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Comment on the Arrest Question: “What more can be done to secure the arrest and surrender of persons subject to arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court?”

Voluntary Surrender: An Overlooked Strategy to Strengthen Voluntary Cooperation to the International Criminal Court

Cooperation with international justice depends on the law-enforcement action of sovereign States on their own territories or the voluntary action of individuals wherever they are.

—Mr. M.J. Nolan, MP, Ireland
Deputy Convenor of PGA’s International Law and Human Rights Programme.1

I. Introduction

To date, the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has indicted thirty-six individuals, issued twenty-seven arrest warrants for individuals in eight situations.2 Of the twenty-seven individuals with arrest warrants, ten are at large as fugitives, and five have been arrested, but not in the Court’s custody. Many of these arrest warrants have been long outstanding.3 In the nine cases where the ICC issued summonses to appear, the cases are in the pre-trial stage,4 has a trial date set,5 or the proceedings terminated upon death of the indictee or upon the charges being dismissed.6

Article 63 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court provides that the accused shall be present during the trial, although the accused may be removed from the courtroom in exceptional circumstances. (e.g., the accused, if present in the courtroom, disrupts the proceedings).7

Thus, the ICC can only fulfill its mandate if suspects are present in court. Voluntary surrender is one strategy, perhaps an overlooked one, to ensure that the suspects are present in court and court proceedings are not impeded. “In the absence of effective international means to arrest and surrender suspects, voluntary surrender is legally (and morally) important.”8 By increasing the number of indictees who voluntary surrender to the Court, voluntary cooperation to the ICC will be strengthened. So far, we have seen examples of successful voluntary surrenders to the ICC in Sudan, Kenya and the Congo. We will look more closely at those situation countries in this comment.

The purpose of this comment is to come up with a set of factors indictees tend to consider when deciding whether or not to appear voluntarily. Based on these factors, the ICC can pursue new policies that take into account the factors that are at play in an indictee’s decision.

First, in section 2, I provide some background on the concept of voluntary surrender. Then, in section 3, I describe the methodology and data analysis that I used to investigate the factors that induce an indictee to voluntarily surrender. Next, in section 4, I posit my hypothesis. In section 5, I present the factors that induce surrender, providing a discussion and analysis of my findings. Finally, in section 6, to test the factors, I apply them to current ICC cases.

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II. Background

Voluntary surrender, also referred to as voluntary appearance, is defined as the “voluntary arriv[al] at court following the notification of a summons to appear.”9 In comparison, a surrender is defined as a “state’s transfer of a person to another criminal jurisdiction.”10 This comment will focus solely on voluntary surrender.

Based on the limited instances of voluntary surrender at the ICC, the ICC seems to follow the following procedure: (1) summons to appear issued under seal, then (2) unsealed, and finally, (3) indictee voluntarily appears shortly thereafter. In the cases where the indictee is still at large, there is an arrest warrant out.

Summons to appear, defined in Article 58(7) of the Rome Statue is authorized “when a summons is sufficient to ensure the person’s appearance.”11 When it is unlikely that a person would appear voluntarily, the ICC then issues an arrest warrant.12 An arrest warrant is an order that authorizes the arrest and detention of an individual. “National authorities must arrest the person before they surrender the person for the purpose of prosecution.”13

III. Methodology

This comment will examine the factors an indictee considers before making the decision to voluntary surrender. It is my hope that an understanding of these factors will lead to improved voluntary cooperation with the ICC. In order to understand why some indictees voluntarily turn themselves in, while others do not, I had structured informal conversations with experienced international lawyers. All the interviewees have significant international experience qualifying as Defense Counsel before international tribunals including the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia, and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

I began the process by speaking to one individual. In my conversation with this individual, I was then referred to other individuals who also had a similar background and knowledge. The main medium by which these conversations were had was by telephone. During the conversation, a pre-defined list of questions was presented. The types of questions asked included a mixture of fixed and open-ended questions. Most questions were intended to elicit their opinion on important factors that indictees consider. Only a few that I contacted offered me their time and/or referred me to other individuals to contact. What began from this simple framework snowballed into conversations with three interviewees.

I used conversations with international criminal defense lawyers as my main data source because as representatives of indictees in front of international courts, they would probably have an insider’s perspective on the issue, grounded in their personal experience and interactions with their clients. All the interviewees were guaranteed anonymity and will be referred to throughout this comment as “Interviewee One”, “Interviewee Two” and “Interviewee Three”.

My comment is limited in many respects. First, a majority of all the lawyers I contacted were from the United States. Second, it is difficult to ascertain whether the interviewees were being strategic or sincere. However, none of the interviewees said or said exclusively that their clients were innocent, suggesting that they weren’t being strategic. Third, the sample size is quite limited and not completely random. Although the sample size is not large enough to conclude anything with statistical certainty, my findings can still provide a qualitative understanding of an indictee’s decision-making process, which will provide insight for future studies and policy decisions.

Although my comment is limited in many ways, the focus of my research is to provide an understanding of voluntary surrender. Such an understanding can benefit the ICC. Future policy decisions should incorporate rules and procedure that strengthen the “voluntary surrender factors.” Additionally, although my study is limited in scope and size, in the course of my investigation, I aimed to ensure that my data was representative by applying the “voluntary surrender factors” to specific ICC cases to see the extent my findings accurately resonated with what is occurring on the ground.

IV. Hypothesis

In this section, I present factors that I assumed would be important. Prior to my research and conversations with the interviewees, I hypothesized that the main factors leading to voluntary surrender were (1) one’s political position/power in home country, (2) the crimes indicted for, (3) mitigation factors, and (4) innocence. At first look, it seemed that those with more political power and those indicted for more serious and heinous crimes were least likely to surrender. I also thought that an indictee would consider voluntary surrender if it could benefit his or her case in the long run.

V. Factors that induce Surrender

We see that factors that serve to decrease benefits and those that raise the probability of detection are among the most important in explaining both captures and surrenders of indicted war criminals.14

Below are factors that indictees are actually likely to consider in making their decision to voluntary surrender. These factors may not always be at play in each individual’s decision-making process, as choosing to voluntary surrender is a highly individualized decision.

Factor #1—Situation in Home Country

The “situation in home country” factor considers the quality of life in the home country, looking at whether or not it is still viable. Indictees are likely to compare the quality of life in the home country with what they are expected to encounter in The Hague. The economy of the home country can also be looked at. At the ICTY, “reductions in economic assistance by the OECD also help[ed] to induce surrenders.”15 The Court may seem to be a good alternative, if the suspects “don’t have another place to go.”16 Some say that “life at The Hague detention facility is probably ideal compared to living out in the jungle forest of many place,”17 while other say “it is not safer at the ICC than at home” as the indictee may not be comfortable with the different culture in the Hague.18 For example, the climate and food at The Hague differ greatly from many ICC situation countries.

In my hypothesis, I assumed that one’s political power would be a leading factor that drives a suspect’s consideration. However, this can be explained by the relationship of one’s political power with their quality of life in the home country. According to Interviewee Two, those with higher political power will likely have a more viable place to go, thus explaining the correlation between why those of higher political power are less likely to voluntary surrender.

Factor #2—Personal Safety

Another factor that indictees consider is their personal safety. An indictee is more likely to voluntary surrender if his or her life is threatened.19 If the indictee’s life is physically threatened in his or her home country, the security and protection the ICC can provide and the distance away from home can become appealing.

Factor #3—Justice and Confidence in the ICC

The underlying idea behind the “justice and confidence in the ICC” factor is that one “would want to submit to a jurisdiction where a local alternative would be much worse.”20 Thus, if a suspect sees a chance of winning or receiving an acceptable outcome at the ICC then he or she is more likely to voluntary surrender. This was proven to be true at the ICTY, where those who previously surrendered were more likely to make a subsequent surrender. Those who have previously surrendered to the Court have some familiarity with the Court and its system, and thus can have more confidence in the Court. “In the model of surrenders in particular, we see that those who exercised the most responsibility for violations of international law tend to turn themselves in relatively quickly and that the number of previous surrenders increases the likelihood of subsequent surrenders.”21 Thus, familiarity with the Court and confidence in the outcomes the Court can provide can influence one’s decision-making process.

However, others argue that this is a suspect’s last consideration, “because [the indictees] know they are not going to get a fair trial.” Interviewee One qualifies his critique of the ICC by saying that “more [suspects] would turn themselves in if they knew they could get a fair trial.”22

In my hypothesis, I assumed that one’s political power would be a leading factor that drives a suspect’s consideration. However, one interviewee specifically stated that “it doesn’t matter if you’re a head of state, or a person on the street,” it is the “belief that there’s due process, a process of justice that is to work and not impede.”23

Factor #4—Innocence

In my hypothesis, I feared that all the interviewees would state innocence as the primary factor in a suspect’s consideration to voluntary surrender. However, the reality is, none of the interviewees emphasized innocence as the sole or leading factor. However, Interviewee Three highlighted a correlation between innocence and voluntary surrender. “The innocent surrender voluntarily, [while] those that are in defiant (those that in the end are proven to be responsible) are reluctant to submit to justice.”24 There are two reasons that help explain this correlation. For one, those that are innocent would have more confidence in facing the Court. If the rule of law works, and no extraneous circumstances are at play, they would be able to prove or at least have confidence in proving that they were not legally responsible in Court. And two, those that are innocent would often want to clear their name. If you knew you had a good case, there is no point in waiting.

On the other hand, if you don’t believe you have a good chance (because you are not factually innocent and/or you have no confidence in the Court), you are less likely to voluntary surrender. Thus, innocence is a factor that would be considered by a suspect in combination with the other factors.

Factor #5—Ability to Make Bail

Odds of voluntary surrender increase if a suspect is reasonably assured that he or she can make bail. Odds decrease if a suspect has no assurance of a shorter time being held. A former Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda said that their efforts to improve voluntary surrender were crippled, “because of the prospects of very lengthy pre-trial custody for the accused.”25

Factor #6—Time

Time is another factor that a suspect considers. Two of the interviewees I talked to mentioned that their clients just wanted to get it over with. Unless the indictee surrenders to the Court, he or she remains in a position of opposition, labeled as a fugitive. According to Interviewee Three, “no one likes being an outcast.” Thus, indictees will consider their ability to tolerate pain of waiting out criminal proceedings. Court proceedings can take a long time, and suspects, unless are able to make bail, can be held for many years before they are tried.

Other Factors

The interviewees also mentioned a few other factors that may be considered by a suspect prior to his or her voluntary surrender. This includes family and courage. According to Interviewee Two, a suspect would make riskier decisions if he or she has no family to be accountable for. In weighing the voluntary surrender factors, not only would a suspect consider his or her own acceptable outcome, but he or she would also consider the outcome his or her family would face as a result of his decision to voluntary surrender. By voluntarily appearing, a suspect is subjecting him or herself to a foreign court in a foreign place. Almost all the interviewees agreed that this would require a lot of courage.

VI. Application

Now that I have outlined the factors the interviewees have described as the most important, I will apply the factors to ICC cases where a suspect has voluntarily surrendered to evaluate whether the certain factor was actually significant.

Factor #1—Situation in Home Country

The dire situation in Darfur, Sudan affected the three rebel leaders’ decisions to voluntary surrender to the ICC. They surrendered at a time of ongoing conflict.26 According to reports by the Prosecutor of the ICC, the lives of civilians in Darfur were significantly affected, as there were fights between Government forces and armed opposition groups.27 The Prosecutor noted that the conflict was “marked by tensions arising from clashes between the Sudanese Government and rebel movements, inter-communal clashes and conflict resulting from control over access to a gold mine.”28

Additionally, the Sudanese justice system was unable and unwilling to address the situation in Darfur, in fact “many victims informed the [UN] Commission that they had little confidence in the impartiality of the Sudanese justice system and its ability to bring to justice the perpetrators of the serious crimes committed in Darfur. In any event, many have feared reprisals in the event that they resort to the national justice system.”29 Under these circumstances, to the three rebel leaders who voluntarily surrendered to the ICC, living under a regime in which the Security Council has held a threat to peace and security does not seem like a viable option. Thus, this factor leaned in favor of voluntary surrender.

On the other hand, the Deputy Head of State of Kenya, William Samoei Ruto (“Ruto”) also voluntarily surrendered, making it the first time in history of international courts that a Head of State voluntarily surrendered.30 As a Deputy Head of State, the quality of life in his home country should be much more viable in comparison to that of the three rebel leaders in Darfur. Despite Ruto’s political power, he still chose to voluntarily surrender, showing that this factor did not affect his decision to surrender voluntarily.

Factor #2—Personal Safety

I could not identify any evidence of an indictee who voluntary surrendered because he or she believed that his life was being threatened.

In Darfur, the three rebel leaders who voluntarily surrendered (Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, and Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus) all returned to Darfur after surrendering to the ICC to continue fighting against the Sudanese government.31 In particular, Jerbo’s life was obviously personally threatened back at home, as evident by his subsequent death when he returned to Darfur after his confirmation of charges hearing.32 Thus, it does not seem like personal safety was a factor the three considered in choosing to voluntary surrender.

Factor #3—Justice/Confidence in Court

The factor of justice came up frequently in the discussion of voluntary surrender. For instance, when Abu Garda voluntarily appeared before the ICC, he claimed that “every leader should co-operate with justice and observe the law…and that he was innocent, so was confident that he would not be charged.”33 Additionally, he urged the President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir to also surrender. Abu Garda would not urge his opposition to surrender if he was not confident that the Court could guarantee a fair trial, or at least a favorable outcome. In fact, he emphasized that “it is very important for any honest leader to come and to face the justice.”34 His confidence in the ICC’s ability was further supported by Tadjadine Niam’s statement, “we believe the court is independent and impartial. Let the others also come to the court.”35

Similarly, Abdallah Banda also voluntarily appeared at the ICC because he believed in justice and wanted to set an example for Al-Bashir.36

Further, Deputy Head of Kenya, Ruto “bow[ed] to justice” and claimed that he cooperated with the ICC before summons for his arrest was even issued, because “[he] believed in the rule of law.”37

Bosco Ntaganda of the Democratic Republic of the Congo also voluntarily surrendered to the ICC, because “the ICC is the best possible option to ensure that fair and impartial proceedings take place against those who have committed international crimes in the DRC.”38

The voluntary surrender of Abu Garda and other suspects suggests that there is confidence in the ICC’s ability to offer a fair trial.39 As one interviewee noted, “people would want to submit to a jurisdiction where local alternatives would be much worse.”40 Thus, to the eyes of those who voluntarily appeared to the ICC, they chose to appear because they believed that the ICC could bring justice.

Factor #4—Innocence

The “innocence” factor goes hand in hand with the “justice and confidence in the Court” factor. A suspect who believes himself to be innocent is more likely to want to seek justice and have confidence in the Court, in order to clear his name.

Deputy President of Kenya said he chose to voluntarily surrender because “[he] believed in the rule of law”, as mentioned above, but also “because [he] firmly believe[d] in [his] innocence.”41 Further, Interviewee Three noted that the ICC received full cooperation from Kenya, whereby the six individuals named by the Prosecutor all voluntarily surrendered.42 As of now, half of those individuals’ charges have been either dismissed or their cases withdrawn. According to Interviewee Three, those who voluntarily surrendered were right in having confidence in the Court and in believing their own innocence.43

Similarly, in Darfur, Abu Garda had no issue with voluntarily appearing at the Court, “because he was not involved with the attack.”44 His firm belief in his innocence gave him courage to face the court, and to urge Al-Bashir to also surrender.45

Factor #5—Ability to Make Bail

Although there is no established rule that voluntary surrender would enable suspects to obtain bail while awaiting trial, the suspects who have voluntary surrendered to the ICC have been able to obtain bail as they await trial.46 Past cases have demonstrated the importance of the freedom to leave the Court after voluntarily submitting to the ICC’s jurisdiction. In the three cases of voluntary surrender in Darfur, the suspects were all able to return to Sudan, and did not have to be detained. The suspects were free to leave The Hague after the initial appearance where a Judge informs the suspect of the crimes he is alleged to have committed and of his rights, and did not have to return until the Confirmation of Charges Hearing before trial.47

Similarly, William Ruto and Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya were able to return to Kenya.48 Additionally, Ruto was granted “permission to be not continuously present in court during his trial, in order to enable him to perform his functions of state ad Deputy President of Kenya while still remaining personally subject to the jurisdiction of the Court….”49

Factor #6—Time

Because this factor requires the consideration of the indictee’s personal emotions that is unlikely to be discussed in public, it is difficult to apply this factor to ICC cases without discussing personally with the indictees their ability to tolerate pain of waiting out criminal proceedings.

However, comparing the date of when the summons to appear was issued to the initial appearance hearing date, most of the indictees voluntary appeared soon after the summons to appear was issued. For example, a summons to appear for William Ruto was issued on March 8, 2011, and he voluntarily appeared to his initial appearance hearing on April 7, 2011, within one month.50 Similarly, a summons to appear for Abu Garda was issued on May 7, 2009 (under seal), unsealed May 17, 2009, and he voluntarily appeared on May 18, 2009, within two weeks.51 Thus, it seems that those who decide to voluntarily surrender do so within a short period after a summons is issued, suggesting that suspects prefer to begin court proceedings sooner rather than later.

On the other hand, it took Abdallah Banda much longer to voluntary surrender. His summons to appear was issued under seal on August 27, 2009, unsealed on June 15, 2010, and he voluntarily appeared on June 17, 2010, in a little under a year.52

Conclusion

This comment marks the beginning of research on voluntary surrender at the International Criminal Court. Voluntary surrender is a nonviolent method that can significantly strengthen voluntary cooperation to the ICC. Future research in this area thus should begin with the integration of these factors into models and policies to induce voluntary surrender. This could include new ways to incentivize surrender and to strategize kinds of people to indict.

Most importantly, while the ICC takes on more situations and cases, and more suspects begin to voluntary surrender, more data will become available. With more data, we can gain a better understanding of the factors that may influence a suspect’s decision to voluntary surrender.

Appendix — Voluntary Surrender Questions

General

  1. Which court(s) are you associated with?
  2. As a defense lawyer, have any of your clients surrendered?
  3. How many?

Substantive

  1. Why do you think indictees choose to surrender? (You can draw from specific experiences with your clients, or your general hypothesis)
  2. What are some important factors that one would consider before surrendering voluntarily?
  3. In comparison, why do you think some choose not to surrender?
    1. Does their political position/power at home country matter?
    2. Does the crime he/she is indicted for matter?
  4. Do you see any difference between international/domestic courts that may affect an indictee’s consideration to voluntarily surrender?
  5. And among the international courts: ICC, ICTR, and ICTY?

Conclusion

Could you recommend others I could talk to?

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

  1. 1.

    Press Release, Parliamentarians for Global Action, PGA Welcomes Voluntary Surrender of Darfurian Rebel Leader to the ICC: Pre-Trial Chamber Hears Mr. Abu Garda on Alleged War Crimes Committed Against AU Peacekeepers (May 18, 2009), available online [hereinafter PGA Welcomes Surrender]. ↩

  2. 2.

    All Situations, ICC, available online. ↩

  3. 3.

    See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo and Dominic Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony (Sep. 27, 2005), available online. Archived. ↩

  4. 4.

    See, e.g., Situation in Darfur, Sudan: Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain, ICC, available online (last visited Dec. 27, 2013) [hereinafter Nourain Situation]. ↩

  5. 5.

    See, e.g., Situation in the Republic of Kenya: Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta, ICC, available online (last visited Dec. 27, 2013). ↩

  6. 6.

    See, e.g., Nourain Situation, supra note 4 (“Proceedings against Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus were terminated by Trial Chamber IV on 4 October 2013 after receiving evidence pointing towards his death.”). ↩

  7. 7.

    Göran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court, 25 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 605, n.3 (2002) (citing ICC Statute at 48). ↩

  8. 8.

    PGA Welcomes Surrender, supra note 1 (statement by Mr. David Musila, MP, Chair of the PGA Kenya National Group). ↩

  9. 9.

    Sluiter, supra note 7. ↩

  10. 10.

    Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], Article 102. ↩

  11. 11.

    Sluiter, supra note 7. ↩

  12. 12.

    For more information, see Background Information on the Chamber’s Process of Ruling on Summons to Appear or Warrants of Arrest, ICC (Dec. 16, 2010), available online. ↩

  13. 13.

    Sluiter, supra note 7. ↩

  14. 14.

    James Meernik, It’s Time to Stop Running: A Model of the Apprehension of Suspected War Criminals, 9 ISP 165 (2008) (in reference to the ICTY) ↩

  15. 15.

    Id. at 180. ↩

  16. 16.

    Telephone Interview with Interviewee One, international criminal defense attorney promised anonymity (Nov. 4, 2013), [hereinafter Interviewee One]. ↩

  17. 17.

    Id. ↩

  18. 18.

    Telephone Interview with Interviewee Three, international criminal defense attorney promised anonymity (Nov. 18, 2013), [hereinafter Interviewee Three]. ↩

  19. 19.

    Interviewee One, supra note 16. ↩

  20. 20.

    Telephone Interview with Interviewee Two, international criminal defense attorney promised anonymity (Nov. 11, 2013), [hereinafter Interviewee Two]. ↩

  21. 21.

    Meernik, supra note 14. ↩

  22. 22.

    Interviewee One, supra note 16. Cf. Press Release, Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Ct., ICC Issues Summons to Appear for Rebel Leader in Third Darfur Case Citing Crimes against AU Peacekeepers: Alleged War Crimes Suspect to Appear in The Hague on 18 May 2009 (May 17, 2009), available online (“With this, both the suspect and a number of cooperating states, mainly African, have shown confidence in the ICC’s ability to offer a fair trial and contribute to justice in Darfur. Such confidence and level of cooperation are necessary to end impunity and serve as an important precedence for the other ICC cases, in Darfur and beyond.”) ↩

  23. 23.

    Interviewee Three, supra note 18. ↩

  24. 24.

    Id. ↩

  25. 25.

    Louise Arbour, The Status of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Goals and Results, 3 Hofstra L. & Pol’y Symp. 37, 41 (1999). ↩

  26. 26.

    Luis Moreno-Ocampo, ICC, Fifteenth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant To UNSCR 1593 (2005), (Jun. 5, 2012), at 40, available online. ↩

  27. 27.

    Fatou Bensouda, ICC, Seventeenth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the UN Security Council Pursuant To UNSCR 1593 (2005), (Jun. 5, 2013), at 16, available online. ↩

  28. 28.

    Id. at 22. ↩

  29. 29.

    Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the UN Secretary-General (Jan. 25, 2005), at 5, available online. ↩

  30. 30.

    The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Transcript of Status Conference Hearing (May 14, 2013), at 17 available online, [hereinafter Ruto Status Conference] ↩

  31. 31.

    Interviewee Three, supra note 18. ↩

  32. 32.

    “Proceedings against Saleh Mohammed Jerbo Jamus were terminated by Trial Chamber IV on 4 October 2013 after receiving evidence pointing towards his death.” Nourain Situation, supra note 4. ↩

  33. 33.

    Press Release, ICC, Abu Garda arrives at the premises of the Court (May 17, 2009), available online, [hereinafter Abu Garda Press Release]. See also, Darfur rebel declares innocence after war crimes hearing, AFP, May 18, 2009, available online (“‘I would like to confirm that absolutely I am not guilty to all charges,’ the United Resistance Front leader told journalists in The Hague…”), [hereinafter Abu Garda Declares Innocence]. ↩

  34. 34.

    Id. ↩

  35. 35.

    Tadjadine Niam was a member of the Darfurian delegation that travelled with Abu Garda. Marlise Simons, Darfurian Rebel Commander to Face War Crimes Charges, N.Y. Times, May 17, 2009, available online. ↩

  36. 36.

    Interviewee Three, supra note 18. ↩

  37. 37.

    Ruto Status Conference, supra note 30, at 4, 46. ↩

  38. 38.

    Hon. Lucie Kipele, MP, PGA Member, stated from her constituency in Dungu (Orientale Province), which has been devastated by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). See Press Release, Parliamentarians for Global Action, Parliamentarians for Global Action Welcomes the Voluntary Surrender of Congolese Warlord Bosco Ntaganda Urges Prompt, Appropriate Action by US Authorities and the ICC, available online. ↩

  39. 39.

    Darfur Rebel Chief Garda Appears Before War Crimes Court, AFP, May 18, 2009, available online (noted by William Pace, Spokesman for the NGO Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Ct.). ↩

  40. 40.

    Interviewee Two, supra note 20. ↩

  41. 41.

    Ruto Status Conference, supra note 30. ↩

  42. 42.

    Interviewee Three, supra note 18. ↩

  43. 43.

    Id. ↩

  44. 44.

    Simons, supra note 35. ↩

  45. 45.

    Abu Garda Declares Innocence, supra note 33. ↩

  46. 46.

    Kenya’s Interdicted Minister Willing to Surrender to ICC, Panapress, Nov. 4, 2010, available online. ↩

  47. 47.

    See, e.g., Abu Garda Press Release, supra note 33. ↩

  48. 48.

    The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Mr Ruto’s Request for Excusal from Continuous Presence at Trial (Jun. 18, 2013), at 5 available online. ↩

  49. 49.

    Id. at 3. ↩

  50. 50.

    Situation in the Republic of Kenya: William Samoei Ruto, ICC, available online (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). ↩

  51. 51.

    Situation in Darfur, Sudan: Bahar Idriss Abu Garda, ICC, available online (last visited Mar. 12, 2014). ↩

  52. 52.

    Nourain Situation, supra note 4. ↩

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