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- miltonlaw: Africa and the Concept of Positive Complementarity The answer to the allegation that Africa is inappropriately targeted by international criminal court could as well lie in the sui generis concept of positive complementary. My doctoral thesis research title is: The international criminal court and positive complementarity: Institutional and legal framework. I. Introduction It is the... (more)
- almariam: Saving the ICC: A Proposal for a Witness Protection Program Justice delayed, again? In late January of this year, I wrote a commentary entitled, “Kenyatta at the ICC: Is Justice Deferred, Justice Denied?” In that commentary I openly expressed my angst over the endless delays, postponements and backpedalling talk about “false evidence” and “lying witnesses” surrounding the Uhuru Kenyatta trial at The Hague. I felt there was perhaps... (more)
- almariam: Kenyatta at the ICC: Is Justice Deferred, Justice Denied? I am getting a little jittery over the repeated delays, postponements and all the backpedalling talk about “false evidence” and “lying witnesses” in the Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta International Criminal court trial. I don’t want to say I smell a rat but I feel like I am getting a whiff. Is the stage being set to let Kenyatta off the ICC hook? There has been feverish... (more)
- Marius_: How can we choose to hide behind claims of moral inappropriateness when - in fact - these crimes are indeed taking place on sacred African soil!? Yes! It is imperative that the ICC should, despite the influence of the 'Powers-that-be', focus on initiating proceedings on crimes within its jurisdiction taking place outside the African continent, so as to meet the dictates of fairness. But that is not to say that the ongoing cases in Africa are without their individual basis. The victims of those... (more)
- ecalmeyer: Mass African Withdrawal from the ICC: Far from Reality Introduction One hundred and twenty two countries are States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”).1 Thirty-four are in Africa, making African states the largest continental bloc of ICC signatory countries.2 Many African nations believe that the International Criminal... (more)
- John Litwin: The International Criminal Court and African Politics Introduction Given the recent vote by the Kenyan parliament to withdraw from the Rome Statute,1 it is necessary to examine the non-meritorious, political reasons that may be motivating the proposed African boycott of the International Criminal Court (ICC).2 Comprising over a quarter of all member-states,3 a withdrawal from the ICC by... (more)
- Jenevieve Discar: Potential ICC Responses to Kenya’s Proposed Withdrawal Introduction Kenya’s recent, precedent-setting vote to withdraw from the ICC highlights the critical nature of this debate; regardless of whether the ICC is actually unfairly biased towards Africa or not, the perceived bias is greatly affecting its reputation and its ability to operate effectively. Kenya’s withdrawal should... (more)
- emilygiven: Complementarity: Too Stringent a Test? While critics claim that the ICC’s focus on crimes committed in Africa is inappropriate, its defenders cite the Prosecutor’s preliminary examinations of non-African crimes as evidence to the contrary. Because the Office of the Prosecutor is evaluating situations outside Africa with an even hand, defenders argue, the Court exhibits no bias against Africa. Several preliminary examinations of non-African... (more)
- karen.kwok: Syria: a Case Study of the ICC’s Limited Jurisdiction Since its inception in 2002, all situations under investigation or prosecution have been in Africa. Critics have claimed that the ICC’s focus on Africa has been inappropriate. In particular, the ICC has been accused of having an African-bias in situation selection. However, such critiques regarding ICC’s unfair targeting of Africa... (more)
- kennygbite: The question “Is the International Criminal Court targeting Africa inappropriately?” is influenced obviously by the fact that all the cases so far being handled by the ICC fall within Africa as if crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court are not taking place in other continents. However, assuming Africans so far indicted by the Court actually committed these crimes, should the question still arise simply because their counterparts in other continents are not being investigated nor prosecuted... (more)
Comment on the Africa Question: “Is the International Criminal Court targeting Africa inappropriately?”
I. Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established with the hope that it would pursue those persons responsible “for the most serious crimes of international concern.”1 Since the Rome Statute’s entry into force in July 2002, the ICC has opened situations in eight countries, all in Africa, leading some to argue that the Court has an African bias.2 A common defense to this critique has been that the ICC only goes after the “most serious” situations, and those situations all happen to be in Africa. By attempting to quantify the gravest situations since 2003, this comment intends to explore this defense to see whether the ICC is truly pursuing the worst crimes within its jurisdiction. If there are conflicts outside of Africa within the jurisdiction of the Court that are graver than the current eight situations, then maybe the ICC is unfairly targeting Africa.
The ICC has developed a test to decide whether a situation is grave enough to justify opening a formal investigation. The assessment “includes both quantitative and qualitative considerations based on the prevailing facts and circumstances.”3 It particularly looks at the scale of the crimes, including the number of direct and indirect victims; the nature of the crimes; the manner of commission of the crimes; and the impact of the crimes.4 “A key consideration is the number of victims of particularly serious crimes, such as willful killing or rape.”5
For most conflicts between 2003 and 2011, I have compiled estimates of the number of civilians who have been intentionally targeted, battle related deaths in armed conflict, and internally displaced persons (IDPs). By using these metrics as proxies for the ICC’s gravity assessment, we can see which conflicts in this timespan have been the most severe. After taking into account the jurisdictional realities of the ICC, we find that the only non-African country that the Court can pursue in which the situation is at least as grave as that in the current ICC investigations is Afghanistan. The fact that Afghanistan is currently under preliminary examination by the Court suggests that the ICC does not have an African bias.
Part II discusses the methodology used to gather these numbers as well as certain assumptions that are made. Part III goes over the results of the research, including general information about each conflict. Part IV discusses the jurisdictional hurdles for certain conflicts and explores which cases the ICC can actually pursue. Part V concludes.
II. Methodology
The first thing to note is that the ICC has jurisdiction over crimes (namely genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes)6, not situations with the most death or IDPs. Thus, an ideal study would find the highest prevalence of these crimes in each country to analyze the situation. However, no such database exists that reliably estimates these crimes per country. A major assumption I must make is that those places with the highest casualties and displaced persons are also the most likely to have crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court7 in proportionate levels.8 It is fair to assume that those countries with the highest casualties from the intentional targeting of civilians are most likely to have ICC crimes. It is never lawful to intentionally target civilians. However, as discussed below, such figures are hard to estimate, and if I only looked at this metric, major conflicts characterized by the occurrence of atrocities would be excluded from the study. Thus, I include battle related deaths and IDPs in order to include the most devastating conflicts. While casualties in war can occur without crimes happening, I still assume that improprieties must occur when there is large-scale fighting.
A. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Datasets
Finding reliable figures for any metric of conflict is very difficult.9 Different reporting organizations can have agendas that lead them either to inflate or deflate the estimate. Often, areas of conflict have very little open access and are too dangerous for organizations to obtain the information. Even neutral organizations with access to information can come up with very diverse estimates for the same metric because of different methodologies and standards for source verification. Because of this, I felt it important to use a single, comprehensive database, implementing the same methodology for all conflicts, in order to have the most consistent results.
The UCDP datasets are the most comprehensive set of information on armed conflict that I could find.10 The three datasets I used compiled yearly figures on deaths from 1989 to 2011 while using the same high standard to verify each number. These datasets rely on numerous public sources, including news articles, journals, reports by NGOs, and government documents.11 “Each source is judged according to the context in which it was published,” and for instances of biased sources or unreliable information, the events are only included in the high estimate, which I excluded from my study.12 Because of the rigorous standards UCDP employs, the figures are sometimes well below what is often reported. “[I]t is possible that there are more fatalities than the UCDP high estimate, but it is very unlikely that there [are] fewer than the UCDP best estimate.”13
Because I’m using the same source for the same type of data, and that source employs the same methodology across the board, I assume that the UCDP datasets are internally consistent. That is, even if the estimates for the conflicts are well below the figures reflecting the reality of the situations, relative to each other, the conflicts are in the proper ranking for gravity.14
1. Intentionally Targeting Civilians
`To get the figures for deliberate civilian casualties, I used the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset.15 According to UCDP, “One-sided violence is the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. Extrajudicial killings in custody are excluded.”16 A formally organized group means “any non-governmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed force.”17 I used the “best estimate” from the database, which aggregates the “most reliable numbers.”18 Because it is often difficult to determine whether an attack was intentionally targeting a civilian, these figures tend to underestimate the situation even more so than the rest of UCDP’s figures.
2. Battle-Related Deaths
The total for battle-related deaths came from adding the figures together from two datasets: the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset19 and the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset20. Both datasets compile the number of “battle-related deaths each year” when armed force is being used, the difference being that for the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, a government is a party to the conflict21 whereas for the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, neither party to the conflict is a government22. Battle-related deaths are defined as those deaths between the parties that can be “directly related to combat.”23 “The target for the attacks is either the military forces or representatives for the parties.”24 Civilian deaths are only included if classified as collateral damage. Thus, there should be no overlap in figures between the three datasets. As with the UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, I used the “best estimate,” and there must be at least 25 deaths in a year for the number to be recorded.
B. Internally Displaced Persons
For IDPs, I was required to use two sources, as neither one contained yearly data for each country during the timespan analyzed. Whenever possible, I used the data from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Statistical Online Population Database (UNHCR Database).25 The UNHCR is a very reputable source that is good at documenting the situations with which they are involved. Their method includes gathering information from three main providers, “governmental agencies, UNHCR field offices and NGOs. Data are compiled or collected using mainly registers, surveys, registration processes or censuses.”26 They define IDPs as “people… who have been forced to leave their homes…, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural—or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an international border.”27
The supplemental source I used was from the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).28 The UNHCR suggests using this source for global IDP figures when they lack the information.29 The IDMC uses the same IDP definition as UNHCR.30
I generally used the UNHCR Database, only supplementing the IDMC data when UNHCR was missing a figure or the figure seemed anomalous. For each country, I chose the best high IDP estimate within the time period analyzed. I only collected IDP figures for those countries with an armed conflict occurring between 2003 and 2011.
C. Timespans
Because the Rome Statute didn’t go into effect until July 2002, I start looking at each conflict’s figures in 2003.31 The UCDP database had data for every conflict up until 2011. Thus, the maximum timeframe for any one conflict is 2003 to 2011. Unfortunately, this means that certain recent events are outside the scope of this analysis—in particular, the situation in Mali.32
For the seven remaining situations under ICC investigation, I used the timeframes that the ICC used before deciding to open the investigation. For example, the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) was opened up for investigation in June 2004. Even though many atrocities occurred in the DRC after this date, I analyze only between 2003 and 2004.33 Because I’m trying to analyze the conditions which spark an investigation at the ICC, it would not make sense to include data after their decision to investigate was made.
For the remaining conflicts, I try my best to limit the timespan to the relevant conflict dates. Thus, I analyzed the Sri Lankan Civil War between 2003 and 2009 as the Tamil Tigers were defeated in May 2009.34 Similarly, while Mexico has been plagued with drug violence for quite some time, I analyzed only between 2007 and 2011 because President Calderón initiated Operation Michoacán in December 2006.35 For the initial analysis, I disregard the dates that the Rome Statute entered into force in these countries.36 However, I later factor this in when distilling the results in Part IV.
D. Method of Analysis
From all of this information, I have generated five metrics to look at: total number of intentionally killed civilians, number of intentionally killed civilians per year, total battle-related deaths, number of battle-related deaths per year, and number of IDPs per country. Each metric paints a slightly different picture of the gravity of a conflict.
Rather than trying to develop some comprehensive formula to meld all of these metrics into a single gravity-representing figure in order to rank each conflict, I have decided to analyze the worst in each category. Thus, I present five lists, each of which contains the worst conflicts for that metric. For each list, I removed all countries that rank lower than the lowest ICC investigation, after excluding Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR).37 The idea is to find countries with graver conflicts than those in a current investigation. With the remaining list, I removed those countries that fall outside of the jurisdiction of the Court, either because the country is not a state party to the Rome Statute or because of complementarity concerns. I then remove those countries that are in Africa. The remaining list should be non-African countries within the jurisdiction of the Court in which the situations are graver than at least one situation being investigated by the ICC judged by a certain metric. If any country is on this final list, it will provide evidence that the ICC is unfairly targeting Africa.
III. Results
As mentioned earlier, the casualty figures present an internally consistent list of where countries rank in relation to each other. Because all that matters for this exercise is how countries rank with respect to one another, I provide only the rankings here, leaving the quantitative figures in the appendix.38 Also, because the rankings are made based on yearly death and IDP figures, important information about certain conflicts is often left out. Following the results, I include small sections for particular conflicts in order to clarify why they appear where they do on the lists.
Countries that are (or have been) under preliminary ICC investigation.
*I exclude CAR and Mali from the final evaluation.
**I treat Palestine’s conflict as lasting for one year for the purposes of Battle-Related Deaths per Year.
A. Notes on Countries Currently Under ICC Investigation
1. DRC
The DRC self-referred the situation to the ICC in March 2004 to cover those crimes occurring on its territory since the Rome Statute went into effect in July 2002.39 The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) officially opened the investigation in June 2004.40 Thus, even though severe atrocities took place before 2002 and after 2004, this list does not reflect those data. In 2004, the ICC reported that according to its sources, “thousands of deaths by mass murder and summary execution [occurred] in the DRC since 2002. The reports allege a pattern of rape, torture, forced displacement and the illegal use of child soldiers.”41
2.Uganda
Uganda self-referred the situation in December 2003, and the OTP opened its investigation in July 2004.42 Of particular interest to the OTP was a February 2004 massacre committed by the LRA at the Barlonyo IDP camp in which over 200 civilians were killed.43
3. Darfur, Sudan
In March 2005, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1593, referring the situation in Darfur for crimes that had occurred since July 2002.44 The referral was largely in response to a UNSC requested report on Darfur which outlined the crimes happening in the region.45 According to the report, within a few years prior, those in Darfur had “been living a nightmare of violence and abuse that has stripped them of the very little they had. Thousands were killed, women were raped, villages were burned, homes were destroyed and belongings were looted. About 1.8 million were forcibly displaced and became refugees or internally displaced persons.”46 The OTP formally opened its investigation in June 2005.47
4. Central African Republic (CAR)
The CAR self-referred its situation in December 2004, and the OTP formally opened its investigation in May 2007.48 The “peak of violence and criminality occurred in 2002 and 2003. Civilians were killed and raped; and homes and stores were looted.”49 This situation was highly unusual in that the “allegations of sexual crimes far outnumber alleged killings.”50 Because my analysis is from 2003 to 2007 and is largely based on casualties, the CAR appears near the bottom of each metric analyzed despite its extremely grave nature. Thus, I exclude this situation from the gravity comparison for any casualty-based category.
5. Kenya
Using his proprio motu powers, then Chief Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo requested in November 2009 to open an investigation in Kenya51, getting authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber (PTC) in March 201052. Despite requesting to investigate only the post-election violence of December 2007 to February 2008, the PTC authorized an investigation for crimes committed between June 2005 and November 2009.53 Thus, despite the majority of violence occurring in a three-month span, some 1200 murders and 900 documented acts of rape or sexual violence54, I analyze the figures over the course of five years.
6. Libya
The OTP opened an official investigation into the Libyan violence in March 2011 after the UNSC referred the situation with Resolution 1970 in February 2011.55 According to the OTP’s first report to the UNSC, “500 to 700 persons died, only in February.”56
7. Côte d’Ivoire
Moreno-Ocampo’s second use of his proprio motu power was in June 2011 when he requested the opening of an investigation into the post-election violence of Côte d’Ivoire from November 2010 to May 2011.57 According to the PTC authorization of October 2011, in that seven-month span, “between 700 and 1048 civilians were killed” and “around one million people” were displaced.58 The figures from UCDP indicate 378 civilian deaths in all of 2011.
8. Mali
Mali’s information is excluded from the study because the relevant events took place after 2011. Mali self-referred the situation in July 2012, and the OTP opened its investigation in January 2013.59
B. Notes on Countries that Are or Have Been Under Preliminary Examination
1. Afghanistan
Afghanistan became a state party to the Rome Statute in February 2003.60 The OTP’s December 2011 Report on Preliminary Examination activities (Prelim Report) acknowledged several potential crimes, including torture, attacks on protected objects, and the recruitment of child soldiers.61 The report also cited an estimated 10,000 civilian casualties between 2007 and 2011.62 It is unclear why an investigation has not been opened yet, but it seems like the OTP is having a hard time verifying the claims inside of the country.63
2. Colombia
The ICC has had jurisdiction over crimes against humanity in Colombia since November 2002 and war crimes since November 2009.64 The country has been under preliminary examination since June 2004.65 Grave atrocities have been occurring in Colombia for decades, and the OTP recognizes that the situation in the country remains one of the worst in the world. However, due to efforts by the Colombian government to hold perpetrators accountable, the OTP has yet to open an investigation due to complementarity concerns.66
3. Nigeria
Nigeria has been a state party since July 2002.67 The Prelim Report acknowledges several potential crimes: thousands of killings as well as cases of rape and abductions.68 It is unclear why an investigation has not been opened, but the OTP mentions that the government has been willing to investigate certain crimes.69
4. Georgia
Despite having the Rome Statute in effect since 2003, my analysis, as well as the OTP’s, of the case in Georgia only involves the August 2008 conflict in South Ossetia.70 Because both Russia and Georgia seem willing to investigate the situation, the OTP has yet to initiate an investigate due to complementarity concerns.71
5. Guinea
The examination in Guinea deals with crimes committed on a single day known as the “28 September massacre” at a stadium in Conakry in which “at least 156 persons were killed or disappeared, and at least 109 women were victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence.”72 Guinean authorities have expressed that they are “willing and able” to investigate the situation, so the OTP has not opened an investigation due to complementarity concerns.73
6. Honduras
The analysis of Honduras deals with crimes committed between 2009 and 2010 after a military coup. According to the Prelim Report, thousands of people were unlawfully arrested, 20 civilians were murdered, and there were a few cases of torture and rape.74
7. South Korea
The preliminary examination of South Korea deals with two incidents in 2010 in which 4 people and 46 people were killed, respectively.75 The UCDP database had no figures for South Korea in this timeframe.
8. Palestine
Palestine has been trying to become a state party to the Rome Statute for some time, but the ICC has been reluctant to allow this due to Palestine’s debated status as a “state.”76 It appears that if the OTP were to investigate anything, it would look at Operation Cast Lead, which lasted from December 2008 to January 2009.77 Because of this, and because of the fact that the conflict lasted just over three weeks, I only analyze the figures in the area from 2008 to 2009 and consider this to be one year for the purposes of deaths per year.
9. Iraq
As noted above in the results, Iraq has been one of the worst conflicts in the world measured by any metric. In February 2006, the OTP issued a decision regarding Iraq, deciding not to investigate due to the small gravity of the crimes after taking into account jurisdictional hurdles.78 Despite this early refusal, I analyze the Iraq numbers until 2011.
10. Venezuela
Along with Mali and South Korea, the UCDP database has no figures for this country between 2003 and 2011, hence these three countries’ being at the bottom of each list. A February 2006 decision by the OTP outlines some possible crimes in Venezuela within the timeframe but refuses to initiate any investigation, in part because the complaints were largely contradictory.79
C. Notes on Select Remaining Countries
1. Syria
It is worth pointing out that the bulk of the fighting in the Syrian Civil War has occurred after 2011. Thus, the situation is really graver than these lists reflect.
2. Mexico
The UCDP database calls out a specific flaw with its own methodology with regard to Mexico. “The UCDP is aware that the figures given for the war between the cartels in Mexico are very low. Unlike much organized violence in the world, however, the fighting between cartels in Mexico is not overt in the sense that none of the actors wish to claim ‘credit’;” thus, the UCDP acknowledges that “such violence is extremely difficult to code with the UCDP’s method.”80 In other words, the gravity of the Mexico situation is really much larger than it appears in my chart.
IV. Figuring Out Which Cases the ICC Can Pursue
After excluding Mali and CAR81 and all conflicts below the lowest ranking remaining ICC investigation in each category, we are left with 28 countries that are not currently being investigated. These are:
Colombia
Georgia
Guinea
Iraq
Nigeria
Palestine
Burundi
Chad
Ethiopia
India
Indonesia
Liberia
Mexico
Myanmar
Nepal
Pakistan
Philippines
Russia
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Syria
Thailand
Togo
Turkey
Yemen
Zimbabwe
A. Eliminating Non-States Parties During the Time of Conflict
The majority of these countries are not states parties to the Rome Statute. Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Palestine82, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Togo, and Turkey have neither signed nor ratified the treaty.83 While Algeria, Russia, Syria, Thailand, Yemen, and Zimbabwe have signed the Rome Statute, they have never ratified it.
Additionally, while Liberia ratified the treaty in September 2004, the conflict analyzed was only for 2003; thus, the treaty wasn’t in force during the appropriate time. Similarly, the Philippines ratified at the very end of 2011, meaning that that year shouldn’t be considered. Because the study only lasts up until 2011, the Philippines will also be excluded. Burundi ratified the Statute at the very end of 2004. Because I analyzed 2003 to 2005, the figures for Burundi are actually much lower than reported, but the country is still able to make the list. Similarly, Chad’s analyzed timespan was 2005 to 2010, but its ratification was at the end of 2006. Thus, Chad’s figures are also lower than reported.
After taking this into account, we are left with eight countries:
Colombia
Georgia
Guinea
Nigeria
Chad
Mexico
B. Eliminating Those Countries Likely to Have Complementarity Issues
Examining which countries should be excluded because of complementarity issues is a complicated exercise which could be the subject of several independent comments. As for the countries currently under preliminary examination, the OTP has revealed which ones are not being investigated due to complementarity concerns. These are Colombia, Georgia, and Guinea.84 Because Burundi and Chad are African countries that will be eliminated from the list in the next section, I will refrain from analyzing their claims of complementarity.
There is surprisingly little literature on Mexico and the ICC given the degree of violence plaguing the country.85 In October 2011, human rights activists in Mexico, led by Netzai Sandoval, filed a complaint with the ICC requesting an investigation into crimes committed by President Calderón as well a major drug lord in the conflict.86 A Human Rights Watch report in November of that year also outlines particular crimes, most notably torture, committed by the government.87 The report notes that violations are not being adequately investigated nor prosecuted, in part due to the use of the military rather than civilian jurisdiction. The “military courts lack the impartiality… to judge their own,” and out of “1,615 investigations from 2007 to April 2011… [n]ot a single soldier has been convicted.”88
However, in a November 2011 press release by the Mexican Foreign Ministry, the government reaffirmed its obligations “to prevent, investigate, punish and redress violations” of fundamental human rights.89 It also remarked that using the ICC to deal with Mexico’s problems is the “wrong way” to proceed. “The jurisdiction of the ICC is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. It justifies the action of the Court only when a state is unable or unwilling to bring criminal penalty for certain crimes listed in the Rome Statute. Neither of these two situations applies to the case.”90
It is apparent that the Mexican government would prefer to deal with the situation domestically and would most likely challenge the ICC’s jurisdiction. Even if Mexico is currently failing in its duty to hold genuine prosecutions for all those responsible for ICC crimes, it is quite possible that it will increase its efforts once faced with a possibility of ICC intervention. Because of the government’s express desire to exclude the ICC, I exclude the situation based on complementarity concerns.
Therefore, after taking into account complementarity issues, we are left with four countries:
Nigeria
Chad
C. Eliminating Those Countries in Africa
Because the point of this comment is to find out whether the ICC is unfairly targeting African countries, it only makes sense to see which situations outside of Africa are graver than those considered in the current investigations. Therefore, after removing all African countries from the remaining list, we are left with a single country: Afghanistan.
D. What is Left?
After all is said and done, the only non-African conflict within the jurisdiction of the Court that is graver than at least one current ICC investigation based on the metrics analyzed is Afghanistan. In fact, according to the UCDP database, between 2003 and 2011, Afghanistan had the highest total battle-related deaths absolutely and on a yearly basis compared to the other conflicts. As noted above, Afghanistan has been under preliminary examination by the ICC, but a decision to open an official investigation has yet to be made.91 Because the ICC is at least examining the situation, it hardly lends support to the claim that the Court has an African bias.
V. Conclusion
Despite the fact that several very grave conflicts outside of Africa have occurred sometime between 2003 and 2011, once taking into account the jurisdictional obstacles of the ICC, only one country remains: Afghanistan. The fact that Afghanistan has been under preliminary examination by the ICC suggests that the Court is not biased toward Africa. The reality of the situation is that Africa has been home to some of the worst atrocities over the last decade, and those countries where these atrocities have taken place have typically accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.
Appendix
Countries that are (or have been) under preliminary ICC investigation.
*I exclude CAR and Mali from the final evaluation.
**I treat Palestine’s conflict as lasting for one year for the purposes of Battle-Related Deaths per Year.
Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 1, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter cited as Rome Statute], (emphasis added). ↩
See e.g., Richard Lough, African Union Accuses ICC Prosecutor of Bias, Reuters (Jan. 30, 2011, 3:59 AM EST), available online. ↩
ICC, Draft Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, ¶ 70 (Oct. 4, 2011), available online. ↩
Id. ↩
ICC, OTP Response to Communications Received Concerning Iraq, 8-9 (Feb. 9, 2006), available online [hereinafter cited as Iraq Decision]. ↩
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5. ↩
From here on out, I will refer to “crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” as “ICC crimes”. ↩
I was unable to find databases that provided estimates for other major crimes such as rape, cases of torture, or use of child soldiers. ↩
See e.g., Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths, 21 European J. Population 145, 146-47 (2005), available online, (describing difficulties in obtaining accurate conflict data). ↩
UCDP Data, available online (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). ↩
UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset v.5-2012b Codebook, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, available online [hereinafter cited as BR Death Codebook]. ↩
Id. ↩
Id. (emphasis added). ↩
It should not matter much for my purposes if the list is not internally consistent. I examine whether each country on the list is within the jurisdiction of the Court, and only Afghanistan remains. Thus, in the end, there is no need for a close examination about whether a country’s situation is graver than another’s. ↩
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v.1.4-2012, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, available online. It appears that this dataset was largely a result of the research done in Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data, 44 J. Peace Res. 233 (2007). ↩
UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset, Id. ↩
Id. ↩
Id. ↩
BR Death Codebook, supra note 11. ↩
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset v.2.4-2012, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, available online. It appears that this dataset was largely a result of the research done in Ralph Sundberg, Kristine Eck, and Joakim Kreutz, Introducing the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, 49 J. Peace Res. 351 (2012). ↩
BR Death Codebook, supra note 11. ↩
UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset, supra note 20. ↩
BR Death Codebook, supra note 11 (emphasis added). Importantly, this excludes indirect deaths (which are included in war-related deaths). ↩
Id. ↩
UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Data extracted: January 3, 2013, available online. ↩
UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database: Sources, Methods and Data Considerations, UNHCR (Jan. 1, 2007), available online [hereinafter cited as UNHCR Methods]. ↩
Id. ↩
Internal Displacement Caused by Conflict and Violence, IDMC, available online (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). ↩
UNHCR Methods, supra note 26. ↩
The Definition of an Internally Displaced Person (IDP), IDMC, available online (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). ↩
I figured it would be inappropriate to use yearly figures for 2002 in case the incidents occurred before July. ↩
Also, certain “Arab Spring” conflicts are outside of the range. ↩
The ICC looked for crimes between July 2002 and June 2004, but, as noted earlier, I am not including 2002 data. However, I am including the whole of 2004. ↩
See Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers ‘Defeated’, Al-Jazeera (May 17, 2009, 4:21 GMT), available online. ↩
See Jo Tuckman, Mexico Drug War Continues to Rage In Region Where President Fired First Salvo, Guardian (Nov. 30, 2012, 10:58 EST), available online. ↩
I do this, in part, because the UNSC could potentially refer the situation for dates before a State’s ratification. ↩
It is inappropriate to analyze these two countries because Mali has no figures for the timespan analyzed and the CAR is a unique situation because its gravity was determined more by sexual violence than by deaths. See Parts III(A)(4) & (8), supra. I include the CAR for the IDP list. ↩
See Appendix A, supra. ↩
Press Release, ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens Its First Investigation, ICC-OTP-20040623-59 (June 23, 2004), available online. ↩
Id. ↩
Id. ↩
Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Opens an Investigation into Northern Uganda, ICC-OTP-20040729-65 (July 29, 2004), available online. ↩
Statement, ICC, Statement by the Prosecutor Related to Crimes Committed in Barlonya Camp in Uganda, ICC-OTP-20040223-45 (Feb. 23, 2004), available online. ↩
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1593, ¶ 1, UN Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), available online. ↩
U.N. Secretary General, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Feb. 1, 2005). ↩
Id. ¶ 626. ↩
Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur, ICC-OTP-0606-104 (June 6, 2005), available online. ↩
ICC, Situation in the Central African Republic, web page, ICC-OTP-BN-20070522-220-A_EN (May 22, 2007), available online. ↩
Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor Opens Investigation in the Central African Republic, ICC-OTP-20070522-220 (May 22, 2007), available online. ↩
Id. ↩
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to Article 15, No. ICC-01/09, (Nov. 26, 2009), available online. ↩
Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, No. ICC-01/09, (Mar. 31, 2010), available online. ↩
Id. ¶ 202. ↩
Id. ¶ 190. ↩
ICC, Questions and Answers on the ICC Proceedings in the Libya Situation Following the Prosecutor’s Request for Three Arrest Warrants, ICC-PIDS-Q&A-LIB-00-002/11_Eng (May 16, 2011), available online; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1970, UN Doc. S/RES/1970 (February 26, 2011). عربي, English, Français ↩
ICC, First Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1970 (2011), ¶19, (May 4, 2011), available online. ↩
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Request for authorization of an investigation pursuant to article 15, No. ICC-02/11, (June 23, 2011), available online. ↩
Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, No. ICC-02/11, ¶¶ 56, 64 (Oct. 3, 2011), available online. ↩
ICC, Situation in Mali: Article 53(1) Report, ¶ 2, (Jan. 16, 2013), available online. ↩
ICC, Afghanistan, web page, available online (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). ↩
ICC OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination activities, ¶¶ 24-29, (Dec. 13, 2011), available online [hereinafter cited as Prelim Report]. ↩
Id. ¶ 24. ↩
See id. ¶ 30. ↩
ICC, Situation in Colombia: Interim Report, ¶ 3, (Nov. 14, 2012), available online. ↩
Id. ¶ 2. ↩
Id. ¶¶ 197-200. ↩
Prelim Report, supra note 61, ¶ 51. ↩
Id. ¶¶ 55-57. ↩
Id. ¶¶ 58-60. ↩
Id. ¶¶ 89-91. ↩
Id. ¶ 98. ↩
Id. ¶¶ 106-07. ↩
Id. ¶ 114. ↩
Id. ¶¶ 33-41. ↩
Id. ¶ 47. ↩
See generally ICC, Situation in Palestine, (Apr. 3, 2012), available online. ↩
See Letter, Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, Director, Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division, OTP ICC, to Kyung Wha Kang, Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 January 2010, available online. ↩
See Iraq Decision, supra note 5, at 8-9. ↩
See Letter, ICC OTP Response to Communications Received Concerning Venezuela, 3 (Feb. 9, 2006), available online. ↩
UCDP, Frequently Asked Questions, web page, available online (last visited Mar. 3, 2013). ↩
CAR is not excluded for the IDP list. ↩
Recall from Part III(B)(8) supra that Palestine wishes to become a State party. ↩
Ratification Status of the Rome Statute, UN Treaty Collection, web page, (last visited Mar. 4, 2013, 12:17 AM), available online. ↩
Prelim Report, supra note 61, ¶¶ 87, 98, 114. ↩
I was able to find a student note discussing a potential complementarity issue arising from Mexico’s lack of defining “crimes against humanity” in its domestic law. See generally, Spencer Thomas, Note, A Complementarity Conundrum: International Criminal Enforcement in the Mexican Drug War, 45 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 599 (2012), available online. ↩
See BBC News, Mexico Activists Seek ICC Investigation of Drugs War, (Nov. 25, 2011, 17:30 EST), available online. ↩
Mexico: Widespread Rights Abuses in ‘War on Drugs’, Human Rights Watch (Nov. 10, 2011), available online. ↩
Id. ↩
Press Release, Comunicado 372, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Press Release 372, in response to calls for an ICC investigation (Nov. 10, 2011), available online (the quotations are from a translation of the text). ↩
Id. ↩
See Part III(B)(1) supra. ↩