II. Historic Efficacy of International Sanctions

Economic sanctions have come to be somewhat disfavored in recent scholarship. This is largely due to the perceived ineffectiveness of traditional trade sanctions. The study of Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot remains the definitive study on the efficacy of economic sanctions.10 In their study, they observed that the use of trade sanctions alone to influence state policy was only effective in twenty-five percent of the cases.11 They state that general trade sanctions will only be successful under an extremely limited set of conditions. They concluded that the general ineffectiveness of sanctions is due to the fact that “the evolution of the world economy since World War II has been a narrowing of the circumstances in which unilateral economic leverage may be effectively applied.”12

The primary requirement for the successful application of general trade sanctions has been near-total international participation. The effective use of trade sanctions in the post—World War II period has required a very high level of international participation for several reasons. First, a country targeted by trade sanctions can nevertheless usually find an export market for their goods, as there is likely to be a nation not participating in the sanctions, as well as the fact that “for many products—especially bulk commodities such as oil and grains—it is hard to verify the origin of goods entering customs.”13

Additionally, restrictions on imports into the target country are also likely to be ineffective as a wealthy ally of the targeted state may intervene and act as a “black knight” by offering their support, which “can largely offset whatever harm is done by the sanctions themselves.”14 Thus, a sanctioning regime could result in economic damage only to the sanctioning party, as their domestic businesses suffer from decreased export markets and higher prices from alternative import markets while the target country is able to merely shift their imports and exports to other markets with minimal economic consequences.

Finally, Trade embargoes can also have severe humanitarian costs. For example, depriving a nation of necessary food aid will have little direct impact on the leaders of a state as they will be able to pass those costs on to their citizens, but may have a dire impact on the population dependent on this aid to survive. Therefore, in the event of a sanction regime based on human rights concerns, trade embargoes can often hurt the very people they were implemented to protect.

All of these concerns are especially salient when discussed in the context of the International Criminal Court. First, any sanctioning action meant to aid the ICC is likely to encounter opposition from the court’s arguably staunchest opponents, Russia and China. The strength and market power of these two nations is likely more than adequate to fatally undermine any trade sanctioning regime meant to compel a state to comply with an arrest warrant. Their ability to veto any action proposed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) also makes it unlikely any sanctioning regime would even survive long enough to be implemented. Additionally, other nations may not be willing to sustain the economic harm that would result from being forced to search for new import and export markets while the nations disregarding the sanctions would reap the benefits of a more favorable market.

More importantly however, any trade sanctioning regime that is effective would likely entail severe humanitarian costs. To date, all ICC Arrest warrants have targeted African citizens.15 The majority of arrest warrants have targeted citizens of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of the world’s poorest nations.16 Any trade restriction could have dire consequences on this already impoverished population. Therefore, the issue of unintentional costs could be especially relevant in the context of sanctions imposed on the basis of refusal to cooperate with the ICC.

For all of these reasons general trade embargoes are of suspect efficacy, particularly when attempting to coerce a state official to comply with an international order aimed at furthering human rights protections. It is thus up to the international system to devise a method of exerting coercive pressure on state leaders in a manner that can be enforced, while sparing the general populace from severe difficulties. It is these traits that make targeted sanctions consisting of asset freezes and travel bans such promising alternatives.

III. Targeted Asset Freezes

A. Practical Implementation

Asset freezes are one promising form of targeted economic sanction. Asset freezes consist of tracing funds stored by leaders or powerful individuals of the targeted nation in international banking institutions and blocking their access to these funds. In the context of the International Criminal Court, the assets to be frozen can extend beyond those of the indicted individual. The official assets of the government, as well as those of the governmental leaders and leading figures within the target nation are also frequently stored with international banking institutions and are potential targets for assets freezes.17

The United States has developed extensive procedures for freezing assets, and its Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) “has become the key institution in the freezing of assets.”18 Key to OFAC’s ability to implement sanctions is the way it has convinced banks to cooperate with its investigations, convincing them that the lost confidence and negative publicity of being associated with international pariahs outweighs it’s the risk of lost future deposits by foreign nations and citizens.19 This along with well-developed technological tools has enabled it to play a major role in seizing the assets of North Korea, China, and Iran.20 The Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, many of whose members are also signatories of the Rome Statute,21 also possesses the mechanisms to impose and coordinate asset freezes internationally. Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the systems and technology exist to successfully impose asset freezes on nations and individuals defying an ICC arrest warrant.

B. Legal Procedures

The freezing of assets of both individuals and nations is not without legal precedent. Chapter VII, Article 41 of the United Nations Charter grants the Security Council the authority to engage in economic interruption to give effect to its decisions.22 When attempting to dislodge the military dictatorship of Haiti in 1993, the Security Council for the first time imposed assets freezes not only over a nation, but over private individuals as well.23 The Security Council has also urged states to impose assets freeze regimes against individuals and nations aiding individuals indicted by international tribunals, such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).24 Thus, the use of assets freezes against both the official funds of nations and private citizens to aid in the apprehension of individuals indicted by international courts is legally permissible.

Outside of the Security Council, the United States has constructed its own well-defined legal regime for such sanctions, as well as a robust technical arsenal that allows for such sanctions to be carried out. This system could serve as a model for nations or international organizations wishing to develop the tools for an effective sanctions regime of a state refusing to comply with an ICC arrest warrant. One of the primary statutes invoked by the United States when freezing foreign assets is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).25 Encompassing 50 U.S. Code §§ 1701-1707, the IEEPA gives the president broad discretion over foreign commerce in relation to specific targeted entities, allowing him to:

Investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.26

This has allowed the president to engage in assets freezes in the past, both over individual as well as over other nations’ official funds, such as those of Iran during the 1979 hostage crisis,27 as well as over individual groups suspected of terrorism.28 The use of IEEPA against the Holy Land Foundation is especially encouraging for its potential to be used to compel compliance with an ICC arrest warrant. Whereas the norm of terrorism is not well established in international law,29 the institutional legitimacy legitimacy of International Criminal Court is generally accepted in most of the international system.30 Thus, the use of IEEPA to compel adherence to the Rome Statute or an order of the UNSC will likely not encounter much resistance on legal grounds.

However, the IEEPA is not the only tool used to effectuate assets freezes by the United States. The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 has also been used. This act permits the freezing of assets in a time of war,31 and is therefore more restrictive than the IEEPA, but nevertheless has been used to freeze the assets of the regimes of North Korea and Cuba.32 Finally, executive orders have also been used by the US presidents to freeze the assets of foreign governments and individuals, including Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi government in the lead up to the first Gulf War.33

Additionally, the ICC could rely on other entities to impose asset freeze sanctions to enforce its arrest warrants. The European Union has recently developed a robust legal doctrine for implementing assets freezes.34 The European Union System includes provisions not only enabling assets freezes, but also mandating mutual recognition of one state’s sanctions by the other member states. In this way the European Union system has the potential to be even more far-reaching and powerful than that of the United States.

Thus, the legality of the freezing of financial assets is well established. The United States has developed an extensive array of tools that enable assets freezes. More importantly, the European Union, which includes many signatories of the Rome Statute,35 has also developed the tools for the implementation and enforcement of targeted asset freeze financial sanctions. The ICC therefore would not be without precedent in requesting the freezing of assets to add coercive force to its arrest warrants, and an extensive legal and technical arsenal exists to accomplish this goal.

C. Advantages of Targeted Asset Freezes

Asset freezes are a promising potential tool for enforcement of International Criminal Court arrest warrants for several reasons. Asset freezes have the unique ability “further isolate persons indicted by the International Tribunal, serve as an effective penalty even if such persons evade justice, and, induce such persons to surrender themselves to the International Tribunal.”36 It is these particular characteristics that make them especially fitting for use by the ICC to compel the execution of arrest warrants.

Perhaps their greatest strength is the precisely targeted manner in which they can be used. As stated above, general trade embargoes are particularly poorly suited for use in the human rights enforcement context because of their high incidence of collateral damage, often harming the very population they are intended to benefit more than the leaders responsible for the sanctioned behavior.37 Even purely financial sanctions can have unintended consequences on the target state’s populace. For example, the investment and credit sanctions imposed on Iran in 1979 had far-reaching implications for the Iranian economy, negatively impacting the standard of living of the Iranian populace.38 Asset freezes, on the other hand, can be narrowed to target only those individuals or entities responsible for the sanctioned behavior or with the influence to affect change. These can include the official assets of the state, as well as the personal assets of leaders or those supporting them such as powerful military commanders or leading business individuals.39 Therefore, the goals of sanctioning can be achieved by targeting only those responsible for shielding the individual from the ICC arrest warrant, while sparing the general populace of the state the onerous conditions associated with trade embargoes.

Additionally, the bane of enforcement of general trade embargoes, the need for near total multilateralism, is much less of a concern for the imposition of a successful assets freeze regime. In some cases assets freezes can be successfully imposed unilaterally. Following the Iranian Revolution of 1979, for example, the government of Iran had between $9 billion to $12 billion in American banks, which the US government froze immediately following Iran’s capture of Iranian hostages.40 Even though the United States was acting without the aid of any other nations, “it is unquestionable that…the freeze of some $12 billion in Iranian assets placed a heavy burden on Iran contributed to the ultimate conclusion hat it was in their interest to resolve the crisis.”41 Even in a situation where the wealth of the sanction target was not concentrated in one nation, it is likely that the cooperation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an entity likely to be in favor of ICC arrest warrant enforcement given the large number of Rome Statute signatories among its members, is likely enough to ensure the effectiveness of asset freezes.42 While more burdensome than unilateral action, this still represents a much smaller hurdle than the near total international participation required for trade embargo enforcement. Furthermore, multilateralism may frequently be much easier to secure for assets freezes over trade embargoes, as “Because these sanctions would be targeted at specific individuals, not governments, it would seem to be easier to gain support of the members of the Security Council for such a measure.”43

Furthermore, asset freezes have a higher likelihood of being accepted and enforced by the international community, as they are less costly to the sanctioning nations than either military force, or other economic sanctions including trade embargoes. Whereas trade embargoes necessarily lead to a decrease of exports or imports for the sanctioning countries, assets freezes have few costs outside of the potential for decreased bank deposits in the future. Therefore, assets freezes are a much less onerous burden for the sanctioning nations and therefore more likely to be accepted and utilized.

Finally, asset freezes maintain the legitimacy costs all international sanctions entail. The very act of applying sanctions will decrease the international legitimacy of a regime. This in turn can decrease the domestic legitimacy of a regime,44 making opposition figures appear stronger and making defying an ICC arrest warrant politically costly. This trend in part explains the groundswell of popular opposition to Milošević in Serbia in 1999 and 2000.45 This also in part explains Libya’s attempt to find “face-saving” ways too cooperate with the UNSC sanctions against it in 1992.46 Therefore, the very act of sanctioning can be productive in and of itself, and asset freezing is able to accomplish this without the onerous collateral costs of other sanctions.

D. Challenges of Asset Freezing

All of this is not to say that asset freezing is a cure-all to the problem of enforcement of ICC arrest warrants. To be sure, it poses its own challenges that must be addressed. First, the ICC has no sanctioning power of its own. It is therefore dependent on the international community to impose sanctions on its behalf. This will necessarily entail some amount of diplomacy.

Unfortunately, this is in direct opposition to the primary requirements for a successful assets freeze regime: speed and secrecy. In the world of international diplomacy, and especially in the field of international human rights, speed and secrecy can both be extremely difficult to maintain, as coming to an international consensus may require protracted negotiation. But without speed and secrecy, a prospective target of sanctions may be able to move its funds out of national banks, leaving the sanctioning party with no assets to freeze. Comparing the cases of the sanctions against Iran in 1979, and against the Taliban regime of Afghanistan in 1999 illuminates the importance of speed and secrecy. In the case of Iran, the Carter administration acted promptly giving no advance warning to the regime in Tehran.47 This resulted in a successful freezing of assets, blocking Iranian access to between $9 billion and 412 billion.48

This contrasts with the example of Afghanistan. Seeking to persuade the Taliban regime to surrender Osama Bin Laden in 1999, the Council debated for weeks preceding the eventual imposition of assets freezes.49 Furthermore, when the UNSC eventually imposed assets freezes, the implementing resolution delayed execution by 30 days.50 While this was ostensibly to allow for negotiations to continue, the end result was that the Taliban regime was able to move or shelter its assets, leading to a limited overall impact and the failure of the policy goal of the sanctions.51

It is thus fortunate that in many cases assets freezes can be implemented unilaterally. However, in the cases in which international participation is necessary, the ICC and the international community must develop streamlined and efficient procedures for implementing the freezes before the sanction target has an opportunity to move, hide, or otherwise shelter its assets.

III. Targeted Travel Bans

A. Practical Implementation

The second form of targeted sanction that could be utilized by the International Criminal Court and its member states is targeted travel bans. While unlikely to generate much coercive force on their own, when combined with other sanctions, including assets freezes, they can have significant persuasive force on the decision-making elites of a state.

Travel bans can take several forms. The first is a general ban on aviation. This type of ban was used against Libya in response to the 1982 Lockerbie bombings.52 This type of sanction bans all aviation into and out of the target country. This form of travel ban has the effect of greatly slowing commerce in the target country at the expense of greater multilateralism and a higher incidence of collateral costs to the population of the targeted nation.

However, more limited forms exist. For example, in certain instances it may be effective to ban certain types of cargo into the target state. Alternatively, banning flights from the sanctioner’s territory into the territory of the targeted state can generate some amount of coercive pressure. Finally, sanctions can also consist of banning the sale of airline parts and services.

B. Legal Procedures for Implementing Travel Bans

Like asset freezes, travel bans are not without international precedent. As stated above, comprehensive travel bans were implemented against Libya in 1993.53 The Security Council also imposed travel bans against Angola in 1997 for violating Lusaka Protocol.54 Other targets have included Sudan, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Haiti.55 These various examples make it clear that travel bans are not a novel concept in international law, especially in the context of human rights, and represent a viable tool that could be utilized by the ICC and its States Parties.

Travel bans can also be implemented unilaterally. Although there are less examples of this than there are of assets freezes, The United States has periodically imposed travel bans. The most prominent example is the ongoing embargo of Cuba, codified by the Helms-Burton Act, which prohibits any travel between the United States and Cuba.56 Thus, legal procedures exist for both the unilateral and multilateral imposition of travel bans.

C. Advantages of Targeted Travel Bans

Several traits of travel bans make them particularly well suited for use with asset freezes to compel ICC arrest warrants. First, like asset freezes they can be targeted at the decision-making elites of the nation. As travel is necessary for international banking, fundraising, and diplomacy, a ban on travel can severely negatively impact a leader’s ability to effectively govern their nation. The travel bans should also aim to deny the leaders access to goods the general populace usually has no access to, such as weapons. All of this can be accomplished with limited impact on the general populace, as exceptions can be made for humanitarian aid and religious travel (such as allowing Muslims to embark on the Hajj) without severely undermining the policy goal of the sanctions as a whole.

The ability of travel bans to target elites was evidenced by their use in the Balkan conflict in the late 1990s. During the conflict, travel bans were placed on over 800 Special Designated Persons (SDPs), who were leading politicians and business people within Serbia.57 Despite petitions of removal from many of the SDPs, the European and US officials held firm in denying them the ability to travel to the US and EU. As a result, many of the SDPs were precluded from substantial business and investment opportunities. This targeted coercive pressure, combined with incentives for the opposition, “no doubt contributed to the groundswell against Milošević and helped convince elites that the costs of supporting the regime were excessive.”58 All of this was achieved with little humanitarian impact caused by the travel sanctions. Thus, travel bans have to potential to target only the decision-making elites.

Secondly, because many airlines are at least in part state-owned, the travel bans can deny valuable income to the sanctioned regime. Security Council Resolution 883 implemented this form of travel sanction against Libya in 1993.59 The result was a loss of approximately $2 billion in aviation losses and another $2.5 billion in damages to Libya’s overburdened road network,60 a substantial amount for a small, relatively poor nation.

Furthermore, unlike most other forms of financial sanctions, travel bans are relatively easy to enforce. The air traffic network is already highly regulated. Little additional effort is necessary to effectively monitor the travel of both individuals and airlines, and so the burden of enforcing travel bans is relatively minimal, especially compared to the vast amount of monitoring necessary to ensure compliance with a general trade embargo.

Finally, as with financial sanctions, the very act of sanctioning a nation sends a strong message to the international community, as discussed above in relation to Iran in 1979 and Libya in 1992. For a regime seeking to maintain its domestic legitimacy, this could make defying an arrest warrant of the ICC too politically costly to be undertaken. Therefore, travel bans could be an effective, relatively easy tool the states supporting the ICC could engage in to further compliance with ICC arrest warrants.

D. Challenge of Implementing Travel Bans

Despite these traits, the successful implementation of a travel ban regime requires being mindful of several limitations. The most severe is that travel bans require a greater amount of multilateralism than financial sanctions. The travel sanctions against Libya, Angola, Afghanistan, Haiti, and Sierra Leone were all imposed by the United Nations Security Council.61 While it is not impossible to get Security Council agreement on an issue related to the ICC (the case against Omar Al Bashir was referred by the security Council),62 the well documented hostility of China, Russia, and occasionally the United States to the Court make it far from guaranteed.

Additionally, travel bans require diligent enforcement. Lax customs or border enforcement can lead to collapse of entire sanctioning regime.63 While enforcement does not require a large resource or time investment, it nevertheless must be undertaken forcefully and comprehensively.

Finally, travel bans do not necessarily have the same coercive force on their own as economic sanctions. If the sanctioned nation has a strong interest in international recognition, stand-alone sanctions may be effective in changing behavior and effectuating arrest. Otherwise however, they likely need to be applied in combination with economic sanctions.64 By being mindful of these limitations travel bans can be successfully implemented, and thus will be a powerful tool for the ICC and its supporting states.

IV. Conclusions

Targeted sanctions are a promising tool for the International Criminal Court. Historically, the opposition to enforcement of human rights treaties has centered on the expense of enforcement, their frequent collateral damage, and the difficulty to ensure compliance within the international community. Targeted sanctions sidestep many of these problems. Enforcement is much easier thanks to the lesser degree of required number of state participants. Also because they do not involve precluding large amounts of trade or investment they are also less costly to enforce, far below the cost of general trade embargoes or military action. Finally, because they focus coercive pressure on the elites and leaders of the state, the pressure of the sanctions is felt only by the decision-making elites, sparing the general population much of the hardship associated with trade embargoes and military action.

This is not to say that targeted actions are a cure—all for the ICC’s challenge of enforcing its arrest warrants. Most limiting is the fact that, because the ICC has no coercive power of its own, Targeted sanctions can only be implemented by members of the international community willing to support the Court. Therefore, the Office of the Prosecutor must continually engage the international community. By building relationships with the Rome Statute’s States Parties in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development the Court will have powerful allies capable of lobbying for the use of targeted sanctions, as well as implementing them unilaterally in certain circumstances. Together, coupled with other tools at the disposal of the Court and its States Parties, targeted economic sanctions could prove to be a powerful tool in compelling the execution of the arrest warrants of the International Criminal Court.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], preamble, para 5. ↩

2. 2.

   Situations and Cases, ICC, available online (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). ↩

3. 3.

   LRA Commanders, LRA Crisis Tracker, available online (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). ↩

4. 4.

   Situations and Cases, supra note 2. ↩

5. 5.

   Eric M. Meyer, International Law: The Compatibility of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court with the U.S. Bilateral Immunity Agreements Included in the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, 58 Okla. L. Rev. 97, 100 (2005). ↩

6. 6.

   Eric Leonard, ICC Effectiveness Depends on Member State Cooperation, Jurist, (Jan. 3, 2012), available online. ↩

7. 7.

   Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell”: America in the Age of Genocide 363 (2002). ↩

8. 8.

   Economic Sanctions, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 11 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 345, 346 (2001). ↩

9. 9.

   Id. at 345. ↩

10. 10.

    See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (1990) at 1. ↩

11. 11.

    Id. at 71. ↩

12. 12.

    Id. at 114. ↩

13. 13.

    Id. at 36. ↩

14. 14.

    Id. at 13. ↩

15. 15.

    Situations and Cases, supra note 2. ↩

16. 16.

    Id. ↩

17. 17.

    Jayantha Dhanapala, Final Expert Seminar on Smart Sanctions: the Next Steps: Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions, in Smart Sanctions: the Next Steps: The Debate on Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions Within the “Bon-Berlin Process” 35 (Michael Brzoska ed., 2001). ↩

18. 18.

    David A. Cortright, George A. Lopez & Elizabeth S. Rogers, Targeted Financial Sanctions: Smart Sanctions That Do Work, in Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft 24 (David Cortright & George A. Lopez eds., 2002) [hereinafter Smart Sanctions]. ↩

19. 19.

    Id. ↩

20. 20.

    Id. ↩

21. 21.

    List of Member Countries-Ratification of the Convention on the OECD, Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, available online (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). ↩

22. 22.

    U.N. Charter art. 41, para. 1. ↩

23. 23.

    See S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 3238th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841 (1993). ↩

24. 24.

    Security Council Resolution 1503, at para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003), available online. ↩

25. 25.

    Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism 177 (2003). ↩

26. 26.

    50 U.S. Code § 1702(a)(1)(B). ↩

27. 27.

    O’Sullivan, supra note 25, at 94. ↩

28. 28.

    Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev. v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 156, 162 (D.C. Cir. 2003). ↩

29. 29.

    United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 86 (2d Cir. 2003). ↩

30. 30.

    Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 Fordham Int’l L.J., 1400, 1443 (2008), available online. ↩

31. 31.

    12 U.S. Code § 95 (a)(1). ↩

32. 32.

    United States Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Foreign Regimes’ Assets—The United Faces Challenges in Recovering Assets, but has Mechanisms that Could Guide Future Efforts, GAO-04-1006, 1-58, at 35 (Sep. 2004), available online. ↩

33. 33.

    O’Sullivan, supra note 25, at 93. ↩

34. 34.

    Confiscation and Freezing of Assets, Eur. Comm., available online (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). ↩

35. 35.

    The States Parties to the Rome Statute, ICC, available online (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). ↩

36. 36.

    Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DePaul L. Rev. 925, 945 (2000). ↩

37. 37.

    Hossein G. Askari, John Forrer, Hildy Teegen & Jiawen Yang, Economic Sanctions: Examining Their Philosophy and Efficacy 113 (2003). ↩

38. 38.

    Smart Sanctions, supra note 18, at 25. ↩

39. 39.

    Id. at 38. ↩

40. 40.

    Id. at 25. ↩

41. 41.

    Id. at 26 (quoting Warren Christopher, Deputy secretary of State and Chief US representative in the US-Iran talks). ↩

42. 42.

    Id. ↩

43. 43.

    See R. Jeffrey Smith, Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan; U.S. Says French Jeopardized Mission, Wash. Post, A32 (Apr. 23, 1998). ↩

44. 44.

    Michael Brzoska, supra note 17. ↩

45. 45.

    Id. at 36. ↩

46. 46.

    Smart Sanctions, supra note 18, at 150. ↩

47. 47.

    Id. at 30. ↩

48. 48.

    Id. at 26. ↩

49. 49.

    Id. at 30. ↩

50. 50.

    S.C. Res. 1267, S/RES/1267 (Oct. 15, 1999), available online. ↩

51. 51.

    Smart Sanctions, supra note 18, at 30. ↩

52. 52.

    S.C. Res. 748, S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992), available online. ↩

53. 53.

    Id. ↩

54. 54.

    Richard W. Conroy, The UN Experience With Travel Sanctions: Selected Cases and Conclusions, in Smart Sanctions, supra note 18, at 152. ↩

55. 55.

    Id. at 156-160. ↩

56. 56.

    22 U.S. Code §§ 6021-6091. ↩

57. 57.

    Michael Brzoska, supra note 17. ↩

58. 58.

    Id. at 36. ↩

59. 59.

    S.C. Res. 883, S/RES/883 (Nov. 11, 1993), available online. ↩

60. 60.

    United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 27 May 1997 from the Permanent Representative of Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, S/1997/404, May 27, 1997, 9. ↩

61. 61.

    Richard W. Conroy, supra note 54, at 145-162. ↩

62. 62.

    Situations and Cases, supra note 2. ↩

63. 63.

    Kimberly Anne Elliot, Analyzing the Effects of Targeted Sanctions, in Smart Sanctions, supra note 18, at 181. ↩

64. 64.

    Id. at 199. ↩