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- Alma Pekmezovic: The ICC Prosecutor has recently submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC to authorize an investigation into crimes committed in Côte d’Ivoire. The post-election violence in the Ivorian territory led to serious crimes including murder of civilians, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary detentions and the use of child soldiers. The decision of the ICC Prosecutor to act on his initiative and ask the Pre-Trial Chamber for permission to investigate the human rights violations in... (more)
- BBM: It is essential that the ICC maintain its independence, actual and perceived. The role of ASP having oversight over the Court to facilitate efficiency and economy is a poor idea, although pursuant to Art. 112 (4). The dangers as I see it, are lack of independence, and the ICC taking on a role similar to the ICJ with respect to its advisory opinions. As we know the ICJ finds itself in a catch 22 situation with requests for advisory opinions put forward by the UNGA. In this case the ICJ... (more)
- danterzian: The IOM Operational Mandate’s proposed oversight mechanism is a constitutional restriction of prosecutorial independence. Introduction Article 112(4) of the Rome Statute grants the Assembly of States Parties (“Assembly”) the discretion to “establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and... (more)
- davidlee211: The IOM may not be needed for financial supervision or administrative management of the ICC, but it would be significantly beneficial to the Court for oversight of misconduct and making recommendations to the ASP. Introduction The general concept of judicial or prosecutorial independence is often cited as a justification to minimize the need for oversight of the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “... (more)
- Cecilia: The Independent Oversight Mechanism will consume the resources of the International Criminal Court and will adversely affect the court’s ability to perform its functions effectively. Introduction The Independent Oversight Mechanism as envisaged by the Rome Statute could potentially serve an important function in enhancing the International Criminal Court’s efficiency and economy. However, the mechanism... (more)
- Scott McDonald: The creation of the Independent Oversight Mechanism (IOM) presents a new set of challenges and opportunities for the International Criminal Court (ICC). In order to capitalize on the benefits that the IOM may be able to provide, the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) must ensure that it is built upon a solid foundation: a properly tailored mandate. The Rome Statute provision that allowed the ASP to create... (more)
- G. L.: I. Introduction During the Ninth Session of the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), the Independent Oversight Mechanism (“IOM”) became operationalized in its investigative function. However, the IOM, as it is currently structured, would be redundant in light of existing institutional checks in the International Criminal Court (“ICC”). The IOM’s functions are... (more)
- Alma Pekmezovic: Introduction There are two dominant theories that inform the current debate. The first theory focuses on agency costs, while the second makes the concept of trusteeship the focal point of the analysis. In this essay, I will argue that the agency framework is not appropriate in the context of the ICC. The Trusteeship Model Under the trusteeship model, trustees are actors who are given authority to make meaningful... (more)
Comment on the Oversight Question: “This debate addresses a constitutional issue: What is the proper balance between the independence of the International Criminal Court (the “Court”) and the oversight role of the Assembly of States Parties (the “Assembly”) regarding the Court’s administration under Article 112 of the Rome Statute?”
Article 112 provides the assembly with responsibility and duties for the operation of the Court- including enforcement procedures,
The oversight role did not include the Court as responsible for anything omitted to be done, where an Organ exists that must do what requires to be done consistent with[in] the Framework called the Rome Statute.
I also believe to show the Court as Independent Constitutionally all Judges cannot be from the State of the National Security Counsel, and state Cannot be classified as more then Observer at Time of Judicial Appointment.
Section 36 provides a minimum Number of Judges in good standing are appointed, that number can be increased,
Section 87 provides questions questions related to enforcement procedure, whether by Member State, or not.
In my view, the I.C.C. should adopt a policy of having the most senor Court Officer [Chief Justice, state], subject to review by the Majority of Members, for the purpose of Child[ren] Protection [victims] [General mental health negatively effected by criminal mind] [disabled are youth for the purpose of law] [victim are youth for the purpose of Law].
For the purpose of trial division, with onset Warning can be called for appeal by the state assembling to the I.C.C. Administration, or Chief Justice to review [registrar as a right at Bar review expense and accounts of Lawyers, including recommending adoption of policies to adapt to changing needs].
In this context of operation the I.C.C. becomes an enforcement agent as a whole and complete superior Court, and Inferior as well making those Courts available as a resource effecting expenses of the international obligation to provide that already exists at there home as inferior to the majority. [there is a context of land mass earth walking is natural].
It is noteworthy that "policing is a provincial function, or city function, a Supreme Court is inherent jurisdiction for code [local cultural and customary]". therefore access to funding is in international obligations for the purpose of the I.C.C. becomes available for policing [re: Afghanistan act] [Canada citation: peacekeepers]