.C. actions further highlight this issue. On November 20, 2023, the United States vetoed a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza, which aimed to halt the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. This veto drew sharp criticism, including from China, whose representative at the U.N. described the decision as a significant blow to the authority of the S.C. and international law. The U.S. veto left the ceasefire resolution with only fourteen supporting votes, including those from the UK and France. Malta’s U.N. representative, Vanessa Frazier, expressed regret that “due to the use of the veto, the S.C. once again failed to fulfill its responsibility to maintain international peace and security.”14 The Chinese representative, Ambassador Fu Cong, stated that the U.S. veto had “destroyed the Gaza people’s last hope for survival” and pushed them “further into darkness and despair.”15 This incident underscores how the S.C.’s selective actions diminish its credibility and reinforce skepticism about its alignment with the ICC’s mission.

2. Deferral Power

Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the S.C. can defer ICC investigations for 12-month renewable periods.16 While designed to balance judicial and political considerations, this power has been criticized for giving the P5 (the five permanent members of the S.C.) excessive leverage to protect their interests or those of their allies. For instance, a deferral could be used to shield nationals of powerful states from prosecution or delay politically inconvenient investigations indefinitely. Even though China is one of the P5 members, such influence reinforces the perception that the ICC is a tool of major powers, further eroding trust among non-party states like China.

In conclusion, the S.C.’s role in ICC operations, particularly through selective referrals and deferrals, highlights the intersection of politics and international justice. Incidents like the Gaza ceasefire veto and the focus on weaker states underscore concerns about bias and double standards. For China, these actions affirm longstanding fears that the ICC operates under Western influence rather than as a neutral, independent institution. Addressing these issues is critical for the ICC to regain credibility and fulfill its mandate equitably.

D. Alleged Western Bias and Selective Justice

The ICC has been the subject of considerable criticism for displaying a tendency towards political bias and engaging in selective justice, particularly in its focus on weaker states while avoiding scrutiny of powerful nations or their allies. These patterns have prompted questions about the Court’s impartiality and its role in the international legal system.

In its formative years, the ICC demonstrated a marked predilection for pursuing cases against African states, with proceedings involving Sudan, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) occupying a disproportionate share of its docket. This focus on Africa gave rise to widespread accusations of “neo-colonial justice”, particularly as similar crimes in other regions were not addressed. The case of Uhuru Kenyatta, Kenya’s sitting president at the time, exemplifies this criticism. Kenyatta’s case ultimately collapsed due to insufficient evidence, reinforcing perceptions that the ICC targeted high-profile figures in weaker states without adequate grounds for prosecution. Such patterns have undermined the Court’s credibility, particularly among non-Western states, and have alienated key stakeholders in global justice.

In recent years, the ICC has shifted its focus beyond Africa, with investigations into Russia’s actions in Ukraine marking a notable expansion of its remit. While this indicates a broader application of its jurisdiction, critics argue that the Court’s approach remains selective. For instance, the ICC has been swift to issue arrest warrants against Russian officials for alleged war crimes but has refrained from similar scrutiny of Western-backed actions, such as the Saudi-led coalition’s involvement in Yemen. This disparity underscores allegations of political bias, as the ICC appears more willing to confront adversaries of powerful Western nations while avoiding cases that might implicate their allies.

Chinese scholars argue that the selective justice of the ICC arises primarily from two sources: institutional expansion and political intervention.17 Institutionally, the issue stems from internal problems such as the legislative design of the Rome Statute, the wide discretion granted to judges and prosecutors in the execution of their roles, and the financial constraints of the institution. Politically, external factors, including the powers of the U.N. Security Council, the treaty-based nature of state participation, and the influence of other entities and non-governmental organizations, exacerbate the problem.

Of particular concern is the expansiveness of the Rome Statute’s design and the potential for abuse of discretion by judges and prosecutors, which undermine the Court’s legitimacy. Additionally, the political intervention of Western powers in the U.N. Security Council, coupled with the selective participation of states in the ICC, directly erodes its credibility. These factors collectively diminish confidence in the Court’s impartiality, further damaging the perception of selective justice and international judicial fairness.

E. Hypothetical Risks to China

China faces considerable risks from potential ICC actions that could target its domestic policies or geopolitical disputes, even as a non-party state. While China’s position as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council affords it the right to veto any adverse ICC referrals, this protection is not absolute. Political dynamics within the Council could shift, especially under intense international pressure, compelling China to repeatedly exercise its veto. Such actions could potentially result in China being diplomatically isolated, its global reputation being damaged, and its foreign relations being complicated. Additionally, lobbying among non-permanent Council members and informal alliances could create scenarios where China’s influence is challenged, raising concerns about indirect risks to its sovereignty.

The ICC’s jurisdiction, which can also be extended through U.N. Security Council referrals or investigations involving crimes on the territory of state parties, creates a pathway for external scrutiny of China’s actions. Such risks are heightened by the Court’s perceived susceptibility to political influence, particularly from Western powers, and its focus on issues like human rights and territorial disputes, which are highly sensitive for China. These scenarios underscore Beijing’s apprehension that the ICC could undermine its sovereignty and legal independence under the guise of international justice.

1. Allegations of Human Rights Abuses

Western countries have long argued that China should face continued international scrutiny for alleged human rights violations, particularly in regions such as Xinjiang and Tibet. Hypothetical ICC investigations into these matters could frame China’s domestic policies as international crimes, despite Beijing’s consistent rejection of such accusations and its emphasis on non-interference in internal affairs. The extension of ICC jurisdiction into non-party states through Security Council mechanisms further exacerbates these fears.

2. Disputes in the South China Sea and Taiwan

China’s territorial and sovereignty disputes, including those in the South China Sea and over Taiwan, present additional vulnerabilities. Hypothetical ICC investigations into actions arising from these disputes, such as military operations or alleged violations of international law, could significantly undermine China’s sovereignty. Such scenarios would not only challenge China’s legal positions on these matters but also risk politicizing sensitive geopolitical conflicts.

For China, such risks confirm its concerns that the ICC operates as a political tool rather than a fair and impartial judicial body. The potential for selective investigations, driven by geopolitical interests or pressure from Western powers, undermines trust in the ICC’s legitimacy. These fears reinforce China’s preference for resolving disputes through bilateral or regional mechanisms, rather than through institutions it perceives as subject to political manipulation.

III. Recommendations from China’s Perspective

China’s critiques of the ICC are accompanied by proposals for reforms designed to address structural flaws, reduce politicization, and ensure greater fairness and impartiality. These recommendations emphasize respect for state sovereignty, equitable justice, and the need for a more universally accepted and effective international justice system.

A. Decoupling the ICC from the U.N. Security Council

China advocates for reducing the influence of the S.C. on the ICC, particularly P5 in referrals and deferrals. The current framework under Article 16 allows powerful nations to shape ICC actions through selective interventions, compromising the Court’s independence. For instance, the S.C.’s referrals of Darfur (Sudan) and Libya aligned with Western geopolitical interests, while similar action was absent in cases involving U.S. allies. Decoupling the ICC from the S.C. by creating a broader multilateral body or independent review mechanism for authorizing referrals would mitigate this imbalance and ensure decisions are grounded in legal merit rather than political considerations.

B. Equal Focus on Western States

China also underscores the necessity for the ICC to address powerful non-party states, such as the United States, to enhance its credibility. The ICC’s focus on weaker states, particularly in Africa, and its lack of scrutiny into Western-backed conflicts, such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan, have led to accusations of double standards. Introducing mechanisms to review and investigate actions by non-party states, especially when they impact state parties or involve grave international crimes, would reinforce the ICC’s impartiality and bolster its legitimacy as a universal judicial body.

C. Expanding Subject-Matter Jurisdiction

China also proposes expanding the ICC’s subject-matter jurisdiction to address crimes that are of significant concern to developing countries. These include drug crimes, international terrorist crimes, transnational organized crimes, and international environmental crimes. In recent years, the Chinese environmental law community has increasingly focused on the ICC’s stance on the potential criminalization of “ecocide.”18

Currently, the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime of aggression. While these are undoubtedly critical, they do not encompass other pressing global threats that disproportionately affect developing nations. Expanding the ICC’s jurisdiction would reflect a more inclusive understanding of global justice and align the Court’s focus with the priorities of a broader range of states. For instance, transnational drug trafficking and terrorism have devastating impacts on the security and stability of developing regions, yet international mechanisms for addressing these crimes remain fragmented.

Such a reform would not only increase the ICC’s legitimacy but also foster greater participation from developing countries, many of which currently view the Court as biased toward issues affecting Western interests. It would underscore the ICC’s commitment to equitable justice by addressing a broader spectrum of crimes that impact humanity as a whole.

D. Greater Transparency in Prosecutorial Decisions

To counter concerns about selective justice and political bias, China advocates for greater transparency in prosecutorial decision-making. The significant discretion currently afforded to the ICC Prosecutor in determining admissibility, particularly regarding the gravity threshold and complementarity principle, has fueled allegations of partiality. Establishing clear, publicly accessible guidelines for assessing these criteria and instituting independent oversight of controversial prosecutorial decisions would enhance the ICC’s impartiality and trustworthiness.

E. Promoting Regional Solutions

China further emphasizes the importance of regional solutions, such as the African Union’s hybrid courts, in addressing international crimes. Regional mechanisms, with their deeper understanding of local contexts, foster greater ownership of justice processes and respect for state sovereignty. For example, the African Union has proposed courts tailored to its member states’ unique political and cultural realities. Supporting such initiatives through financial and technical assistance and integrating them into the global justice framework as complementary to the ICC would strengthen the overall system of international accountability. As the Chinese proverb says, it is better to teach a man to fish than to give him a fish. On issues such as Darfur, China advocates for implementing consensus-based solutions involving the United Nations, the African Union, and local governments, highlighting the value of regional cooperation and diplomatic resolution.19

In conclusion, China’s proposed reforms aim to address key structural deficiencies in the ICC by reducing political interference, ensuring equitable case selection, and promoting regional accountability mechanisms. If adopted, these measures would enhance the ICC’s legitimacy, align it more closely with its mission of universal justice, and foster greater participation and trust among non-party states.

IV. Conclusion

In conclusion, the ICC’s operations, particularly its case selection process, reveal deep-seated challenges that go beyond legal considerations. From China’s perspective, the ICC’s actions often reflect a politicized approach that undermines state sovereignty and disproportionately impacts non-Western nations. By critically examining jurisdiction, admissibility, and the role of the U.N. Security Council, this comment highlights how these structural and operational flaws contribute to perceptions of bias and selective justice.

China’s critiques and reform proposals underscore the importance of addressing these issues to restore the ICC’s credibility as a truly impartial global judicial institution. Decoupling the Court from political influences, ensuring equitable scrutiny of all states, promoting transparency, and fostering regional solutions represent meaningful steps toward achieving a more just and effective international legal system. Only through such reforms can the ICC fulfill its mandate to combat impunity while respecting the diversity and sovereignty of the global community.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   These concerns were elaborated in detail by Ambassador Wang Guangya, head of the Chinese delegation at the 1998 Rome Diplomatic Conference on the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Wang Guangya, Interview, Xinhua News Agency, Jul. 1998, available online; see also Dai Yuzhong (戴玉忠), Should China Join the International Criminal Court, Part 1, China Crim. Just. (Apr. 10, 2009) (China), available online.

   Five concise reasons why China does not join the International Criminal Court:

   • Universal Jurisdiction: China opposes the Rome Statute ’s universal jurisdiction, arguing it lacks voluntary state consent and contravenes the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
   • War Crimes Definition: China rejects extending “war crimes” to domestic conflicts, claiming it exceeds customary international law.
   • Security Council Role: China asserts that aggression, being a state act, must first be determined by the Security Council.
   • Prosecutor’s Powers: China fears the prosecutor’s expansive investigative authority could facilitate interference in domestic affairs.
   • Crimes Against Humanity: China insists “crimes against humanity” should apply only during wartime, as per customary international law.
   ↩
2. 2.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], Art. 8, available online. ↩

3. 3.

   See Yaling Pan (潘亚玲), China’s Non-Interference Diplomacy: From Defensive Advocacy to Participatory Advocacy, 9 J. World Econ. and Pol. 45 (2012) (China), available online.

   (The principle of non-interference refers to a foreign policy of not interfering in each other’s internal affairs for economic, political or ideological reasons. It was first proposed by China at the Bandung Conference in 1955. In recent years, with the development of international human rights norms, the concept of security threats and the concept of “responsibility to protect”, this principle has been challenged and questioned; but Chinese scholars believe that, through these concepts, the Western international community led by the United States and Europe has found increasing legitimacy support for various forms of humanitarian intervention, especially humanitarian intervention authorized by the U.N. Security Council). ↩

4. 4.

   Guiying Yu (喻贵英), An Analysis of International Criminal Law Enforcement Models, 6 J. Nw. U. Pol. Sci. & L. 80 (1998) (China), paywall, doi. ↩

5. 5.

   Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available online, archived. ↩

6. 6.

   Rome Statute, supra note 2, at Art. 12(1). ↩

7. 7.

   Id. Art. 12(2). ↩

8. 8.

   Id. Art. 13. ↩

9. 9.

   International Law View (国际法大视野), Status of the International Criminal Court’s Arrest Warrant Against Former Sudanese President Bashir, NetEase (Aug. 12, 2023, 9:21 PM) (China), available online. ↩

10. 10.

    Yang Jiao (焦阳), A Study of Issues on the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Non Contracting State Nationals, 40 J. Jinzhong U. 69–73 (2023) (China), paywall. ↩

11. 11.

    Rome Statute, supra note 2, at Preamble, Art. 1. ↩

12. 12.

    Id. Art. 13. ↩

13. 13.

    Xiumei Wang (王秀梅), 从苏丹情势分析国际刑事法院管辖权的补充性原则 [Analysis of the Principle of Complementarity of the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court from the Perspective of Sudan], 6 Modern Jurisprudence 181 (2005) (China), paywall. ↩

14. 14.

    Yi Wang (王逸) & Juecheng Zhao (赵觉珵), The International Criminal Court Issues Arrest Warrant for Netanyahu, Global Times, Nov. 22, 2024, (China), paywall, doi. ↩

15. 15.

    Id. ↩

16. 16.

    Rome Statute, supra note 2, at Art. 16. ↩

17. 17.

    Yi Wang (王毅), On the Selective Justice of the International Criminal Court (2023) (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Liaoning University) (China), paywall, doi. ↩

18. 18.

    Fu Ziluo (傅子洛) & Liu Dan (刘丹), The Fifth International Crime?—Theoretical Source and Legislative Response of “Ecocide”, 4 JBOS 25 (2023) (China), paywall. ↩

19. 19.

    Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson for China Foreign Ministry, Reply to Questions on the Security Council’s Adoption of the Resolution on the Darfur Issue (Aug. 2, 2007) (China), available online. ↩