III. De jure Immunity

To date, 72 of the world’s 194 countries, or 37% of all nations, are NSPs.8 More than one third of the world’s countries therefore enjoy de jure immunity from the ICC.

The precise composition of this 37% at least partially accounts for the immunity gap between African and non-African states. This is because a significant majority of the world’s NSPs are, almost certainly un-coincidentally, amongst the world’s most repressive and prosecutable countries. Moreover, an overwhelming percentage of these notorious states are in fact non-African countries.

Two datasets that track human rights abuses by country—Freedom House’s “Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies in 2012” and Fund for Peace’s Human Rights index—support my assertion.9 Consider, for example, that fifteen of the sixteen states identified in the Freedom House report are NSPs,10 or that ten of the twelve worst human rights abusers according to the Fund for Peace boast the same status.11 It therefore matters not that attacks against civilian populations were widely reported in the Burma, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, and Syria; that enslavement, in the form of human trafficking, is rampant in the Burma, China, Eritrea, Laos and Uzbekistan12; that torture is par for the course in China, Eritrea, Laos, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Uzbekistan13; that rape and other acts of sexual violence are common in the Burma, Somalia, and Sudan14; that persecution against groups on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion or gender was widely reported in each of the sixteen countries identified in the Freedom House report15; or that the number of disappeared persons is, according to Amnesty International, high in Algeria, China, Lebanon, Nepal, Pakistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka, Turkmenistan and Yemen.16 Because each country is a NSP, each is also immune, as a matter of law, from ICC investigation (save, of course, an UNSC recommendation).

Critically, however, not every country appearing in the aforementioned Freedom House and Fund for Peace indexes has de jure immunity. Indeed, there are two exceptions: Chad and the DRC, the only State Parties appearing in either of these two infamous datasets. This suggests that unlike their notorious non-African counterparts, both Chad and the DRC have, for reasons beyond the scope of this paper, voluntarily waived their de jure immunity. The same is true of the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Mali, and Uganda, five other African countries currently under ICC investigation.

It is therefore plausible that the so-called Africa bias results from a stark de jure immunity gap. Whereas most prosecutable African states like Chad and the DRC have relinquished de jure immunity, most prosecutable non-African states, from Sri Lanka to Saudi Arabia, have retained it. As a result, the majority of prosecutable states that actually fall within the Court’s jurisdiction are located in Africa. In this sense, the ICC’s unbalanced caseload is largely a byproduct of these non-African NSPs’ refusals to ratify or accede to the Statute. Neither the Court nor the OTP thus deserve blame.

However, the de jure immunity gap between prosecutable African and non-African states only partially explain the so-called Africa bias. Indeed, while this hypothesis accounts for the African State Parties currently under ICC investigation, it fails to explain how or why two African NSPs, Libya and Sudan, are currently before the Court. Clearly then, the de jure immunity gap does not, in and of itself, account for the Court’s unbalanced caseload. Another form of protection, called P5 immunity, is equally revealing.

IV. P5 Immunity

NSPs acquire P5 immunity through cliency relationships. When they do, “Security-Council-guaranteed accountability-free zones” are formed, and the ICC cannot investigate crimes committed in, or by citizens of, these states.17

A. Clientelism Defined

Before elaborating further, I first must define clientelism. This is not an easy task. Indeed, one scholar recently noted that the concept lacks any “generally accepted definition,” and instead proceeded to highlight four key elements—dyadic relationships, contingency, hierarchy, and iteration—essential to its meaning.18 For simplicity’s sake, I rely on Mark J. Gasiorowski’s definition. He explains:

Cliency is a mutually-beneficial, security-oriented relationship between the states of two countries, known as the patron and the client, which differ greatly in size, wealth, and military and political power. Cliency consists, in essence, of a reciprocal exchange, between the patron and client, of goods and services which enhance their mutual security.19

Gasiorowski’s definition therefore emphasizes that cliency relationships involve two key elements: an exchange that is mutually beneficial to parent and client alike, and a relationship rooted in security. These two elements are obviously interrelated. The backbone of any cliency relationship is its symbiotic nature; this symbiosis is predicated on the patron and client’s “international security considerations.”20

Equally apparent is that both the patron and client enter the cliency relationship for distinct purposes. The patron receives an ally who advances its regional security interests.21 Typically, the client does so by providing the patron with “access to military bases, navigational or overflight privileges, and active cooperation in certain military and intelligence activities.”22 It is for this reason that clients are generally located in “strategically-important” regions, irrespective of their “economic saliency.”23 Accordingly, Gasiorowski (accurately) predicted that patrons are most likely to acquire clients in the Middle East and East and Southeast Asia.24

In exchange for advancing its regional interests, the patron generally furnishes the client with an array of benefits known as “cliency instruments.” These include one or more of the following:

(1) Economic aid, including loans, grants, and indirect transfers such as loan guarantees and import quotas; (2) security assistance, including training and equipment for the client’s military police, and intelligence forces; (3) security arrangements, such as treaties, alliances, and informal commitments of support; (4) overt or covert intervention in the client’s domestic politics.25

Though the precise form of these instruments varies from relationship to relationship, a patron’s overarching goal in providing them is universal: to strengthen a client’s security and empower it against foreign and or domestic foes.26 The following section’s analysis of two cliency relationships will enumerate how patrons use these instruments to accomplish this objective.

B. The Impact of Clientelism on the Court’s Caseload

Together with the disproportionate number of prosecutable non-African NSPs (see above), I believe that clientelism accounts for much of the so-called Africa bias. This is because a handful of the world’s most prosecutable non-African states are not only NSPs, but are also clients of one or more P5 members. By contrast, no African state fits this mold. None therefore enjoys P5 immunity. Relying on Gasiorowski’s definition, this section specifically analyzes the relationship between clientelism and P5 immunity with respect to two allegedly prosecutable states, Israel and Syria, and more generally considers the impact of P5 immunity on the Court’s caseload.27

1. Israel

Israel and the United States enjoy a mutually beneficial relationship, the backbone of which is undoubtedly security. Indeed, the U.S. State Department’s website explicitly states, “commitment to Israel’s security has been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in the Middle East since Israel’s creation.”28 Three of Gasiorowski’s aforementioned cliency instruments, security assistance, loan guarantees, and security arrangements, affirm this commitment.

Beginning with security assistance, Israel, a country of approximately 7.8 million people, received more than $22 billion (US$) of military aid from the U.S. between 2003-2011.29 This accounted for 17% of Israel’s total military expenditures over this period.30 Moreover, included in this figure is approximately $8 billion of military equipment, a number that exceeds the value of equipment sold or given by the U.S. to Australia (7.7 bn.), Japan (5.5 bn.), Egypt (5.2 bn.) and the UK (4 bn.) despite their respective populations of 22, 127.4, 83.6 and 63 million persons.31 Even more revealing is the fact that this $8 billion represents an astonishing 93% of all arms exported to Israel over this nine-year span.32

In addition to providing Israel with direct military aid, Washington also guarantees a portion of Israel’s loan obligations. In 2003, Washington approved $9 billion in loan guarantees; Congress recently extended this guarantee (of the remaining $3.8 billion) through 2016.33 As a result, the U.S. is currently liable for up to $3.8 billion dollars in the event of an Israeli default. With this security, Jerusalem is able to borrow money at considerably lower interest rates.

But Washington’s commitment to Tel Aviv’s security is thicker than dollars. The two countries participate in numerous joint military exercises every year. In fact, the two countries very recently conducted Austere Challenge 12, their largest joint military operation in history.34 Moreover, the U.S. operates the Dimona Radar Facility in Southern Israel, and Port of Haifa is a frequent port of call for the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet.35

The U.S. also protects Israel from its repeated (and outrageously disproportionate) attack at the United Nations. Since 2000, the U.S. has vetoed ten UNSC resolutions in condemnation of Israel.36 By comparison, Washington vetoed just one other resolution in this thirteen-year span.37 Relatedly, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has vilified Israel in 30 of the 46 resolutions passed since 2006 (the same year the UNHRC replaced the United Nations Commission on Human Rights); each instance the U.S. had the opportunity to do so,38 it voted against these resolutions.39

Collectively, these trends and statistics indicate the robust nature of the U.S.-Israel cliency relationship. More importantly, however, they suggest that the U.S. would undoubtedly veto any UNSC resolution seeking to refer Israel, a NSP, to the ICC. In this sense, Israel enjoys P5 immunity from the Court. Therefore, despite the international community’s preoccupation with punishing Israel for allegedly perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza and the West Bank in 2008-09 and 2012, it appears that Israeli officials are immune from an UNSC-initiated ICC investigation.40

2. Syria

Syria, like it foe to the southwest, enjoys a cliency relationship with Russia. Indeed, the Moscow-Damascus tandem in many ways parallels that of its Washington-Jerusalem counterpart. The former, like the latter, is rooted in security, and similarly features a wide array of direct military aid, loan assistance, and other security arrangements.

Beginning with military assistance, Russia provides Syria with the vast majority of its weapons. Between 2003 and 2011, Syria received $1.4 billion of its nearly $2 billion (70%) worth of military imports from Russia.41 Only three countries—Algeria, Malaysia, and Venezuela—imported more Russian arms per capita over this period.42 More recent estimates suggest that Syria has even jumped to the top of this list. Syria currently purchases $700 million arms from Russia per year.43 In fact, sources now suggest that 10% of all Russian arms sales are Syria-bound.44

The Syrian-Russian cliency relationship consists of more than just weapons. Russia has forgiven $10 billion in Syrian debt.45 It is also allegedly “printing money” for the cash-strapped Assad regime.46 Moreover, Tartus, Syria is Russia’s lone naval base in the Mediterranean (and, in fact, the only Russian naval base outside of the former Soviet Union).47 The base provides Moscow with a crucial fueling zone, obviating the Kremlin’s need to send ships back to the Black Sea for oil.48

Finally, and perhaps most critically, Russia has a proven track record of protecting Syria at the U.N. Over the past two years, Moscow vetoed three UNSC resolutions in condemnation of the Assad regime.49 Considering the fact that Russia vetoed only six other UNSC resolutions since the fall of the Berlin Wall, this number is quite revealing. That Russia voted against four UNHRC resolutions targeting Syria since February 2012 similarly evidences Moscow’s commitment to Syria’s (read: Assad’s) security.50

Together, Russia’s military assistance, financial generosity, and other security arrangements prove the strength of the Russian-Syrian cliency relationship. Consequently, this brief analysis suggests that Russia would almost certainly veto any UNSC resolution recommending Syria to the ICC. In this sense, Syria, like Israel, has successfully secured P5 immunity. The death of 70,000 people,51 as well as the disappearance of almost 30,000 civilians,52 will not be investigated by the Court.

3. Beyond Israel and Syria

It is entirely possible that several countries in addition to Israel and Syria are clients of one or more P5 Members and therefore enjoy the benefit of P5 immunity. However, due to a lack of reliable and or transparent information, it is difficult to discuss these relationships with certainty. I will therefore share my thoughts on that which I’ve been able to find, though I fully acknowledge that these opinions are speculative.

Staying in the Middle East, it is possible that Iran is a client of Russia. Moscow has twice voted against UNHRC resolutions condemning the Islamic Republic for perpetrating massive human rights abuses.53 It also supplies Tehran with the majority of the Islamic Republic’s military equipment.54 Still, since 2006, Russia has voted in favor of eight UNSC resolutions critical of, and even imposing sanctions on, Iran because of its nuclear agenda.55 Moreover, numerous reports have recently intimated that bilateral relations are currently tense.56 Finally, and as will be discussed below with regard to Sudan, that a country is a major importer of Russian arms does not necessarily guarantee its possession of P5 immunity.57 As a result of these competing realities, it is unclear how Russia would ultimately vote should the UNSC refer Iran to the ICC.

By contrast, it is likely that Russia, and possibly China, would veto a UNSC referral of Sri Lanka to the Court. In fact, Richard Dicker, director of Human Rights Watch’s international justice program, listed Sri Lanka, along with Israel and Syria, as one of the “Security Council-guaranteed accountability-free zones.”58 Though various indicia of military and economic aid are difficult to verify, Beijing’s and Moscow’s actions at the UNHRC buttress Dicker’s claim: China and Russia opposed two resolutions condemning Colombo for its alleged abuses against the Tamil rebels, (including the death of nearly 40,000 people) during the final phase of a 26-year civil war.59 Accordingly, it is probable that China and Russia would similarly veto a UNSC referral to the ICC.60

North Korea, too, is a possible candidate for P5 immunity. The Hermit Kingdom has, for decades, relied on China for its security. However, precise data evidencing the transfer of various cliency instruments from Beijing to Pyongyang is impossible to find. The only ascertainable information of relevance is China’s voting record at the UN. It closely parallels that of Russia’s vis-à-vis Iran: Beijing has opposed UNHRC resolutions condemning North Korea for human rights abuses,61 but has repeatedly voted in favor of UNSC resolutions sanctioning Pyongyang for its nuclear program.62 It is therefore unclear how China would vote should the UNSC recommend the pariah state to the ICC. Militating against a Chinese veto is North Korea’s third and most recent round of nuclear testing, which might have finally put Beijing over the edge.63

4. Africa

Whereas the Middle East is home to (at least) two states in possession of P5 immunity, no African country is similarity shielded from the Court’s jurisdiction.

Consider, for example, arms sales from P5 Members to African countries. Between 2003-2011, France did not export more than $50 million in arms to any of Africa’s 48 states.64 Over this same period, the U.K. did so to South Africa only.65 Similarly, just two African states, South Africa and Nigeria, imported more than $50 million of weaponry from the world’s largest exporter, the U.S.66 Therefore, by at least one metric of security assistance, these three countries lack any clients in the Dark Continent.

China and Russia were more generous. Each independently exported weapons in excess of $50 million to four African countries.67 However, this fact, by itself, does not translate into P5 immunity. Sudan is proof. Between 2003-2011, Khartoum was the largest and second largest African recipient of Russian and Chinese arms, respectively.68 However, both Moscow and Beijing voted to refer Sudan to the ICC.69 In other words, even Khartoum failed to acquire P5 immunity.

Arms sales are not the only indicia that illustrate the paucity of African-P5 cliency relationships. No P5 state, with the exception of France, has a strong military presence in Africa. Russia, China, and the UK do not have a single military base on the continent. The U.S. has just one naval base, in Djibouti70; France, too, has a base in Djibouti, as well as two smaller ones in Senegal and Gabon.71

Finally, and most importantly, African countries are similarly lacking in informal security arrangements. Since 2001, the UNSC voted on 341 resolutions targeting at least fifteen specific African states.72 It vetoed just one.73 In other words, 99.7% of the time, no P5 member came to an African state’s defense. It is thus unsurprising that Sudan and Libya weren’t spared from UNSC-initiated ICC investigations.74

In sum, it appears that no African country currently enjoy a cliency relationship with a P5 member. None therefore possesses P5 immunity. Sudan and Libya are the most glaring examples, as unvetoed UNSC referrals led to ICC investigations. Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, or Somalia—all NSPs repeatedly condemned by the UNSC for rampant human rights violations—might soon suffer the same fate.75

It is therefore clear that P5 immunity contributes to the immunity gap between prosecutable African and non-African states. Whereas Israel and Syria, and possibly even Iran, Sri Lanka, and North Korea, are immunized from UNSC-instigated ICC investigations, no African country enjoys the same protection. This reality, in addition to the disproportionate number of prosecutable non-African NSPs, contributes to the perceived Africa bias.

V. Final Thoughts

Instead of attempting to dispel the so-called Africa bias, this paper sought to accurately identify the culpable parties.

Specifically, this paper argued that the Court’s unbalanced caseload results from two developments. First, a disproportionate amount of prosecutable non-African countries are NSPs. Second, at least two, but probably more, prosecutable non-African countries are protected by a P5 patron state. Taken together, these two realities suggest that prosecutable non-African states are protected from the ICC through de jure immunity, its P5 counterpart, or both. By contrast, prosecutable African states, from the DRC to Libya, lack any comparable security blanket.

As a result, neither the Court nor the OTP are culpable for the Court’s unbalanced caseload. Instead, the international community should acknowledge that true responsibility lies with the infamous NSPs as well as the P5 members who allow them to operate with impunity.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   The eight situations before the ICC are: Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Kenya, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali. ↩

2. 2.

   In 2009, the African Union condemned the ICC’s decision to issue an arrest warrant for Sudan’s President Omar al-Bashir. Similarly, following the ICC’s decision to investigate violence in Kenya, Kenyan political leaders called for Nairobi to withdraw from the Court. Mugabe and Qaddaffi have also criticized the Court. See Margaret M. deGuzman, Choosing to Prosecute: Expressive Selection at the International Criminal Court, 33 Mich. J. Int’l L. 265, 271-272 (2011). SSRN paywall. ↩

3. 3.

   See id. at 305. ↩

4. 4.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter cited as Rome Statute], Article 13. ↩

5. 5.

   id. ↩

6. 6.

   When this paper discusses “prosecutable” states, it refers to states whose territories have witnessed, or whose nationals have committed, crimes falling within the Court’s jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 5 of the Rome Statute, these crimes are: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression (beginning on January 1st, 2017). ↩

7. 7.

   Richard Dicker, A Flawed Court in Need of Credibility, NY Times, May 21, 2012, available online. ↩

8. 8.

   See ICC, State Parties to the Rome Statute, available online. ↩

9. 9.

   While these two indexes do not exclusively track crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction, there is significant overlap. For example, Article 7 of the Rome Statute affords the ICC Jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Pursuant to the Statue, these include: attacks against any civilian population; enslavement (in the form of human trafficking); forcible transfers of populations; torture; sexual violence; and persecution against any group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, or gender grounds. These crimes are also explicitly accounted for in both the Freedom House Report, infra, and Fund for Peace, The Failed States Index, (2011), available online, [hereinafter cited as Fund for Peace Index]. In this sense, these two datasets serve as proxies for which countries the ICC should investigate. ↩

10. 10.

    The notorious sixteen are: Belarus, Burma, Chad, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Laos, Libya Equatorial Guinea, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Only Chad is a State Party. See Freedom House, Worst of the Worst: The World’s Most Repressive Societies, (2012), available online, [hereinafter cited as Freedom House Report]. ↩

11. 11.

    This list, in order from worst to “best,” is: Somalia, DRC, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Uzbekistan, Egypt, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea. Only the DRC and Chad are State Parties. Foreign Policy, Failed States Index 2012 Interactive, available online. ↩

12. 12.

    See Freedom House Report, supra note 10; see also Fund for Peace Index, supra note 9. ↩

13. 13.

    Id. ↩

14. 14.

    id. ↩

15. 15.

    See Freedom House Report, supra note 9. ↩

16. 16.

    See Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2012: The State of the World’s Human Rights, (2012), available online. ↩

17. 17.

    See Dicker, supra note 7. ↩

18. 18.

    Allen Hicken, Clientelism, 2011 Ann. Rev. Polit. Sci. 289 (2011). ↩

19. 19.

    Mark J. Gasiorowski, Dependency and Cliency in Latin America, 28 J. Interamerican Stud. & World Aff. 47, 51 (1986). ↩

20. 20.

    Mark J. Gasiorowski & Seung-hyun Baek, International Cliency Relationships and Client States in East Asia, 2 Pacific Focus 113, 114 (1987). It is worth noting that this latter element, security, is what separates cliency relationships from economic dependency relationships, which are “determined by the structure of the world economy.” See id. ↩

21. 21.

    Id. at 115. ↩

22. 22.

    Id. ↩

23. 23.

    Id. ↩

24. 24.

    Id. ↩

25. 25.

    Id. at 115. ↩

26. 26.

    See Gasiorowski, supra note 19, at 52. ↩

27. 27.

    I decided to focus on these two countries for two reasons. First, they are widely accused of perpetrating large-scale war crimes and crimes against humanity. Second, comprehensive data pertaining to numerous cliency factors is relatively accessible; the same is not true of Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Sri Lanka, each of whom arguably enjoy P5 immunity (see Section IV in text). ↩

28. 28.

    See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Relations with Israel, Fact Sheet (November 28, 2012), available online. ↩

29. 29.

    Jeremy M. Sharp, U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel, Congressional Research Service at 30, March 12, 2012, available online. ↩

30. 30.

    Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (“SIPRI”), Military Expenditure Database, available online. ↩

31. 31.

    SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, available online, [hereinafter cited as SIPRI Database]. It is worth noting that SIPRI’s arms transfers figures are specified 1990 dollars. I therefore converted these numbers into 2010 dollars using an inflation calculator. Population figures are from CIA, The World Factbook, available online. ↩

32. 32.

    SIPRI Database, Id. ↩

33. 33.

    See Nadav Shemer, US Extends Israel Loan Guarantees to 2016, The Jerusalem Post, October 25, 2012, available online. ↩

34. 34.

    Ilan Ben Zion, US Military Chief Meets with Peres, Lauds Military Partnership, The Times of Israel, October 29, 2012, available online. ↩

35. 35.

    Tim McGirk & Aaron J. Klein, Israelis Wary of a US Base in the Negev, Time Magazine, October 2, 2008, available online. ↩

36. 36.

    See Global Policy Forum, Changing Patterns in the Use of Veto in the Security Council, available online. ↩

37. 37.

    Id. ↩

38. 38.

    I compiled a database of all UNHRC resolutions passed since 2006, [hereinafter cited as UNHRC Database]. Information was gathered from the UNHRC website. ↩

39. 39.

    The U.S. was only a UNHRC member during 18 of 30 anti-Israel resolutions. See id. ↩

40. 40.

    Because the Palestine Liberation Organization is well aware of this reality, and given the fact that the PLO recently became a non-member observer state, it is entirely possible that the PLO will try an alternative approach. Rather than launch what would be a purely symbolic but ultimately unsuccessful campaign at the UNSC, the PLO, which has already acceded to the Rome Statute, can self-refer its case to the ICC. However, given Israel’s de jure immunity, this approach would be equally unsuccessful. Indeed, the best the Palestinians can hope for is a “Sudan-like situation.” See Patrick Martin, Palestinians’ potential access to International Criminal Court worries Israel, The Globe and Mail, November 29, 2012, available online. ↩

41. 41.

    See SIPRI Database, supra note 31. ↩

42. 42.

    Id. ↩

43. 43.

    Jacqueline McLaren Miller, What’s Behind Russia’s Syria Veto?, EastWest Institute, February 8, 2012, available online. ↩

44. 44.

    Richard Galpin, Russian Arms Shipments Bolster Syria’s Embattled Assad, BBC News, January 30, 2012, available online. ↩

45. 45.

    See Miller, supra note 41. ↩

46. 46.

    Alex Spillius, Russia Printing Money for Syria Claims Reports, The Telegraph, November 26, 2012, available online. ↩

47. 47.

    Andrew E. Kramer, Russian Warships Said to be Going to Naval Base in Syria, NY Times, June 18, 2012, available online. ↩

48. 48.

    Id. ↩

49. 49.

    See Global Policy Forum, supra note 36. ↩

50. 50.

    See UNHRC Database, supra note 38. ↩

51. 51.

    Ashley Fantz, Syria Death Toll Probably at 70,000, U.N. Human Rights Official Says, CNN, February 13, 2013, available online. ↩

52. 52.

    Luke Harding, Up to 28,000 Syrians Have Disappeared Since Uprising Began, The Guardian, October 18, 2012, available online. ↩

53. 53.

    See UNHRC Database, supra note 38. ↩

54. 54.

    See SIPRI Database, supra note 31. ↩

55. 55.

    See Global Policy Forum, supra note 36. ↩

56. 56.

    See Jahangir Karami, Iran-Russian Relations: Expectations and Realities, 9 Discourse: An Iranian Quarterly (2011), available online; Ariell Farrar-Wellman, Russia-Iran Foreign Relations, Iran Tracker, August 2, 2010, available online; Pavel Felgenhauer, The Unraveling Relationship Between Russia and Iran,BBC News, July 24, 2010, available online. ↩

57. 57.

    Id. ↩

58. 58.

    See Dicker, supra note 7. ↩

59. 59.

    See Editorial, UN Adopts Resolution on Sri Lanka War Crimes Probe, BBC News, March 22, 2012, available online. ↩

60. 60.

    See Dicker, supra note 7. ↩

61. 61.

    See UNHRC Database, supra note 38. ↩

62. 62.

    See Global Policy Forum, supra note 36. ↩

63. 63.

    Kurt Campbell, North Korea is Testing China’s Patience, Financial Times, February 19 2013, available online. ↩

64. 64.

    See SIPRI Database, supra note 31. ↩

65. 65.

    Id. ↩

66. 66.

    Id. ↩

67. 67.

    Id. ↩

68. 68.

    Id. ↩

69. 69.

    See UNSC, Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan, to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court, Press Release, SC/8351, March 31, 2005, [hereinafter cited as UNSC Darfur Press Release], available online. ↩

70. 70.

    Craig Whitlock, Remote U.S. Base at Core of Secret Operations, The Washington Post, October 25, 2012, available online. ↩

71. 71.

    Andrew Hansen, The French Military in Africa, Council on Foreign Relations, February 8, 2012, available online. ↩

72. 72.

    A database of all UNSC resolutions can be found on the Security Council’s website [hereinafter cited as UNSC Database]. The 341 resolutions I refer to exclude those that targeted particular regions of Africa (e.g. the sub-Saharan) or the continent as a whole. ↩

73. 73.

    See UNSC Database, id. Both Russia and China vetoed a 2008 resolution attempting to sanction Zimbabwe. See Neil MacFarquhar, 2 Vetoes Quash U.N. Sanctions on Zimbabwe, NY Times, July 12, 2008, available online. ↩

74. 74.

    See UNSC Darfur Press Release, supra note 69; see also UNSC, In Swift, Decisive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures On Libyan Regime, Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters, Press Release, SC/10187/Rev.1, February 26, 2011, available online. ↩

75. 75.

    See UNSC Database, supra note 72. ↩