The Reparations Question — Comments

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Comment on the Reparations Question: “What International Criminal Court reparations regime would be most appropriate for addressing mass atrocities and war crimes?”

How to Disentangle State Assets from Reparation Funds

Argument: Assuming the implementation of a reparations regime pursuant to Article 75 of the Rome Statute, the ICC will face a particularly daunting task: how to treat the assets of the convicted when these are commingled with those misappropriated from the state. I propose the creation of a judicial mechanism giving the trial division a degree of discretion to determine which funds are available for reparations. The procedure of this judicial inquiry will include two conjunctive steps with differing standards of proof. These will most appropriately balance obstacles to evidence collection as well as equity and legitimacy considerations, thus providing the most appropriate tool for determining which assets to collect for reparations.

I. Introduction

Convictions have the important effect of providing closure to a victim and a sense of justice for a community. Meting out prison time, however, cannot rehabilitate the physical destruction left in the wake of war crimes or some other crime against humanity. In some instances, nothing can, as victims will have lost their lives as a result of egregious brutality. But even with the loss of precious life, a victim’s family will undoubtedly be altered in a painfully significant way. And for victims who survive with the scars of atrocities, they too will have to live with the difficult aftermath of war crimes. All of which begs an important, and already answered, question: should these victims received reparative compensation of some kind? The State Parties to the ICC, by signing the Rome Statute creating the ICC, answered affirmatively in Article 75: “The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations.”1

The authorization by State Parties to provide a reparative remedy to victims creates a whole host of implementation issues that I will avoid addressing, save for one. The issue I will focus on stems in part from the general nature of contemporary, alleged war criminals. Most of these alleged perpetrators wield power in nations where their own assets remain commingled with assets stolen from the state.2 This failure to distinguish between personal and state assets might not serve as a substantial obstacle to obtaining funds for reparations if careful records existed to allow investigators to classify these assets separately ex post. Unfortunately, another common characteristic of modern day alleged perpetrators of war crimes involves deceptive or shoddy record keeping.3

Resolving the difficulties presented by this context also raises an ethical dilemma: whose assets should be eligible for reparations? If, for instance, the answer includes revenues obtained illegitimately, the specter of ethical collectivism4 is raised as funds effectively misappropriated from the country will fund reparations. If these funds are ineligible, though, penetrating analysis will remain necessary to partition these assets from those available for reparations. Article 75 does not provide a definitive response to this question. It only offers that the “Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations.”5 The controversial prospect of a state’s stolen assets being distributed as reparations suggests, though, that only assets derived from legitimate activities of the convicted should be awarded to victims. Consequently, I will proceed by assuming the need to differentiate between illegitimately and legitimately obtained assets, notably those rightfully belonging to the state—no easy task.

Section II will closely examine relevant sections of the Rome Statute itself, before briefly offering a guide to distinguishing between the categories of available, and unavailable, assets for reparations. Next, I will propose a judicial mechanism for determining disputes over qualifying assets. I will then finish with concluding remarks.

When deciding on a reparations regime to implement, the International Criminal Court should evaluate each context individually. The ICC should then tailor the reparations regime it adopts to best fit the society, culture, and particular circumstances of each case while taking account of practical limitations.

I. Introduction

Reparations provisions are a relatively new development in the context of international criminal law. The Statutes of the ICTY and ICTR have some authority for reparations in the form of restitution; however, neither court has ever ordered restitution to be paid.1 Additionally, compensation and other remedies have usually been left up to the jurisdiction of national courts.2 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) went a step further in this area of law, and has created a somewhat novel question as to the implementation of a reparations regime.

The ICC has broad discretion in the execution of a reparations regime and the form that reparations can take in a given case. Article 75 of the Rome Statute states that “[t]he Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”3 Furthermore, under the same provision, the ICC has authority to order reparations through the Victim’s Trust Fund,4 whenever it deems it appropriate. Expanding on the Rome Statute, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence further give the ICC more discretion.5 Rule 97 explains that the ICC can order reparations on an individual or collective basis, or both.6 Rule 98 gives the ICC discretion to use the Victim’s Trust Fund when awarding reparations on an individual basis.7

Given this broad discretion, the ICC should implement a reparations regime that varies by context and by society. There are several factors that should be considered by the ICC when evaluating each situation before it. First, the ICC should consider the particular culture of the society in conflict, and assess the degree of importance traditionally given to individualism or collectivism8. This helps ensure that the society is comfortable with the methods used and that the methods of justice employed are not biased by western points of view. Additionally, it helps legitimize the role the ICC plays in its determination of reparations before the eyes of the victims and the international community. Second, the ICC should consider the point in time of its involvement in the conflict, and evaluate what type of reparations best address the society’s needs at that time. This highlights the varying degrees of ICC involvement and the effect that timing can have on the selection of a most effective and efficient reparations regime. Finally, the ICC should take into account the practicality of certain reparations regimes. Given that the ICC may have more funds available in some cases than in others, the ICC should be practical in what it can hope to achieve through the reparations process.

Part II of this comment will analyze how the ICC’s selection of a reparations regime should vary by context. The situations before the ICC will be unique and will require reparations tailored to a particular conflict and society. I will discuss the non-exclusive factors summarized above as special considerations for the ICC when implementing a reparations regime, and the effects these factors can or should have on the ICC’s decision.9 Part III of this comment will conclude.

Allocation of Voluntary Contributions of the Trust Fund for Victims

Argument—Because a defendant’s assets usually do not provide for adequate resources to compensate his victims, the TFV’s “other resources” mechanism needs to be used effectively. Following a ravaged conflict, the term “victim” should be defined to include individuals who are not directly linked to the crimes of the defendant undergoing prosecution. These victims should receive individual reparations from the TFV in an aim to allocate resources efficiently and restore society to one that is “functional.”

I. Introduction

Unlike other ad hoc international tribunals, the International Criminal Court (the “ICC”) is unique in its mandate to provide victims’ reparation rights.1 Although Article 75 of the Rome Statute provides for reparations to victims of crimes that fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, the term “victim” has not be sufficiently defined, and clear guidelines are not set forth in the Statute. It is often difficult to speak of reparations generally, rather than on a case-by-case basis. This is because the nature of the reparation and also the class of beneficiaries often depend on the timing during which reparations are distributed after the conflict, the type of the conflict, and the nature of the society. In a conference held at the Peace Palace in the Hague in May 2011, Judge Sang-Hyun Song, President of the ICC, made clear in his opening remarks that the exact form of future reparations is unknown, since each case and each victim provides unique circumstances that lead to tailored forms of reparations.2 Thus, it is rather difficult to generalize without making a direct application to a specific nation or conflict.

However, my goal is to allocate resources to areas where they can be most effectively utilized. Waiting until after a conflict has completely settled to allocate TFV funds to a museum is not the manner in which we should be expending these resources. Instead, I will argue that we should be assisting individuals immediately to restore their lives so that they can function and contribute to a more productive post-conflict society. Generally, there are two broad groups of victims: (1) those whose perpetrator is a defendant before the ICC and (2) victims who have suffered crimes that are not directly linked to any defendant.3 My argument focuses on individuals whose perpetrator is not being prosecuted by the ICC using the TFV’s “other resources” provision.4 In these instances, the TFV has an independent role and can choose to benefit victims even absent Court-ordered reparations.5 Only very few of the total number of victims receive direct awards against convicted defendants. Most victims receive recourse through the “other resources” mechanism of the TFV, or in other words, from voluntary contributions.6 Thus, my focus is on the victims, which includes families of injured persons, who receive these funds and who have suffered crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction, not only crimes of the convicted defendants.7 Application of this model also depends on the type of conflict. This model is more effective in conflicts that have ended or will end soon as opposed to those where violence is not an imminent threat to the reparations given.

Finally, this model assumes that reparations will be paid immediately following a cessation of hostilities. There are several stages of repair in a post-conflict society, similar to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (“DDR”) framework set forth by the United Nations Integrated Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (“IDDRS”) in undergoing peace building and reconstruction. DDR occurs in societies that are insecure and lawless, those that require social services and social cohesion. The first stage consists of conflict and humanitarian relief, the second stage is post-conflict stabilization, the third is the society’s transition and recovery stage, and finally, the peace and development stage.8 My model focuses on the first two early stages of repair: humanitarian relief and post-conflict stabilization. Reparations should aid DDR efforts. In essence, the TFV must provide emergency relief before societies can look forward to long-term economic development and consider such policies as revenue reform, trade and currency reform, financial sector reform, and the like. To experience economic advancement and benefit from sound economic policies, the population must have confidence in the economy. This cannot occur until a sense of justice and loyalty is instilled in as many victims as possible. There are many problems in a post conflict society such as alienation, loss of family, resort to violence, return to combat, gangs, difficulty of reintegration, disease, and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Reparations should be focused on these areas. Local knowledge is extremely important. For example, DDR could take place in reference to the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) in Uganda. Reparation directly and individually to these victims may be their only hope to recovery in an effort to contribute to societal healing and functionality, apology, and reconciliation.

Argument: In seeking to achieve rehabilitative justice, the ICC should implement reparative schemes through the Victim’s Trust Fund (VTF). When doing so, an approach which parallels the principle of complementarity in the criminal prosecution context also provides a good model for reparations. By working in conjunction with domestic agencies to issue reparations schemes, the VTF can conserve resources, strengthen domestic systems, allow victim involvement, and will have a high degree of flexibility in adapting to the context-specific needs of different situations. There are several different examples of this principle in action, which will differ greatly depending on the given situation.

Introduction

When implementing reparations schemes for victims of crimes under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is important to consider the need to restore and rebuild a broken society. In this respect, broad reparations schemes to communities are often appropriate. The Victims Trust Fund (VTF) is well positioned to administer reparations which provide rehabilitation after conflict to a large number of victims. In implementing these schemes, the VTF would be well served by working in conjunction with domestic agencies, in a manner similar to the that of complementarity in the criminal prosecution context. Such cooperation may achieve many benefits, such as conserving resources, strengthening domestic systems, allowing opportunities for victim involvement, and providing flexibility to work in different situations. With this structure in mind, this comment offers several different examples, by no means exhaustive, which illustrate such benefits. These include reparations schemes which create financial organizations, those which provide practical service or aid, and those which establish symbolic reparations to victims. While each of these provides only an example which must be adapted to the differing needs of different situations, they can all be administered by the VTF in conjunction with domestic agencies.

I. The ICC’s prerogatives for rehabilitative justice should be pursued through the VTF

Article 75(1) of the Rome Statute states that “the Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.”1 Rehabilitative justice may be understood as a form of reparations which focuses on the restoration of communities or groups of people who have been victims of grave crimes. Rather than punishing perpetrators or returning to victims what was lost, rehabilitative justice aims to rebuild by providing the groundwork for peace and stability. This may be in the form of psychological healing, reconciliation between groups hostile to one another, or fixing structures or organizations that have been ravaged by war. By seeking to heal broken people and societies, rehabilitative justice aims to provide lasting peace and prevent future atrocities from occurring. Absent this effort to repair society, the danger of repeated perpetrations may increase, either from the original offending party or in the form of civil unrest from dissatisfied people. In reparations schemes, therefore, rehabilitative justice is extremely important to the ICC’s mandate of ending impunity by perpetrators of war crimes and of deterring future atrocities.2 It is also a highly practical way of recognizing a society’s suffering and providing tangible support as a remedy.

Because rehabilitative justice focuses on rebuilding communities on a larger scale, collective awards are often an integral part of the remedial scheme. Collective reparations are funds or other support which are given to a community or group of people, rather than to individual victims, in recognition of their loss. While direct victims of criminal perpetrators are generally the target of these schemes, a broader segment of society may also receive direct or indirect benefits from collective awards.

Argument: The International Criminal Court may be ill-equipped to make reparations decisions in all cases. Instead of seeking to make these specific determinations, the ICC should focus its resources on creating a set of standards and guidelines that local reparations committees—drawn from local governments, organizations and victims’ groups—can use to make decisions about how reparations funds will be distributed. The ICC would serve as a guide that would ensure that the process of determining reparations is fair and properly inclusive.

Introduction

To do reparations most effectively, the International Criminal Court should seek to guide a victim-centered process of restorative justice rather than make ex ante decisions about the form or recipients of reparations. In practice, this would mean that the ICC would move to establish reparations committees in the areas where crimes have occurred within the Court’s jurisdiction. These reparations committees would do all of the heavy lifting associated with making the determinations of who would receive reparations, and in what form. Rather than looking at this as an abdication of any responsibility by the ICC, one should see this as an affirmative division of labor by the Court.

The ICC may be remote from the conflicts and societies that gave rise to the crimes committed. This means that there will be social, cultural and political nuances that the ICC will not be able to immediately grasp. There are dangers in ignoring these nuances, and the ICC can minimize this danger by putting more decision-making power in the hands of locals.

That is not to say that the ICC will take any sort of hands-off approach. The ICC would be very involved in every step of the process. Firstly, the ICC would create general guidelines that would dictate the composition of reparations committees. Secondly, the ICC would be involved in the activities of the committees. Third, the ICC would make initial determinations regarding the involvement of victims and the definition of affected groups. Finally, the ICC would ratify any decisions made by the reparations committees before disbursing funds from the Victims’ Trust Fund or other sources.

This paper first details the limitations of the ICC in terms of making decisions regarding the final form and extent of reparations to victims. The goal in exploring these limitations is to create a principled basis for setting up the division of labor in the second part of this paper. This second part will explore the types of guidance that the ICC will offer to reparations committees. These guidelines will not only conform to the provisions of the Rome Statute, but will seek a goal of victim-centered, restorative justice by creating rules regarding the involvement of victims, defining groups and balancing forward-looking and backward-looking concerns.

Monuments and Museums as Reparations after Mass Atrocities

Argument: The International Criminal Court should utilize monuments and museums as a form of collective reparations once a coherent, shared narrative has emerged after mass atrocities. To determine if a narrative has emerged, the Court should look to the majority views within the parties to a conflict to determine if there is agreement as to the occurrence of crimes and the roles of the parties in those crimes. However, the Court must not create monuments and museums before a narrative has emerged as these spaces might become a rallying point which further divide a community.

Introduction

After mass crimes have occurred, it is important for a community to create a narrative which identifies the victims, perpetrators and cause of the crimes. A coherent, shared narrative ends the cycle of blame for past wrongs; disagreement as to the nature or occurrence of crimes might encourage or continue conflict. The International Criminal Court (ICC) should utilize monuments and museums as a form of collective reparations once a narrative has emerged.1 Monuments and museums can be used to bolster a narrative by presenting specific events and a coherent narrative to viewers. Although monuments and museums do not address the immediate needs of victims after mass atrocities, such sites restore the dignity and status of victims within the community and can serve as a first line of defense against the next generation of leaders who might seek to use past animosity to rise to power.

The ICC must not demand the creation of monuments and museums before a narrative has emerged. To determine if a coherent, shared narrative has emerged, the Court should look to the majority views within the parties to a conflict to determine if there is agreement as to the occurrence of crimes and the role of the parties in those crimes. The slow pace at which the Court determines cases could in fact benefit the tribunal by allowing time for the efforts of the Court to investigate and inform parties to effect the beliefs within parties to a conflict. However, if the Court imposes a narrative on parties, such might heighten division within a community as parties feel blamed for crimes for which they do not feel responsible. In such instances, monuments and museums could further divide a community or even encourage open conflict. Monuments serve to not only restore the dignity of victims of crimes, but also to end the cycle of blame for crimes which enables leaders to rely on past history to justify future aggression.

I would like to pose the following questions to the experts:

1.) Did the ILC make an error is striking State Responsibility from the Zutphen Drafts? The problem as I see it is that the victims may be awarded a large monetary sum, either collectively or individually, and there is a single defendant; what if he or she judgment proof? And what if the TFV has insufficient funds to meet the award?

2.) Without an overarching body speaking for the Court and not each individual chamber, does the issue of reparations lend itself to fragmentation of awards? To be certain the recent report in December by AMERICAN UNIVERSITY’S WASHINGTON COLLEGE OF THE LAW, WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, ENSURING EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT REPRESENTATION OF VICTIMS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT,27-33 (Dec. 2011) reveals total inconsistancy as to victim particpartion in the various cases before the chambers highighting fragmentation. One would hope that the issue of reparations does not face the same fate.

3.) Why is there such reluctance to have live victim testimony as a form of restorative justice under Article 76? The defendant is allowed an opportunity to offer remorse and apology as a form of mitigation. Why is the victim precluded from offering live testimony as a form of restoration of dignity which would negate a feeling that justice has not been usurped by the chamber. (Professor Edna Erez has written eloquently on the topic.)

4.) Is there not a direct conflict in the mandate the TFV sees for itself and that of the Chamber which may make reparations under Article 75.

Article 79 of the Statute reads in pertinent part: “A trust fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of State Parties for the benefit of victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims.” A board of directors of five members are elected by the Assembly of State Parties (hereinafter: “ASP”) at least once a year in The Hague. The Trust Fund is an independent body and Schabas articulates its mandate as being the provision of reparations in accordance with Articles 75 para. 2, 79 para. 2, and Rule 98 RPE. “The responsibility of the Trust Fund is first and foremost to ensure sufficient funds are available in the eventuality of a Court reparation order pursuant to Article 75 of the Statute”. In contrast the ASP sees the role of The Trust Fund for Victims (hereinafter: “TFV”) has being broader and says that there are two mandates: (1) administering reparations ordered by the Court against a convicted person, and (2) using other resources for the benefit of victims subject to the provisions of article 79 of the Rome Statute.

Under Article 75 para. 2, the Court may where appropriate order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust Fund. This would happen only if at the time of making the order it was impossible to make the award directly to the victim. Here the funds, as a result of the award, would be kept separately from the other funds of the trust account.

The trust is funded by :
(i) Voluntary contributions from Governments, international organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities, in accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the Assembly of State Parties ;
(ii) Money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture transferred to the Trust Fund if ordered by the Court pursuant to Article 79, paragraph 2 of the Statute;
(iii) Resources collected through awards for reparations if ordered by the Court pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; and,
(iv) Such resources, other than assessed contributions as the Assembly of State Parties (“ASP”) may decide to allocate to the Trust Fund.

Compensation to the trust fund is voluntary by the ASP. The ASP has interpreted the phrase for the ‘benefit of victims’ as consisting of reparations and material support. The Board of Directors has interpreted Article 75 para. 1 as being based on the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines,’ which includes restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition.

Indeed, before any trial had even begun, the Trust Fund began allocating sums of money for projects that were said to be of benefit for the victims. These have been allocated for projects in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (hereinafter: “DRC”) and the Central African Republic.

Defendants objected to the aforementioned projects on the grounds that the projects created an inference of guilt and impaired the accused’s presumption of innocence. The defendants’ argument is not well taken.

It is undisputable that Uganda, the DRC, and Central African Republic have been subject to mass-scale gross crimes. But this is not arguendo related to a defendant who is on trial, and the defense argument is tenuous at best. The decision of the Trust Fund to use the funds within its custody, possession and control to provide rehabilitation, psychological rehabilitation, and material support is not a predetermination as to the guilt of the accused. Rather the funding of the projects from monies in the TFV has been used for support of the war torn areas and, at this point in time, is unproblematic as to the accused’s due process rights.

The better argument to be made by defense counsel and the OTP is that the monies expended on these projects should have been kept in reserve for the victims of the mass crimes, upon a guilty verdict. It would be gross mismanagement, now that Lubanga has been convicted, and reparations are to be awarded if the reparations are made and are in excess of the monies expended on the aforementioned projects.

One could cogently argue that the expenditure of the monies on the projects was a breach of a fiduciary duty to the victims to ensure that reparations ordered by the Court against a convicted person are paid. It is not error that the TFV is called a ‘trust fund’ with the obligation of the trustees to ensure that victims are paid pursuant to the instruction of the Court pursuant to Article 75 para. 2 and Rule 98 paras. 2 -4.

It also may also be argued that there is an inherent inconsistency between Article 75 paras. 1 and 2, and Article 79 para. 3. A way to harmonize the two articles is provided in Rule 98 RPE which states “that an award for reparations deposited in the trust fund shall be separated from other resources of the Trust Fund and shall be forwarded to each victim as soon as possible.” This way the Trust Fund cannot use the reparation funds, and inferentially 79 para. 3. applies to administrative issues. Ferstman says that the paragraph refers to the management structure of the Fund and its relationship with other bodies of the Court, voluntary contributions, and the scope of beneficiaries By this measure there is no inconsistency between the two Articles. However, the paradox of the mandate of the TFV alluded to, that of Court ordered reparations and “for the benefit of victims” under Article 79 para. 1 is highly problematic over the long term. Similarly, as to the Regulation of the Trust Fund, there appears to a large amount of discretion vested in the ASP and the Board as to how monies will be spent.

Travelling the path of Schabas, there is an inherent breach of fiduciary duty by spending the money on projects prior to the determination of guilt and an order of reparations as the mandate of the TFV is limited to making reparations upon order of the Court. In contrast the Board of Directors over-reaches in its overbroad reading of “for the benefit of victims” prior to any determination of guilt as fitting within the mandate of TFV pursuant to Article 79 para. 1.

Simply said, the TFV was set up as a means to ensure victim reparations with primacy given to the Court as to how reparations are made. The decision of the Board of Directors, albeit with approval of Chambers, to embark on various domestic projects over the short term is unproblematic, however over the long term it poses serious strategic problems. As the number of verdicts start to rise, the ability of the TFV to maintain these projects is going to become increasingly difficult. The actions of the Board of Directors as to the projects it has embarked on is un-perspicacious, lacks strategic vision and is in all likelihood a breach of fiduciary duty. The Court’s imprimatur on the premature expenditure of funds does not exculpate Boards irresponsibility. The two views as to the TFV’s mandate need to be reconciled as the views are on a collision course.

Reparations in the Democratic Republic of Congo

I. Abstract

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) provides for reparations to victims of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction, but does not specify to whom they are to be made, what kind they are to be, or how they are to be provided. During our February 2012 trip to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), we spoke with approximately twenty representatives of NGOs, as well as members of the Bogoro community of victims, about reparations schemes. While there was general agreement among the NGOs that collective reparations are preferable, the elders of Bogoro expressed a strong preference for individual reparations. Neither the NGO representatives nor the Bogoro victims expressed a clear preference for how a reparations scheme should be implemented. However, the NGO representatives with whom we met generally believed that reparations funds should be committed to institutions such as medical facilities, schools, or other types of aid for victims. Given the extreme difficulty of administering an effective reparations scheme for individuals, the importance of community rehabilitation, and the urgent need for institutional, collective aid, a collective reparations scheme which creates lasting institutions may be preferable.

II. Findings

A. Existing Reparations Schemes

Multiple sources stated that Congolese law provides for the state to create a fund for victims of crimes. Although there is thus a legal framework supporting a domestic reparations scheme for victims, this has yet to become a reality in the DRC. This is because of general corruption, or because the perpetrator often has little or no funds with which to pay fines. A representative of one NGO noted that this contributes to the distance that most Congolese feel from their formal justice system. Instead of going to court to receive damages, victims of crimes often will instead resort to traditional justice processes. In such “arrangements,” two parties will come to a resolution in which a wronged family is paid in goats or other livestock. In the current situation in the DRC, this is often more effective than any formal scheme, at least for small-scale crimes.

In addition, no person with whom we spoke was aware of any activity by the ICC’s Trust Fund for Victims (TFV) in the DRC. This could result from a general lack of awareness, or from the fact that its activities are conducted in areas far from Goma or Bogoro. Alternatively, it was suggested to us that the TFV may keep such projects secret. Regardless, we found no knowledge of any existing international reparations scheme either in Goma or in Bogoro.

It is true that when deciding on reperation the ICC should decide on each case, on its individual context. Individual claims for reparation are made directly against the convicted person. This limits the exposure of states and potentially the level of reparation. It is a factor that the best person to determine what ICC reparation regime would be most appropriate for addressing attrocities and war crimes are those directly affected by the crimes. It is in the nature of international criminal justice to associate guilt with individuals only. There is a reason why traditional reperation strategies have been targeted at the states reletively deep pockets rather than the state agents.

The ICC statute apply only to crimes committed by individuals not by states themselves. There is not a single international instrument which extends criminal resposibility to states. Even for Genocide and crimes against humanity. This is less than satisfactory and the jurisprudence of the ICC should be extended. The court must acknowledge that governments that might have delayed in bringing perpetrators to justice. And that governments gave comfort to criminals or because they might have intervened and prevented atrocities. Surely international criminal justice does not stand for the proposition that states cannot also have part in causing harm to victims whether by instigating, tolerating or ordring the commission of crimes. One reason cases have to be looked and judged on their individual context, is that it often seems wrong to single out individual perpetrators when many were complicit in atrocities and the entire political and legal system supported the unlawful actions.

Therefore it is vital that the case/charge selection and reparation truly reflects the full extent of the victimization and nature of the atrocities. Therefore the is not one approach which is the most suitable to crimes within the jurisdiction of the court. The court must consider all the factors in a given case to come up with an award which might include several components that is meaningful and appropriate in light of all the circumstances. For instance if there are grounds to take civil actions against the state within crimes against humanity. Then the reparation must realistically mirror what would be awarded within domestic court where the atrocities where committed. And literally charged to the government or state implicated. If the crimes were committed within a stable democratic framework. And it is proven that the government or previous government and state agencies were complicit, Within Systematic crimes against humanity.

A region-wide, collective reparations scheme is the best option for several reasons. As nmoley convincingly points out in her June 2012 comment on this issue, individual reparations are impractical because of the difficulties in determining who a "victim" is and for distributional problems. I would add that the amount of available reparations per victim doesn't have as much utility as a collective good such as a school or hospital. As of August 2012, the Trust Fund for Victims had ~$1.5 million (online ). Given that there are easily hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of victims to the conflict, each victim would receive at most $10 (a generous estimate). While such an amount might help families in the short term, it won't make a huge difference in their lives. Alternatively, $1.5 million can go a lot farther if used to build a collective good such as a school or hospital. These institutions would generate tangible, long-term benefits for large portions of the community.

A reparations scheme that benefits only a portion of the community might also fuel tensions in the region. In October of 2012, I traveled with Professor Richard Steinberg and a group of students to the Ituri region of the DRC to interview victims as to their reparations preferences. According to my translator (Hema) and several other locals that I spoke with, the conflict in Ituri was largely influenced by wealth inequality. Traditionally, both Hema and Lendu followed a community property system, sharing land with each other. When colonialists came and brought their private property rights regime, the Lendu refused to follow the system, believing that land belonged to the community. Hema, on the other hand, cooperated with the new property system, resulting in Hema obtaining much more wealth compared to the Lendu. This wealth disparity led to feelings of resentment and largely contributed to the conflict between the two groups. Any reparations scheme that is viewed as helping one community over another could lead to more resentment. Several victims that I talked to (typically those with more education and elder victims) expressed such a belief. In their opinion, collective reparations that benefitted the entire region - both Hema and Lendu - would be best.