II. Uganda: Self-Referral

The conflict that prompted the first self-referral to the ICC began long before the court’s inception. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) was founded in 1988 by Joseph Kony in order to overthrow President Museveni and establish a new government founded on his version of the ten commandments.5 Since the LRA was created they have routinely engaged in the rape and murder of civilians, abduction and enslavement of children, and attacks on displacement camps. According to the United Nations, it is estimated that the LRA is responsible for over 100,000 deaths, the abduction of between 60,000–100,000 children, and the displacement of 2.5 million civilians between 1988–2012.6

While President Museveni had long promoted a military solution to eliminate the LRA, after years of increasingly violent conflict and several failed peace negotiations, it became clear that the Ugandan government was unable to eradicate the LRA or arrive at a successful negotiation with them.7 Furthermore, President Museveni was facing increasing political backlash from local leaders surrounding his government’s failure to take care of the LRA as well as allegations surrounding his own army’s human rights abuses.8 Due to mounting pressure from his people and the fact that the conflict was fueling the idea that his government was illegitimate, Museveni ultimately referred the situation concerning the LRA to the ICC in hopes of gaining international support and establishing that his government was firmly in charge.

On December 16, 2003 Uganda became the first State Party to self-refer a case to the ICC under Articles 13(a) and 14 of the Rome Statute.9 Article 13(a) of the Rome Statute states that the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction in a situation where one or more of the crimes the ICC prosecutes (ex: crimes against humanity, war crimes, crime of aggression, and genocide) appears to have been committed and is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party.10 Article 14 states that a State Party must refer a situation to the Prosecutor with the purpose of determining whether someone should be charged with the commission of the crimes.11

Self-referring the situation in Uganda put Museveni and his government in a valuable position for several reasons. First, Uganda was lauded as a champion of international justice because they were willing to subject themselves to international scrutiny. During the formation of the Rome Statute one of the biggest perceived issues was getting countries to agree to potentially be prosecuted by an international court.12 By having Uganda be the first not only to acquiesce but ask to be prosecuted, President Museveni helped rally international support around his government.

Additionally, by referring the LRA to the ICC, President Museveni was able to control the narrative surrounding the conflict. Since Museveni and his government were the ones providing the Court with information, they were able to establish the focus on the atrocities of the LRA and not any crimes Museveni’s government may have committed.13 The Ugandan government was able to brand the LRA as criminals while simultaneously establishing themselves as a legitimate institution.

The fact that the case was referred to the Court by Uganda was beneficial to the ICC as well. At the time the case was referred, the Rome Statute had only entered into force a little over a year prior and the ICC needed to prove itself to supporters and adversaries alike. One of the main fears surrounding the ICC was that the prosecutor would abuse their power of proprio motu to discriminately target specific States. Another matter of trepidation was the United States’ refusal to accept the ICC, as this undermined the credibility of the Court. Both of these fears were addressed through Uganda’s self-referral.

Because Uganda requested that the ICC look into the LRA there could be no possible allegations of the Prosecutor abusing their proprio motu power. Additionally, there would be no issues with the ICC impeding on State sovereignty since the State was the party that asked the Court to prosecute the LRA. Rather, the ICC would be seen as helping out a State that has admitted that it does not have the capacity to appropriately prosecute this rebel group. Furthermore, the United States would be unlikely to object to the potential prosecution of the LRA since it had openly rejected the LRA and later put them on its international terrorist list.14 Ultimately, as an OTP official stated, “Uganda was a perfect case for the OTP’s first investigation.”15

Most importantly, it was imperative for the ICC that President Museveni and his government work with them if they wanted to successfully prosecute any members of the LRA. The ICC does not have its own police force, nor does it have the ability to properly conduct investigations without help from the state.16 Therefore, if the ICC wanted to gather enough evidence for arrest warrants and then wanted those warrants to be enforced they needed the Ugandan government’s cooperation. The ICC’s direct reliance on Museveni and his government allowed him to be applauded for giving the Court evidence against his enemies while simultaneously being able to protect his own interests.

Even though President Museveni’s military, the Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF) has repeatedly been accused of human rights violations such as unlawful killings, torture, and arbitrary detention, the ICC has never opened an investigation into any members of the UPDF.17 While former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has stated that the ICC has not looked into the UPDF because the gravity of their crimes is not the same as those that have been committed by the LRA, it is likely that the ICC has chosen to turn a blind eye on the UPDF because they need their cooperation in order to arrest and convict key figures of the LRA like Kony.18

Furthermore, in response to concerns regarding the lack of an investigation into the UPDF, ICC officials have responded that they have received no evidence to support the UPDF’s alleged war crimes.19 Since the majority of the evidence that the ICC has received regarding the situation in Northern Uganda comes directly from President Museveni’s government, it is unlikely that the ICC will ever get this evidence. This selective enforcement allowed President Museveni and the UPDF to continue these crimes while being perceived by the international community, and to a certain extent his own people, as a champion of justice.

Ultimately, by self-referring the situation in Northern Uganda regarding the LRA to the ICC, President Museveni was able to gain further political control. As a result of the ICC’s investigation into the LRA, Museveni was able to establish the legitimacy of his government by crafting the narrative that he referred the LRA to the ICC because he cared about justice while in reality his main purpose was to eliminate his competition. By being the first State to refer itself to the ICC, Museveni also provided the illusion that his government had nothing to hide. Even when that illusion was questioned there was little the ICC could do if they wanted Museveni’s continued cooperation in regards to the LRA. In conclusion, President Museveni was able to effectively use the ICC for his own domestic political gain.

III. Sudan: Security Council Referral

Under Article 13(b) of the Rome Statute, the Security Council can refer situations to the ICC prosecutor when exercising its powers to maintain and restore international peace and security.20 By receiving a referral from the United Nations Security Council (S.C.) the ICC is able to get jurisdiction over a State even if it is not a party to the Rome Statute.21 Since Sudan did not agree to the Rome Statute, a referral from the Security Council is the only way for the ICC to get jurisdiction to investigate Sudan.

The situation in Darfur, Sudan was the Security Council’s first referral to the ICC due to the massive amount of human rights atrocities that have taken place there. At the time of the referral (2005), the U.N. had estimated that at least 1.6 million civilians had been displaced and over 200,000 had died as a result of the fighting in Darfur.22

The situation in Darfur, Sudan was a result of tensions between Arabs and non-Arabs that boiled over in 2003 when two Darfuri rebel groups—the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement—started a rebellion against the government and its autocratic president Omar Al-Bashir.23 These rebels, who were primarily sedentary agriculturalists, were protesting what they perceived as unfair treatment from the Sudanese government due to the fact they were not Arab.24 The government responded by training and mobilizing the Arab-militia known as the Janjaweed.25 The Sudanese government provided the Janjaweed with arms, communications, and Sudanese military intelligence.26 The Janjaweed established a routine where they would attack civilian settlements with helicopter gunships or bombs and then ride in and rape women, kill men, and kidnap children. They would then seize anything of value and raze the village to the ground. The result was what the United Nations described as a humanitarian calamity and catastrophic human rights crisis that resulted in the Security Council’s referral to the ICC.27

In stark contrast to President Museveni’s self-referral, Al-Bashir had no authority in determining whether the ICC could investigate the situation in Darfur. Furthermore, while President Museveni was able to direct the ICC’s attention to his opponents, Omar Al-Bashir was one of the targets of the ICC’s investigation.28 The ICC determined that Al-Bashir played a key role in implementing the warfare campaign against Darfur and that he acted with specific intent to attempt to eradicate the Fur, Masilit, and Zaghawa ethnic groups.29 Consequently, the ICC issued warrants for his arrest regarding crimes against humanity and war crimes in 2009 and genocide in 2010.30

These arrest warrants were met with resistance by many Africans for several reasons. First, Al-Bashir was the first sitting head of state to be charged with crimes by the ICC, and he argued that he had head of state immunity. Customary international law provides that head of state immunity allows serving heads of state to have personal immunity from national courts of other States for all acts.31 This is a concept that is rooted in principles of state sovereignty and equality between States.32 Al-Bashir argued that by refusing to grant him head of state immunity the ICC was disrespecting both Sudan and Africa as a whole.

Al-Bashir was also able to use the ICC to his political advantage by using his indictment as an excuse to effectively expel key NGOs from Sudan. After learning of his potential indictment, Al-Bashir threatened the United Nations by telling them if the ICC executed an arrest warrant against him he would make sure the NGOs in Sudan would have to close down.33 Within a month of his arrest warrant, Al-Bashir had shut down sixteen major NGOs in Darfur. In response to international outrage, Al-Bashir stated that he would replace these NGOs with “national and friendly foreign NGOs.”34 However, there is no evidence that supports his statement. As a result of the expulsion of the NGOs, Al-Bashir was able to weaken the population in Darfur that his militia the Janjaweed had been created to eliminate. Additionally, the expulsion of foreign NGOs allowed Al-Bashir to reduce the amount of information other countries could receive regarding his agenda. Ultimately, by cutting out foreign NGOs, Al-Bashir was able to gain power by forcing his people to rely more heavily on the Sudanese government.

Al-Bashir was also able to rally support from the African Union (AU). By the time of Al-Bashir’s arrest warrants, the AU had become increasingly disillusioned by the ICC. African States had initially been among the ICC’s chief supporters.35 African States were eager to avoid atrocities like the ones committed during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 from occurring again. Many were also hopeful that an international court would prevent powerful countries from invading or taking advantage of the weaker African States.36 At the Rome Conference where the Rome Statute was drafted forty-seven African States were present, and the majority of them voted in favor of the establishment of the ICC.37 Senegal became the first State to ratify the Rome Statute in 1999 and several other African States immediately followed suit.38

African civil rights groups were helpful in the establishment of the ICC as well. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) passed a resolution in 1998 asking African States to ratify the Rome Statute and take steps to bring their national policies and laws into conformity with it.39

The African Union’s support for the ICC began to wane after it became clear that the ICC was focusing almost exclusively on Africa. At the time Al-Bashir’s arrest warrants were executed the ICC had only opened investigations into the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, and the Central African Republic.40 The investigation into Al-Bashir was the tipping point for many African States both because it was the first case that had not been self-referred and because he was the current head of state. Additionally, since Sudan is not a party to the Rome Statute, many African leaders saw the Security Council’s referral as a violation of State sovereignty. This feeling was exacerbated when the Security Council did not defer their investigation into Al-Bashir. Under Article 16 of the Rome Statute the Security Council has the power to defer investigations and prosecutions for a renewable period of twelve months.41

After learning that the prosecutor was going to apply for an arrest warrant for Al-Bashir, the AU Peace and Security Council requested that the Security Council defer the investigation because “the search for justice should be pursued in a way that does not impede or jeopardize lasting peace.”42 The AU Peace and Security Council also expressed concern that the arrest warrant may be a misuse of indictments against African leaders that reflects the ICC’s double standards.43 This statement was reinforced by the AU Heads of State and Government when they met a few months later.44 The AU Heads of State and Government reiterated their commitment to ending impunity while also stating that an indictment of Al-Bashir would undermine the potential peace process happening in The Sudan.45 They proposed the unprecedented step of calling the African countries that were parties to the Rome Statute together to discuss “views on the work of the ICC in relation to Africa” as well.46

The African Parties to the Rome Statute met and ultimately determined that because their Article 16 deferral request had not been met, the AU Member States would not cooperate pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statute in regards to the arrest and surrender of President Al-Bashir. Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute states that the ICC may not ask a State to act inconsistently with its obligations to international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person unless the Court can get the third State to agree to a waiver of immunity.47 Since Sudan has not agreed to a waiver of Al-Bashir’s head of state immunity, the AU determined that they did not need to comply with the ICC’s request.

Additionally, the AU found that Article 27(2) of the Rome Statute did not apply to Al-Bashir’s case. Article 27(2) states that ordinary immunities that are attached to the official capacity of a person do not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over them.48 However, both Al-Bashir and the AU determined that, because Sudan had never agreed to the Rome Statute, Sudan was not subject to Article 27(2).

Ultimately, Al-Bashir’s indictment by the ICC was the catalyst that began the AU’s journey of condemnation toward the International Criminal Court. By not acknowledging the AU Peace and Security Council’s request for a referral into the investigation of Al-Bashir, the Security Council only exacerbated feelings of resentment and the perception of bias against African States. Additionally, the investigation into Al-Bashir, a sitting head of state, was viewed by many African States as contrary to contemporary international law. The AU felt that the ICC would never have investigated a sitting head of state outside of Africa. This led many African States to believe that the ICC was simply another instrument of the west that was trying to manipulate their choices and take away their sovereignty. Consequently, the AU rallied behind Al-Bashir and he gained the political support of many key African leaders.

While Al-Bashir was able to use the ICC for his political gain to some extent, ultimately his indictment by the ICC had a negative effect on his reign over Sudan. While Al-Bashir was allowed to visit many States such as South Africa and Egypt even after his arrest warrants were issued, he still had to carefully plan which States to travel to in order to avoid potentially being arrested.49 This reduced his ability to effectively rule.

Furthermore, in 2011 southern Sudanese citizens overwhelmingly voted to secede from Sudan. This left Sudan without most of its oil revenue and led to inflation and widespread shortages.50 As a result, opposition groups and ordinary citizens began to express their resentment towards Al-Bashir for failing to remedy the shortages, address their issues, or implement political reforms.51 Although Al-Bashir was able to win the 2015 election, he was faced with increasingly large backlash until he was ultimately overthrown in a military coup in 2019.52

Although Al-Bashir attempted to use his indictment by the ICC to his political advantage, the investigation into the situation in Darfur, Sudan was ultimately detrimental to his political position due to the lack of control he had in the proceedings. Since the situation was referred by the Security Council, Al-Bashir was unable to establish a narrative as successfully as President Museveni. This was in large part due to the fact that Al-Bashir had always condemned the ICC and thus was unwilling to work with the Court from the beginning.

Additionally, unlike the situation in Northern Uganda where the ICC needed President Museveni and his government’s cooperation in order to secure evidence, the ICC was targeting Al-Bashir and his government and knew he was unlikely to cooperate with them. Consequently, due to his lack of control over the ICC’s proceedings Al-Bashir was only minimally able to use the Court for his political advantage.

IV. Kenya: Proprio Motu

The situation in Kenya was the first case that the Prosecutor decided to open proprio motu. Proprio motu is a power granted to the Prosecutor by Article 15(1) of the Rome Statute.53 Proprio motu refers to the power of the Prosecutor to open an investigation into alleged atrocity crimes without a referral from the Security Council or a State Party. The crimes must have taken place on the territory of a state party or by a national of a state party. Additionally, if the crimes occurred in a non-state party the Prosecutor can still open a case proprio motu if the non-state party consents to the ICC’s jurisdiction.54

The situation in Kenya was a result of the post-election violence of 2007 and 2008. The two major political groups at the time were the Party of National Unity led by Mwai Kibaki and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga.55 Political parties in Kenya are heavily determined by ethnicity, and both candidates used fear of ethnic dominance or displacement in order to gather support.

Although the election day occurred with no violence, almost immediately there were accusations of major voter-rigging. Odinga, who had been winning by 370,000 votes with 90 percent of the constituencies reporting, was announced the loser by over 200,000 votes.56 Despite evidence of voter-rigging and the admission of several commissioners that they were under pressure to announce Kibaki as the winner, Kibaki was still sworn in. This led to violence in Odinga’s home province and Nairobi. The violence was initially directed against the Kikuyu (Kibaki’s ethnic group), but soon turned into indiscriminate looting, raping, and killing. The violence resulted in around 1,200 deaths, 350,000 internally displaced persons, 2,000 refugees, and the destruction of 117,000 private properties and 500 government-owned properties.57

In response to allegations that the violence was orchestrated by politicians who ordered criminal gangs to commit the violence, a Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence was created.58 This commission, known as the Waki Commission, was tasked with investigating state security agencies and making recommendations according to their findings.59 The Waki Commission completed its report and called on the government to establish a Special Tribunal to prosecute perpetrators of the post-election violence. If the government was unable to do this in a reasonable amount of time the Commission recommended that the cases be referred to the ICC. After the deadline the Commission set up for the government passed, the names were given to the ICC and after analyzing the reports provided by the Waki Commission, Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo decided to open an investigation.60

A. Pre-Election 2013

Although Ocampo identified six individuals as potentially responsible for crimes against humanity committed during the post election violence, this comment only focuses on two: William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta. During the 2007 election Ruto was a member of the ODM party and backed Odinga’s campaign to unseat Kibaki. Ruto was alleged to be responsible as an indirect co-perpetrator of the crimes against humanity of murder, and forcible transfer and persecution by the ICC.61 In contrast, Kenyatta chose to back Kibaki in the 2007 election.62 Kenyatta was alleged to be an indirect co-perpetrator of the crimes against humanity of murder, forcible transfer, rape, persecution, and other inhumane acts.63

Despite being in opposing political camps in the 2007 election, Ruto and Kenyatta ended up using their ICC charges to their advantage in order to win the 2013 election. It was beneficial to them that many Kenyans distrusted the ICC after its indictment of Al-Bashir and were consequently reluctant to have the ICC investigate them.64

In 2011 the Kenyan government challenged the admissibility of the cases before the ICC.65 The government argued that under Article 17 of the Rome Statute the ICC could not prosecute Ruto, Kenyatta, and the others. Article 17 discusses the principle of complementarity, which states in part that if a State government is already dealing with the same case they have primary jurisdiction over it.66 The Kenyan government argued that the adoption of their new constitution and various legal reforms have made it so that Kenya can conduct a sufficient investigation into the post election violence of 2007.67 However, the ICC quickly rejected this argument as the Kenyan government had been given an opportunity to form a special tribunal before the ICC’s involvement and failed to do so. Furthermore, after the adoption of their constitution the Kenyan government had not begun any of their own legal proceedings into the cases before the ICC and showed no sign of doing so.68

Kenyatta and Ruto were able to use Kenya’s resentment towards the ICC to their political advantage. By banding together to form the Jubilee Alliance, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to support the narrative that they were drawing their two ethnic groups (Kalenjin and the Kikuyu) together. Despite previously being on opposing sides of the 2007 election, by running together for the 2013 election they were showing the world and the Kenyan people that they were healing the divisions between their ethnic groups. This not only helped their bid for election but also served to make them look slightly more innocent from an international perspective. Given that Kenyatta and Ruto were now committed to bringing their ethnic groups together, it presents an image of unity that makes it seem less likely that these very same politicians would have ordered the torture and murder of these ethnic groups a few years previously.

Another way that Kenyatta and Ruto were able to use the charges from the ICC to their political advantage was by campaigning partly on the idea that Odinga and his “western allies” were using the ICC to attempt to take them out of the election. Many western countries had issued statements condemning Kenyatta and Ruto or warning the Kenyan people that electing those indicted by the ICC would be a mistake. For example, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs said that there would be consequences if Kenyans elect those indicted by the ICC.69 This statement was heavily criticized by supporters of the Jubilee Alliance who felt that the statement contradicted President Obama’s when he stated that the U.S. would honor the 2013 election results. The fact that President Obama shared a Luo ethnic heritage with Odinga also served to reduce many Kenyans’ trust as this was seen as an additional reason the U.S. may want to manipulate the election in Odinga’s favor.70 Additionally, several European governments had stated that they would impose sanctions on Kenya if they elected Kenyatta and Ruto.71 This further served to incite many Kenyans as they saw these statements as infringing on their right to choose their own leaders.

Finally, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to use the ICC to help them win the 2013 election by implying that the charges against them were an indictment of their entire communities. To exemplify, there were arguments made by the ICC’s prosecutor that Ruto was a part of a “Kalenjin network” that had been organized to create violence after the elections.72 Many Kalenjin perceived this as the ICC villainizing and condemning their entire ethnic group. Additionally, many Kikuyu believe that any attacks Kenyatta may have organized were in order to protect the Kikuyu who were violently targeted after the election. Thus, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to gain further support from their ethnic groups by suggesting that the ICC was disparaging not only them but their communities as well.

B. Post Election 2013

Kenyatta and Ruto’s condemnation of the ICC continued to help them politically even after they had won the election. Kenyans were outraged after learning that the ICC did not plan on dropping the charges against Kenyatta and Ruto even though they were now President and Deputy President. This outrage was further inflamed when the ICC denied Kenyatta’s request to attend his trial via video so he could remain in Kenya to effectively govern.

Additionally, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to further exacerbate the gulf between the African Union and the ICC that Al-Bashir’s indictment had started. After winning the election, Kenyatta and Ruto managed to accumulate the support of enough AU member states to call an extraordinary session of the AU Assembly.73 This session was primarily focused on Africa’s relationship with the ICC. Kenyatta and Ruto used the session to convince the AU to request that the ICC defer their case.74 They also used African leaders’ fears of also being prosecuted to their advantage. By reminding the AU that, with both Kenyatta and Al-Bashir, two African Presidents had been targeted by the ICC, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to convince the AU to stipulate that they would not recognize any charges before an international court against a serving president or senior member of a government in power.75 Ultimately, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to use their ICC indictment to garner more political support from the AU after they had been elected.

On December 5, 2014 the Prosecutor of the ICC Fatou Bensouda announced that the ICC was withdrawing its case against Kenyatta.76 The case was withdrawn after the trial was postponed twice and several key witnesses suddenly retracted their statements, refused to testify, or simply went missing.77 Ruto’s case was later thrown out by the ICC on April 5, 2016 due to “troubling incidence of witness interference and intolerable meddling.”78

Ultimately, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to successfully use the ICC’s indictment of them to their political advantage. By crafting a narrative that the ICC was an instrument of the west that was attempting to reduce Kenya’s sovereignty as a State, Kenyatta and Ruto were able to garner support for their campaign while also casting doubt on their political opponents. Furthermore, they were able to rally much of the African Union behind them by claiming that the ICC is a neocolonial weapon being used by the west to usurp their power.

V. Conclusion

Although the International Criminal Court is clearly a valuable institution with an honorable purpose, in order to be more effective it should recognize that it is not just a judicial institution but also an inherently political one. By claiming to avoid politics, the ICC often comes across as hypocritical when it inevitably has to deal with the political complexities that come with being an international court.

Instead, the ICC should acknowledge that there are times when, as an international judicial institution, the Court will need to occasionally engage in political endeavors in order to effectively prosecute certain individuals. This is perfectly exemplified by the ICC’s investigation into the situation in Uganda. The ICC needed President Museveni and the Ugandan government’s cooperation in order to gather enough evidence to convict members of the LRA. Even though the ICC was called upon to investigate Museveni and the UPDF, the Prosecutor correctly concluded that the gravity of the UPDF’s crimes was less than the LRA’s. Even though the ICC knew that Museveni and his government had also likely committed crimes that they could prosecute, they chose not to in part due to the fact that if they had begun to investigate Museveni he would have refused to work with the ICC anymore. As a result of the ICC’s selective enforcement they were able to successfully convict a key commander in the LRA and force its leader into hiding.

In contrast, when the ICC immediately went after key political leaders such as Al-Bashir, Kenyatta, and Ruto without securing a cooperative foothold in the State first they were unable to establish an effective investigation and consequently spent years on cases that did not sustain any convictions and were fraught with tampering. Without a police force or enough resources to conduct a thorough investigation on their own, the ICC is dependent on the State where the situation they are investigating has occurred. Thus, in order to effectively carry out its mission of ending impunity, the International Criminal Court must be willing to acknowledge that it is a political institution and be willing to occasionally engage in selective enforcement if it means that some victims will be able to get justice.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   About the Court, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

2. 2.

   International Criminal Court, Understanding the International Criminal Court (Mar. 16, 2021), available online. ↩

3. 3.

   ICC Investigations, CICC, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

4. 4.

   The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ASP, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

5. 5.

   William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice: The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 257 (May 2009), available online, doi. ↩

6. 6.

   Central Africa (The Lord’s Resistance Army), Global Centre R2P (Apr. 2, 2022), available online. ↩

7. 7.

   Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal Court, 99 Am. J. Int’l L. 403 (Apr. 2005), paywall, doi. ↩

8. 8.

   Sarah M. H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EJIL 941, 946 (Nov. 2010), available online, doi. ↩

9. 9.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, as amended [hereinafter Rome Statute], available online. ↩

10. 10.

    Id. ↩

11. 11.

    Id. ↩

12. 12.

    Andreas Th. Müller & Ignaz Stegmiller, Self-Referrals on Trial: From Panacea to Patient, 8 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1267 (Nov. 15, 2010), available online, doi. ↩

13. 13.

    Nouwen & Werner, supra note 8, at 949. ↩

14. 14.

    Lord’s Resistance Army, National Counterterrorism Center, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

15. 15.

    Sarah H. M. Nouwen, Complementarity in the Line of Fire 111 (Nov. 5, 2013), paywall, doi. ↩

16. 16.

    Mark Kersten, Why the ICC Won’t Prosecute Museveni, Just. in Conflict (Mar. 19, 2015), available online. ↩

17. 17.

    Human Rights Watch, “Get the Gun!” Human Rights Violations by Uganda’s National Army in Law Enforcement Operations in Karamoja Region (Sep. 2007), available online. ↩

18. 18.

    Mark Kersten, Yeah Right: ICC Officials Say There’s No Evidence Against Ugandan Military, Just. in Conflict (May 5, 2016), available online. ↩

19. 19.

    Id. ↩

20. 20.

    Rome Statute, supra note 9, at Art. 13(b). ↩

21. 21.

    Sudan, CICC, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

22. 22.

    Darfur, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

23. 23.

    Life Before the Genocide, Holocaust Memorial Day Trust, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

24. 24.

    Janjaweed: Sudanese Militia, Encyclo. Britannica, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

25. 25.

    Id. ↩

26. 26.

    Id. ↩

27. 27.

    Explainer: How Darfur Became a “Humanitarian Calamity and Catastrophic Human Rights Crisis”, U.N. News, Dec. 14, 2023, available online. ↩

28. 28.

    Removal of President Omar al-Bashir and the Continued Pursuit of Justice, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

29. 29.

    Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, International Justice is Finally Catching Up with Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir (Feb. 11, 2020), available online. ↩

30. 30.

    Omar al-Bashir, CICC, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

31. 31.

    Magnus Mannerström, Head of State Immunity and International Crimes (2015) (Master of Laws Thesis, Lund University), available online. ↩

32. 32.

    Id. ↩

33. 33.

    Sudan: NGO Expulsion to Hit Darfur’s Displaced, IRIN (Mar. 9, 2009), available online. ↩

34. 34.

    Id. ↩

35. 35.

    John Mukum Mbaku, International Justice: The International Criminal Court and Africa, Brookings Institution (Dec. 20, 2013), available online. ↩

36. 36.

    Id. ↩

37. 37.

    Sascha-Dominick Dov Bachmann & Naa A. Sowatey-Adjei, The African Union-ICC Controversy Before the ICJ: A Way Forward to Strengthen International Criminal Justice?, 29 WILJ 247 (Apr. 7, 2020), available online. ↩

38. 38.

    Id. ↩

39. 39.

    African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, ACHPR/Res.27(XXIV)98, Resolution on the Ratification of the Treaty on the International Criminal Court (Oct. 31, 1998), available online. ↩

40. 40.

    Situations Under Investigations, available online (last visited Dec. 6, 2024). ↩

41. 41.

    Rome Statute, supra note 9, at Art. 16. ↩

42. 42.

    African Union, PSC/MIN/Comm(CXLII) Rev.1, Communiqué of the 142nd Meeting of Peace and Security Council (Jul. 21, 2008), available online. ↩

43. 43.

    Id. ↩

44. 44.

    Dire Tladi, The African Union and the International Criminal Court: The Battle for the Soul of International Law, 34 SAYIL 57 (2009), available online. ↩

45. 45.

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