I. Proposals to Improve the Rate of Execution of ICC Warrants

Common proposals for improving the efficacy of the ICC, both in general and with respect to the effectuation of warrants, include increasing outreach to States Parties, particularly in Africa, to improve the Court’s image; encouraging the U.S., China, and Russia to take a more active role in supporting the Court; and creating an international police force that could arrest alleged criminals independently. The ICC has little control over whether these proposals will come to fruition, and in any case, they proposals are unlikely to become reality within the next ten years if at all.

A. Outreach

The experience of the ICTY and ICTR suggest that states will not cooperation with international tribunals absent if they do not trust the institutions, and outreach is one way to increase confidence in such a court’s good intentions. Scholars of the ICTY have identified Serbia and Croatia’s skepticism about the tribunal’s function and impartiality as a barrier to eliciting their cooperation in the ICTY’s early years.16 Diane Orentliche criticizes the ICTY for waiting six years to establish an outreach program, by which time distrust of the tribunal in Serbia was always deeply ingrained.17 A polity that is supportive of collaboration with the ICC may be able to pressure political and military leaders to cooperate, particularly if the state in question is a democracy. To that end, it seems likely that increased outreach, both to locals and directly to governments, could improve relations between the ICC and African countries and thus increase the likelihood of collaboration with respect to arrest warrants.

However, achieving state cooperation is a lengthy process. It took eight years for the ICTY to gain custody of Milošević, fifteen to gain custody of Radovan Karadžić and Goran Hadžić,18 and eighteen to gain custody of Ratko Mladić, who had been living freely as late as 2009.19 It is possible that Mladić’s arrest would not have occurred absent continued pressure from the European Union, which refused to open membership talks with Serbia until he was arrested.20 The ICTY’s belated outreach process, targeted at victims rather than high-level officials, had not communicated the tribunal’s purpose to many victims even through the late 2000s.21

The process of persuading an unfriendly regime to tolerate an international criminal tribunal, much less actively support it, is time-consuming and appears to require external support in order to be effective. The ICC is facing difficulties similar to those of the ICTY with respect to Sudan, and similar issues are likely to arise in the Court’s case against Uhuru Kenyatta, the current president of Kenya, who, while currently cooperating with the Court, has little incentive to provide it with incriminating evidence.

Other difficulties face the ICC in improving its relationship with situation countries via outreach. First, while Court’s relationship with situation countries has improved since Fatou Bensouda became Prosecutor,22 the alleged Africa bias continues to weigh heavily on the relationship between the ICC and the A.U. Questions of bias are unlikely to be assuaged unless and until Ms. Bensouda opens a formal investigation in a non-African country.

Second, the Court cannot expand its outreach programs without funding, and the Court’s overall budget is subject to constraints, particularly given the current state of the world economy.23 The Court’s budget in 2011 was €103.6 million24 and €108 million in 2012;25 the proposed budget for 2013 is €118.75 million.26 The Court has explicitly asked that some of the additional fund be allotted to outreach.27 Even if the proposed budget is approved, there is no guarantee that the Court will be able to expand outreach activities given the Court’s other financial needs. Since 2011, the Court has taken on new investigations in Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali.28 The trial of Uhuru Kenyatta is scheduled to begin this July.29 Moreover, most cases still have not reached the trial stage, two appeals are underway, and eight countries are still under preliminary investigation. Thus, an expansion of outreach activities of any kind may not be feasible.

B. Great Power Assistance

Absent the cooperation of States Parties, the Court may benefit from the assistance of powerful countries. The U.S., Russia, and China have deep pockets, well-equipped military forces, and trained law enforcement at their disposal, none of which are available to the ICC. Moreover, China and the U.S. may be able to use their vast resources to provide States Parties incentives to cooperate by offering foreign aid, conditional trade deals, or other forms of assistance.

In the past, however, these states have not offered unequivocal support to international criminal tribunals, even when they were perfectly suited to do so. For instance, in the former Yugoslavia, NATO forces initially refused to arrest indicted suspects in Bosnia even though NATO forces were active there and had the authority to arrest ICTY indicted suspects.30 The U.S., Russia, and China will prove similarly reluctant to offer their support to the ICC.

While Russia and the U.S. are signatories to the Rome Statute, neither they nor China are among the Court’s greatest proponents. China and the U.S. have expressed major reservations regarding some of the Rome Statute’s provisions.31 With respect to the U.S., the American Service-members’ Protection Act prevents the U.S. from supporting the ICC, formally cooperating with it, or assisting it in any way should the Court target an American citizen.32 However, over time, the U.S. has become more supportive of the ICC, and on April 3, 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry announced the expansion of a program offering rewards for information leading to the arrest, transfer, and conviction of four of the nine people for whom the Court has outstanding warrants.33 Even so, the U.S. is highly unlikely to ratify the convention given Congress’s persistent partisan divide and the unpopularity of international law among conservatives.34 Moreover, China and Russia rarely support efforts to intervene in states’ domestic affairs, particularly when military force is involved.35 Therefore, while the U.S. is now offering indirect assistance, and China and Russia are not actively obstructing the Court, the ICC cannot rely on them as an alternative to the cooperation of States Parties.

For the same reasons, the Security Council is not likely to increase its assistance in securing the arrest of the accused in referral cases, as the U.S., Russia, and China all have veto power.

C. An International Police Force

Discussions of a global police force arise regularly in both the legal and international relations literature. Scholars who take the possibility seriously tend to treat the idea favorably, and contemplate different possibilities for structuring an international police force.36 Others, notably international relations realists, do not believe that a world government is viable under the international nation-state system.37

The question of an international police force’s feasibility is too complex to address within the confines of this essay. However, assuming that a global police force is an achievable goal, such a force still will not arise in the near future, would take years to develop into a functional, competent force, and in any case would be limited in its reach without military support.

Given the sovereignty concerns of the U.S., China, and Russia discussed above, and in particular the U.S.’s reluctance to submit to an international institution with jurisdiction over its military, neither those countries nor the U.N. Security Council are likely to sponsor the creation of a global police force without a radical shift in outlook and policy. In their absence, there are few alternative sponsors. While the European Union has a Europe-wide police force, it is an investigative body only. If E.U. member states will not entrust a trans-Europe force with arrest powers, they are unlikely to support vesting such powers in an institution over which they have even less control.38 The A.U.’s current discomfort with the ICC would likely extend to institutions intended to strengthen it, and even if it were supportive of such a force, it lacks the money to fund it independently. Thus, any efforts towards the creation of a world police force have a low probability of success, at least for now.

Even were a world police force to be created tomorrow, it would still encounter difficulties. First, any new global institution requires time to build its reputation, develop standard operating procedures and best practices, and harmonize its staff. Those tasks are more difficult when, as with a military or police force, international practices diverge wildly. Second, even once the police force gained experience and competence, it would still be limited by the fact that police are not equipped to force their way into places where they are not wanted. If a state refused it entry, as Sudan likely would at present, the force’s entrance into the country would cause a diplomatic crisis at best. Equally problematic would be cases in which the accused are under heavy military protection, as is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Police are not trained to protect themselves in a war zone without military backing, which will not always be on hand.

For those reasons, the creation of an effective international police force with the ability to successfully execute ICC warrants is also doubtful.

D. Alternatives to Action

For the reasons explained above, increasing the ICC’s rate of arrest via deliberate action will prove difficult, at least for now. However, even absent such action, state cooperation with the ICC, and therefore the arrest rate, is likely to increase. Independent factors also play a role in determining whether and well the accused will be arrested. One is international pressure and the provision of carrots and sticks, as was the case in Serbia. Another is political or military regime change.

II. How Regime Change Increases the Effectuation of International Criminal Arrest Warrants

For the purposes of this paper, regime change does not necessarily mean government overthrow, though in Africa the two frequently overlap. Regime change can involve a switch in either political or military control. What matters is not a change in formal titles but a shift in real power, particularly if the shift results in a loss of power by the accused. That shift need not be absolute; it may involve the loss of power by some in a regime but not others.

The reasons why a change in regime may improve cooperation with the ICC are manifold. First, cooperation with the ICC can demonstrate a break with the old regime, which may be desirable if the old regime is unpopular or allegedly responsible for the country’s past problems. Because the ICC only investigates the most severe situations, alleged crimes committed in situation are likely to have had a deleterious effect on the surrounding territory. New leaders can increase their popularity by blaming their predecessors for their country’s ailments and demonstrate their commitment to change by holding their predecessors accountable. Most obviously, in cases involving a civil war, the winning side will have a natural inclination to foist blame on their opponents, and may hope that cooperation will divert the Court’s attention to the other side. Something similar seems to have occurred in Rwanda, where the government cooperated with the ICTR until it began to investigate crimes allegedly committed by President Kagame’s allies.

Even if new leadership does not result in an immediate shift of blame, political developments may encourage political leaders to cease providing the accused with legal protections and members of the military to defect from accused military leaders protected by their own forces. Political shielding of accused persons was a frequent occurrence in Serbia and is currently a concern in the Sudan. Likewise, in Rwanda, Joseph Kony and his subordinates are protected by their own forces and remained unmolested by the Rwandan authorities. Without political or military protection, the accused are more likely to be arrested. Additionally, change in, and solidification of, new political and military regimes can result in new and potentially more effective policies regarding rebel groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army.

Finally, time and distance from the regime allegedly responsible for criminal acts may decrease tensions associated with holding the accused responsible for events the polity does not believe took place.

A. Serbia

While Serbia was initially reluctant to cooperate with the ICTY, the ICTY nonetheless achieved unique success with respect to arrests: as of July 2011, it had obtained custody of all 161 persons indicted by the tribunal.39 Even though the ICTY’s experience is singular, the fact that all of its warrants were eventually executed suggests that with sufficient political and military evolution, even the least willing of countries may eventually comply with an international tribunal.

Unsurprisingly, under Slobodan Milošević, who was President of Yugoslavia throughout the Yugoslav Wars, Serbia refused to cooperate with the ICTY.40 Similarly, his successor, Vojislav Koštunica, actively obstructed tribunal early in his tenure. For instance, Koštunica approved the grant of an Army pension to Ratko Mladić in 2002, which Mladić continued to receive through 2005.41 Likewise, in 2001, Koštunica created a “Commission of the General Staff of the Army of Serbia and Montenegro for Cooperation with the Hague Tribunal” staffed by current and former army members under the control of Ratko Mladić’s former deputy, who had also been indicted.42

However, at the same time, Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić pressed for cooperation with the ICTY and engineered the surrender of Milošević to the tribunal over Koštunica’s objections and in spite of his protests that the arrest was illegal.43 The government continued to surrender indicted Serbians throughout the next two decades, though the degree to which it cooperated with both arrests and trial proceedings varied according to current events —for instance, the assassination of Djindjić in 2003 sparked an increase in cooperation--and the number of ultra-nationalists in the National Assembly.44

It is particularly telling that the extent of Serbia’s cooperation with the ICTY varied as control of government and the security services shifted between the pro-Hague reformists and the anti-Hague nationalists. Neither had absolute control of Serbia after 2001, but whenever the reformists gained ground, Serbia increased its collaboration with the tribunal, even though the nationalists still limited its extent. In Serbia’s case, political change had a discernable effect on cooperation with the court, both generally and with respect to warrant effectuation.

Many other factors affected the Serbian situation, including pressure from the E.U. However, it is important to note that while the European Union’s influence encouraged the reformists to collaboration with the ICTY, the ultra-nationalists still resisted cooperation despite support for E.U. membership among a majority of Serbs.45 If they had retained total control over Serbia, the government might have rebuffed the E.U.’s efforts. It seems likely that some regimes are more receptive to certain external pressures than others. Regime change increases the probability that whoever holds power will be responsive to such pressure.

B. Rwanda

The ICTR faced difficulty not with executing warrants but with ensuring the fair and effective prosecution of those aligned with the regime of President Paul Kagame. However, the Rwandan experience demonstrates how regimes can and will shelter their allies from international criminal tribunals.

The UN tasked the ICTR with investigating the genocide of Hutus in Rwanda and other serious violations of international humanitarian law in 1994.46 Notably, the UN extended the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction past the end of the genocide but before the end of Tutsi retaliation, and deliberately located the tribunal outside Rwanda “to ensure not only the reality but also the appearance of complete impartiality and objectivity in the prosecution of persons responsible for crimes committed by both sides to the conflict.”47 While Rwanda was initially supportive of the ICTR’s efforts, it ceased to cooperate with the tribunal in 2001, after new Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte launched an investigation alleged crimes committed by Tutsi members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which Kagame led in 1994.48 Rwanda proceeded to block would-be witnesses from leaving the country to testify, resulting in the suspension of three trials.49 Del Ponte’s successor, rather than press the issue, forwarded the trials of RPF to courts in Rwanda, and refrained from contesting the fairness of procedurally defective trials by military tribunals.50

Political and military leaders are naturally reluctant to aid in the capture of investigation of their allies, particularly when those allies might retaliate by providing a tribunal with sufficient evidence to implicate those leaders in the same or other crimes. The likelihood of Rwandan cooperation with the ICTR with respect to the alleged crimes of RPF members would increase dramatically if Kagame’s opponents were to take power, as they would have no special solicitude for the current president’s allies.

Due to a lack of statistically significant data from the ad hoc tribunals or a way for controlling other variables specific to situation countries, I cannot determine a numerical correlation between the rate of regime change and the rate of arrest. However, the evidence above suggests that such a correlation exists, and that change in the regimes of situation countries would increase the likelihood that the ICC’s accused will be captured and transferred to The Hague. The question, therefore, is whether regime change is likely to occur in those countries. An analysis of the frequency of regime change in Africa, where all current situation countries are located, indicates that such changes are likely to occur.

III. Regime Change Frequency in Africa

The analysis below is not meant to test any hypothesis. Rather, it demonstrates statistically and graphically the frequency of regime change in Africa and in the rest of the world. For the purpose of statistical analysis, I limited my data set to instances of 1) coups, both bloodless and otherwise, 2) democratic transitions, including both caretaker regimes and the successful introduction of democracy, 3) rebellions resulting in government overthrow, 4) government overthrow resulting from military invasions51 and 5) peaceful breakups.52 Coups are defined as military interventions that resulted in the installation of a new government that lasted for at least one week,53 though in the cases presented here, they persisted for months if not years. The set does not include partial shifts in political or military power, such as civil wars or peaceful transitions between democratic leaders, because they are more difficult to identify.

A. Data

The analyses below use data from Monty G. Marshall’s Systemic Peace in Africa, Stephen Haggard et al.’s Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset, Patrick McGowan’s African Military Coups d’Etat,”, and Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne’s Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010.54 McGowan is frequently cited in studies of political stability in Africa; Marshall and Powell and Thyne, while lesser known, use the same definition of coup, and their data is therefore compatible.

I made two primary modifications to the combined data set. First, the sets often differed on the year in which a change in regime took place. In these cases, I selected whichever year was the most commonly used. Second, some of the data sets included shifts in regime type that did not amount to regime change as defined in this paper. For instance, the Haggard data set included changes in constitutional regimes that did not result in a change in political leadership. Those data points were removed.

There was at least one instance of regime change in Africa between 1965 and 1994. The same is true of the rest of the world for every year but 1977. After 1994, instances of regime change dropped, but changes in regime occurred 21 times in Africa between 1995 and 2012 and 21 times in the rest of the world.55

B. Calculations

I calculated the mean and standard deviation of the number of regime changes in Africa per year between 1965 and 2012. Then I ran an Ordinary Least Squares regression to determine change in the rate of regime change during those years. I did the same for regime changes in the rest of the world from 1965 to 2012, and then repeated the process counting the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 as a single data point.

C. Results

The mean for regime change in Africa was 2.63 changes year with standard deviation 0.25. In the rest of the world, regime change was slightly lower at 2.44 changes per year with standard deviation 0.39. When data from 1989-1991 was excluded, the rate of African regime change dropped to 2.56 changes per year with variance 0.26, and plummeted in the rest of the world at 2.08 changes per year with variance 0.23.

Table 1. Mean Regime Change/Year

	Mean	r
Regime Change (Africa)	2.63	0.24
Regime Change (Other)	2.44	0.39
Regime Change (Africa 1)	2.56	0.25
Regime Change (Other 1)	2.08	0.23

While the number of situation countries is too low for statistical analysis, for the purposes of this essay, an informal comparison is sufficient. I exclude Kenya from the list below because all the Kenyan accused are cooperating voluntarily with the Court. The mean rate of change in situation countries, at 3.29 changes per year, is higher than the rate for Africa as a whole.

Table 2. Regime Change in Situation Countries

Situation Country	# Regime Changes
Uganda	4
Democratic Republic of the Congo	3
Sudan	3
Central African Republic	5
Libya	2
Côte d'Ivoire	1
Mali	5
Total Regime Changes	23
Mean	3.29

Both OLS regressions demonstrated a downward trend in regime change rate. The unadjusted African regime change coefficient was—3.65; for the rest of the world, indicating a slower deceleration. However, when data from 1989 to 1991 was removed, the coefficients were—2.94 and—5.30, respectively indicating that, barring radical changes in the global landscapes, regime change in Africa is actually decelerating more slowly.

Table 3. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results for Regime Change (Africa)

Year	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|
(rc = regime change in Africa, unadjusted)
Regime Change	-3.03	1.13	-2.68	0.01

Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results for Regime Change (Other, unadjusted)

Year	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|
(rcother = regime change in other countries than Africa, unadjusted)
Regime Change	-2.91	1.10	-2.66	0.01

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results for Regime Change (Africa, adjusted)

Year	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|
Regime Change	-2.94	1.11	-2.66	0.01

Table 6. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Regression Results for Regime Change (Other, adjusted)

Year	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|
Regime Change	-5.30	1.00	-5.28	0.000

D. Analysis

While the rate of regime change in Africa decreasing, it is doing so in an unpredictable manner, and, when one controls for the breakup of the Soviet Union, is decelerating more slowly in Africa than it is in the rest of the world.

African countries in particular have a high rate of regime change, one that, on average, is higher than the rate of change in the rest of the world, more so when data from 1991 is excluded from the calculations. The rate of African regime change decreased between 1965 and 2012, and probably will not return to its former height, which reflected rapid overturn in the wake of decolonization. The number of regime changes per year has decreased since the mid-1990s, but at least one change continues to take place each year, and varies wildly from year. In the absence of the break-up of the Soviet Union, the rate of regime change in Africa is decelerating more slowly than in the rest of the world, and because Africa’s mean regime change per year is higher, it seems likely that the continent’s rate of regime change will remain higher than the rate of change in other regions, at least for now. It is also important to note the model does not take into account shifts from single-party to multi-party democratic regimes or changes in ruling political parties, which, while hitherto uncommon in Africa, are likely to increase given the apparent stabilization of democracies in countries such as Kenya.

Because OLS regressions cannot be used for extrapolations, I cannot predict the future rate of regime change in Africa as a whole, much less the rate in the ICC’s current situation countries, for which I do not have statistically significant data. However, the data, when combined with recent African political history and the persistence of military regimes on the continent, suggests that regime change in Africa will continue to arise frequently, increasing the opportunity for the evolution of policy towards the ICC and the likelihood of situation countries’ eventual cooperation.

Conclusion

Changes in military and political control gives new leaders incentives to place responsibility for their countries’ ills on their predecessors, can increase the ideological differences between the old regime and the new, and lessens the likelihood that a regime will offer the accused political protection or that his military forces will shield him from arrest, regime change is likely to increase the rate of arrest in Africa, and, if the experience of the ICTY in Serbia is any guide, eventually result in the arrest or surrender of all of the accused to the Court. The process may take time, but it indicates that we should not fear that the perpetrators of crimes under investigation by the Court will be shielded from justice forever.

The question remains how this correlation will affect future ICC cases, which will not always be limited to African countries. The rate of regime change is lower in the rest of the world than it is in Africa. If a future situation country refuses to cooperate with the Court, probability suggests that there will be fewer opportunities for transition to a regime less hostile to the ICC.

However, it is important to note that regime change does not occur in a vacuum. Shifts in power are far more frequent in some countries than in others. They arise because of a confluence of internal and external factors that this paper does not seek to identify. The fact that regime change is currently more likely to occur in Africa than it is elsewhere does not preclude the possibility that other countries will undergo regime change.

Furthermore, regime change is only one factor that improves the likelihood of cooperation with the ICC. International pressure is also a crucial component. As the Court’s strength and legitimacy increase, so does pressure on situation countries and the people therein to cooperate, as the U.S., Russia, and China’s evolving attitude towards the ICC demonstrates. Even in the absence of regime change, more arrests may be effectuated. It is only a matter of time.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Regime Change by Country (Africa)

Country	Year	Type
Benin	1965	Coup
	1965	Coup
	1967	Coup
	1969	Coup
	1975	Coup
Burkina Faso	1966	Coup
	1974	Coup
	1976	Coup
	1980	Coup
	1982	Coup
	1983	Coup
	1987	Coup
Burundi	1966	Coup
	1976	Coup
	1987	Coup
	1996	Coup
CAR56	1966	Coup
	1979	Coup
	1981	Coup
	1985	Democratic Transition
	2003	Coup
Chad	1975	Coup
	1982	Coup
	1990	Coup
Comoros	1975	Coup
	1978	Coup
	1989	Coup
	1999	Coup
Republic of Congo	1968	Coup
	1977	Democratic Transition
	1979	Democratic Transition
DRC	1965	Coup
	2001	Coup
	2012	Coup
Equatorial Guinea	1979	Coup
Ethiopia	1974	Coup
	1974	Coup
	1977	Coup
Gambia	1994	Coup
Ghana	1966	Coup
	1969	Coup
	1972	Coup
	1978	Coup
	1979	Coup
	1981	Coup
	1993	Democratic Transition
Guinea	1984	Coup
	2008	Coup
Guinea-Bissau	1980	Coup
	1998	Coup
	1999	Coup
	2000	Democratic Transition
	2003	Coup
	2012	Coup
Côte d’Ivoire57	1999	Coup
Lesotho	1970	Coup
	1986	Coup
	1990	Coup
	1991	Coup
	1993	Democratic Transition
Liberia	1980	Coup
Libya	1969	Coup
	2011	Revolution
Malawi	1993	Uprising
	1994	Democratic Transition
Mali	1968	Coup
	1991	Coup
Mali	1992	Democratic Transition
	2012	Coup
	2012	Democratic Transition
Mauritania	1978	Coup
	1980	Coup
	1984	Coup
	2003	Coup
	2005	Coup
	2008	Coup
Niger	1974	Coup
	1996	Coup
	1999	Coup
	2000	Democratic Transition
Nigeria	1966	Coup
	1966	Coup
	1974	Coup
	1975	Coup
	1983	Coup
	1985	Coup
	1993	Coup
	2010	Coup
Rwanda	1973	Coup
	1994	Coup
Sierra Leone	1967	Coup
	1968	Coup
	1992	Coup
	1996	Coup
	1997	Coup
Senegal	2000	Democratic Transition
Somalia	1969	Coup
Sudan	1969	Coup
	1985	Coup
	1989	Coup
Togo	1967	Coup
	2005	Coup
Uganda	1966	Coup
	1971	Coup
	1980	Coup
	1985	Coup
Algeria	1965	Revolution
	1992	Coup
South Africa	1993	Democratic Transition
	1994	Democratic Transition
Zambia	1990	Democratic Transition
	1991	Democratic Transition
Madagascar	1972	Coup
	2009	Democratic Transition
Swaziland	1973	Coup
Seychelles	1977	Coup
Algeria	1965	Coup
Tunisia	2011	Revolution
Egypt	2011	Coup

Appendix 2. Regime Change by Country (Other)

Country	Year	Type
Haiti	1986	Coup
	1988	Coup
	1988	Coup
	1991	Coup
	1994	Democratic Transition
Dominican Republic	1965	Coup
Grenada	1979	Coup
	1983	Coup/Military Invasion
Guatemala	1982	Coup
	1983	Coup
	1986	Democratic Transition
Honduras	1972	Coup
	1975	Coup
	1978	Coup
	2009	Coup
El Salvador	1979	Coup
	1984	Democratic Transition
Panama	1968	Coup
	1989	Military Invasion
Suriname	1980	Coup
Ecuador	1966	Coup
	1972	Coup
	1976	Coup
	2000	Coup
Peru	1986	Coup
	1975	Coup
	1975	Coup
	1980	Democratic Transition
Brazil	1969	Coup
Bolivia	1969	Coup
	1970	Coup
	1971	Coup
	1978	Coup
	1979	Coup
	1980	Coup
	1981	Coup
Paraguay	1989	Coup
Chile	1973	Coup
	1990	Democratic Transition
Argentina	1966	Coup
	1970	Democratic Transition
	1976	Coup
Uruguay	1973	Coup
	1985	Democratic Transition
Portugal	1974	Coup
Greece	1967	Coup
	1973	Democratic Transition
Cyprus	1974	Military Invasion
Russia	1991	Peacful Separation
Belarus	1991	Peacful Separation
Romania	1991	Revolution
Azerbaijan	1991	Peacful Separation
Tajikistan	1991	Peacful Separation
Kyrgyzstan	1991	Peacful Separation
Uzbekistan	1991	Peacful Separation
Turkmenistan	1991	Peacful Separation
Armenia	1991	Revolution
Moldova	1991	Revolution
Ukraine	1991	Revolution
Estonia	1990	Revolution
Latvia	1990	Revolution
Lithuania	1990	Revolution
East Germany	1989	Revolution
Bulgaria	1990	Revolution
Albania	1991	Revolution
Poland	1989	Revolution
Macedonia	1991	Revolution
Turkey	1971	Coup
	1980	Coup
Iraq	1968	Coup
	2003	Military Invasion
Syria	1966	Coup
	1969	Coup
	1970	Coup
Yemen	1967	Coup
	1974	Coup
	1978	Coup
	1986	Coup
Qatar	1972	Coup
	1995	Coup
Oman	1970	Coup
Afghanistan	1973	Coup
	1978	Coup
	2001	Military Invasion
Pakistan	1971	Coup
	1977	Coup
	1999	Coup
	2008	Democratic Transition
Bangladesh	1975	Coup
	1975	Coup
Myanmar	1988	Coup
	2010	Democratic Transition
Thailand	1976	Coup
	1977	Coup
	1991	Coup
	2006	Coup
Cambodia	1997	Coup
Vietnam	1965	Coup
	1965	Coup
Indonesia	1966	Coup
	1999	Democratic Transition
Fiji	1987	Coup
	2006	Coup
Czech Republic	1993	Revolution
Slovakia	1993	Revolution
Serbia & Montenegro	1992	Revolution
Bosnia & Herzegovina	1992	Revolution
Croatia	1991	Revolution
Serbia	1996	Peacful Separation
Montenegro	2006	Peacful Separation
Slovenia	1991	Revolution
Ghana	1993	Democratic Transition
Madagascar	1972	Revolution
	1992	Democratic Transition
Nepal	1990	Revolution
São Tomé and Príncipe	1975	Revolution
South Korea	1988	Democratic Transition

Appendix 3. Number of Regime Changes by Year, Grouped by Region

Year	Africa Countries	Other Countries
1965	5	3
1966	7	2
1967	3	4
1968	3	2
1969	5	3
1970	1	4
1971	1	4
1972	2	4
1973	2	4
1974	5	3
1975	4	6
1976	2	4
1977	3	2
1978	3	4
1979	5	3
1980	5	4
1981	2	1
1982	3	2
1983	2	1
1984	4	1
1985	1	0
1986	2	4
1987	0	1
1988	2	4
1989	3	4
1990	4	6
1991	3	17
1992	5	3
1993	4	3
1994	0	1
1995	3	1
1996	1	1
1997	2	1
1998	4	0
1999	3	2
2000	1	1
2001	0	1
2002	3	0
2003	0	1
2004	5	0
2005	2	0
2006	0	3
2007	0	0
2008	2	1
2009	1	1
2010	1	1
2011	3	0
2012	4	0

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   See, e.g., David Kaye, Who’s Afraid of the International Criminal Court?, 90 Foreign Aff. 118, 118 (2012); Lisa Clifford, “Terminator” Case Casts Shadow over International Criminal Court, Times (London), Oct. 7, 2010, available online. ↩

2. 2.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], Article 52. ↩

3. 3.

   See Dapo Akande, The Effect of Security Council Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC, 10 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 299 (2012). ↩

4. 4.

   Andrew England, Malawi pulls out of hosting AU summit, Fin. Times, Jun. 8, 2012, available online; African Union Opposes Warrant for Qaddafi, AP, Jul. 2, 2011, available online. ↩

5. 5.

   See All Situations, The Int’l Criminal Court, available online (last visited May 6, 2013). ↩

6. 6.

   See Rome Statute, supra note 2; Akande, supra note 3; Africa Debate—Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, ICC Forum, available online (last visited May 7, 2013). ↩

7. 7.

   See Max du Plessis, The International Criminal Court that Africa Wants, Inst. For Sec. Studies 67-76 (2010), available online. ↩

8. 8.

   Alex de Waal & Gregory H. Stanton, Should President Omar-al-Bashir of Sudan be Charged and Arrested by the International Criminal Court? An Exchange of Views, 4 Genocide Stud. & Prevention 329, 332-33 (2009); but see Emily Henken Ritter & Scott Wilford, Bargaining and the Effectiveness of International Criminal Regimes, 24 J. Theoretical Pol. 149 (2011) (arguing that the suggest that the ICC is deliberately issuing warrants despite the low likelihood that they will be executed because it wants to appear “tough” and is unable to do so via strategic prosecutions; thus, it is cementing its legitimacy by going after anyone it can). ↩

9. 9.

   Marlise Simons, Wanted, Sudan’s President Can’t Escape Isolation, N.Y. Times, May 2, 2010, available online (noting that al-Bashir has stayed away from conferences in South Africa, Uganda, and Nigeria, the latter of which concerned Darfur); Malawi drops AU summit over Sudanese leader, CNN, Jun. 9, 2012, available online (“Malawi said it won’t host an African Union summit next month because the organization wants Omar al-Bashir, the Sudanese leader accused of war crimes in Darfur, to attend”). ↩

10. 10.

    See Part II, infra. ↩

11. 11.

    ICC—About the Court, Int’l Criminal Court, available online (last visited May 7, 2013). ↩

12. 12.

    Judge Sang-Hyun Song, Written Submissions on Mr Lubanga’s Application for My Disqualification, Mar. 8, 2013, available online. ↩

13. 13.

    James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 Vill. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2009). The possibility of investigation may still deter potential perpetrators, but it is unclear how long that effect will last if the Court proves unable to try most accused persons. ↩

14. 14.

    Africa Debate—Is the ICC Targeting Africa Inappropriately?, supra note 6. ↩

15. 15.

    The Oxford English Dictionary defines regime change as “the replacement of one administration or government by another, especially by means of military force.” I contend that it is the shift in power, and not formal control of a particular institution, that increases the likelihood that a state will cooperate with the ICC. A broader definition is therefore more appropriate in the context of this essay. However, because it is difficult to quantify the definition, and no data sets using that definition have been constructed, I rely on the traditional definition of a coup for my statistical analysis. ↩

16. 16.

    See, e.g., Diane F. Orentliche, Shrinking the Space for Denial: The Impact of the ICTY in Serbia, Open Society Justice Initiative (2008), available online (noting that the popularity of accused political figures and perception of bias against Serbs have hampered cooperation, and suggesting that absent EU pressure, cooperation would not have materialized); Patrice C. McMahon & David P. Forsythe, The ICTY’s Impact on Serbia: Judicial Romanticism Meets Network Politics, 30 Hum. Rts. Q. 412, 422-23 (2008) (noting that while Serbian perceptions of the ICTY have improved, in 2006, only 16 percent completely approved of cooperating with the tribunal), Victor Peskin & Mieczyslaw P. Boduszynski, Croatia’s Moments of Truth: The Domestic Politics of State Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 1, 2003, available online (arguing that the Croatian nationalist movement has stymied Croat cooperation with the ICTY despite the desire of some politicians to cooperate). ↩

17. 17.

    See Orentliche, supra note 16. ↩

18. 18.

    War Crimes Fugitive Radovan Karadzic Arrested, The Guardian, Jul. 21, 2008, available online. ↩

19. 19.

    Murray Wardrop & Damien McElroy, Ratko Mladic: War Crimes Fugitive Arrested in Serbia, The Telegraph (London), May 26, 2011, available online. ↩

20. 20.

    Stephen Castle, Mladic Arrest Opens Door to Serbia’s Long-Sought European Union Membership, N.Y. Times, May 26, 2011, available online. Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, was visiting Serbia at the time of the arrest. It remains unclear whether the timing of the arrest was coincidental. ↩

21. 21.

    Janine Natalya Clark, International War Crimes Tribunals and the Challenge of Outreach, 9 Int’l Crim. L. Rev. 99, 101-106 (2009). ↩

22. 22.

    Rick Gladstone, A Lifelong Passion is Now Put to Practice in the Hague, N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 2013, available online. ↩

23. 23.

    As of 2010, six of the top ten contributors to the ICC were European states; Europe suffered particularly badly from the financial crash due to the eurozone crisis. See The European Council, The European Union and the International Court (2012), at 12, 14, available online; Adam Davidson et al., Europe’s Financial Crisis, in Plain English, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 2011, available online. ↩

24. 24.

    Assembly of States Parties, Res. 4, ICC, ASP, 9th Sess., ICC-ASP/9, at 30-33 (Dec. 10, 2010), at 30-33, available online. ↩

25. 25.

    Assembly of States Parties, Res. 4, ICC ASP, 10th Sess., ICC-ASP/10/Res.4 (Dec. 21, 2011), at 24-27, available online. ↩

26. 26.

    Assembly of States Parties, Proposed Program Budget for 2013, ASP, 11th Sess., ICC-ASP/11/10 (Aug. 16, 2012), available online. ↩

27. 27.

    Id. ↩

28. 28.

    All Situations, supra note 5. ↩

29. 29.

    Id. ↩

30. 30.

    Patricia M. Wald, Apprehending War Criminals: Does International Cooperation Work?, 27 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 229, 235 (2012); Kaye, supra note 1. ↩

31. 31.

    See, e.g., Bing Bing Ja, China and the International Criminal Court: Current Situation, 10 Singapore Year Book of Int’l Law and Contributors 1 (2006) (noting China’s preference for opt-in jurisdiction and a definition of command responsibility that excluded civilian superiors, as well as its distaste for the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers); Press Release, U.S. Department of Defense, Statement on the ICC Treaty (May 6, 2002), available online (expressing concern that the Court would target American servicemembers involved in counterterrorist or military operations). ↩

32. 32.

    22 U.S.C. § 7423. ↩

33. 33.

    Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Secretary Kerry on Bringing War Criminals to Justice Through Expansion of the War Crimes Reward Program (Apr. 3, 2013), available online. ↩

34. 34.

    See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013), available online, (limiting severely the ability of foreign defendants to file universal jurisdiction claims in American federal court unless their claim has a direct bearing on U.S. interests); Full Written Transcript of Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law (Feb. 27, 2012 5:44 PM), available online, Jennifer Steinhauer, Weighing the Effect of an Exit of Centrists, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 2012, available online, ↩

35. 35.

    See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs, China Urges Quick End to Airstrikes in Libya, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 2011, available online (quoting a front-page article in the People’s Daily, an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party which stated that “[h]istorical experience has shown that humanitarian intervention is only an excuse for military intervention into other countries’ domestic affairs”); Neil MacFarquhar, Russia and China Block U.N. Action on Syria, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2012, available online (quoting the Russian Foreign Minister, who warned against “taking sides in a civil war”). Note, however, that both countries appear comfortable to allow, if not support, some degree of intervention. Both approved strikes by U.N. peacekeepers in Sierra Leone against local military bases in 2011, and neither vetoed the Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in Libya. Dan Bilefsky, Recent U.N. Actions Show Policy Shift, Analysts Say, N.Y. Times, Apr. 5, 2011, available online. ↩

36. 36.

    See, e.g., Luis Cabrera, Global Governance, Global Government: Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System (2011); Alexander Wendt, Why a World State is Inevitable, 9 European J. of Int’l Rel. 491 (2003); Robert C. Johansen & Saul H. Medlovitz, The Role of Enforcement of Law in the Establishment of a New International Order: A Proposal for a Transnational Police Force, 6 Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 307, 322 (1980); John J. Davenport, Just War Theory Requires a New Federation of Democratic Nations, 28 Fordham Int’l L.J. 763 (2004). ↩

37. 37.

    See, e.g., John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2003). ↩

38. 38.

    Europol, About Europol, Europa.eu, available online. Edu/content/page/about-europol-17 (last visited May 13, 2013). ↩

39. 39.

    Tribunal Welcomes the Arrest of Goran Hadžić, ICTY, Jul. 20, 2011, available online. ↩

40. 40.

    Orentliche, supra note 16, at 12. ↩

41. 41.

    Id. at 31-32. ↩

42. 42.

    Eric Gordy, Serbia After Dindjic: War Crimes, Organized Crime, and Trust, 51 Problems of Post-Communism 10, 16 at note 11 (2004). ↩

43. 43.

    R. Jeffrey Smith, Serb Leaders Hand Over Milosevic for Trial by War Crimes Tribunal, Wash. Post, Jun. 29, 2001, at A1. ↩

44. 44.

    See Orentliche, supra note 16, at 39-50. Within four months of Djindjić’s assassination, one Serb had been arrested and four had surrendered themselves to the ICTY. Cooperation with the tribunal fell sharply following the Serbian Radical Party winning the December 2003 parliamentary elections. Support again increased after the election of the reformist Boris Tadić to the Presidency in 2004, and thereafter wavered depending on whether Tadić or Koštunica, who became Prime Minister in 2003 and had control over the security services, had the upper hand. ↩

45. 45.

    Dan Bilefsky, Serbs Losing Fervor for European Union Accession, N.Y. Times, May 4, 2012, available online. In 2009, 75% of Serbs favored E.U. membership. ↩

46. 46.

    About the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, available online (last visited May 12, 2013). ↩

47. 47.

    Leslie Haskell & Lars Waldorf, The Impunity Gap of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Causes and Consequences, 34 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 49, 55 (2011). ↩

48. 48.

    Rwandan President Kagame ‘sparked 1994 genocide’, BBC, Oct. 4, 2011, available online. ↩

49. 49.

    Id. at 57; Victor Peskin, Courting Rwanda—The Promises and Pitfalls of the ICTR Outreach Programme, 3 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 950 (2005). ↩

50. 50.

    See Haskell & Waldorf, supra note 47 at 60-71. ↩

51. 51.

    E.g. the American invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. ↩

52. 52.

    Limited to the Soviet states that broke amicably with Russia and the separation of Serbia and Montenegro. ↩

53. 53.

    See Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Coups d’Etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution, 41 J. African Studies 339, 343 (2003); Jonathan M. Powell & Clayton L. Thyne, Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset, 48 J. Peace Research 249, 252 (2011); Monty G. Marshall, Systemic Peace in Africa, Annex 2b (2004), available online. ↩

54. 54.

    McGowan, supra note 53; Mashall, supra note 53; Powell & Thyne, Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010; Powell & Thyne, Coups d’etat, 1950-Present, Dataset 2 (2011), available online; Stephen Haggard et al., Distributive Conflict and Regime Change: A Qualitative Dataset (Sep. 12, 2012), available online. For the complete dataset, see Appendices I-III. ↩

55. 55.

    See Appendices I and II for lists of regime changes and their classifications. ↩

56. 56.

    While the incident is not included in the data set, CAR experienced another coup in March 2013. See Scott Sayare, Mystery Shrouds Rise and Aims of Rebel at Helm of Central African Republic, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 2013, available online. ↩

57. 57.

    While the incident is not included in this dataset, U.N. and French forces, in an excellent example of partial regime change, successfully ousted military leader Laurent Gbagbo in 2011. See Colum Lynch & William Branigin, Ivory Coast Strongman Arrested After French Forces Intervene, Wash. Post, Apr. 11, 2011, available online. ↩