II. Role 1: A Regional ICC: The African Court of Justice and Human Rights

In October 2016, South Africa withdrew from the Rome Statute and mentioned, in a statement, that:

South Africa will work closely with the African Union (AU) and with other countries in Africa to strengthen continental bodies, such as the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, created to deal with such crimes.6

The South African withdrawal was revoked a few months later in March 2017 after their High Court declaring the withdrawal “unconstitutional and invalid”.7 However, this still shows the general desire to have a regional court in Africa to prosecute similar crimes as the ICC. This was echoed by several African states threatening withdrawal due to an alleged “African bias”, with most cases at the ICC targeting African states. South Africa’s mention of strengthening the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights is misleading since that court’s jurisdiction is limited by the Court’s founding Treaty to determining human rights cases and disputes relating to the interpretation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.8 It thus cannot be a regional alternative to the ICC.

What could work as a regional ICC would be the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). In June 2014, AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Malabo and adopted the Protocol on the Statute of the ACJHR which would give the ACJHR jurisdiction to prosecute crimes under international law and transnational crimes.9 If the Protocol came into force, the ACJHR would have jurisdiction to try crimes like genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, aggression as well as piracy, terrorism, corruption, money laundering, mercenarism, trafficking in persons, etc.10 Some of these crimes have been of great concern to Africa such as mercenarism and corruption, which have not generated significant international attention.11 It would thus be an African regional criminal court operating akin to the ICC but with narrowly defined geographical scope.

The AU had a Draft Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC which stated that the AU:

PROPOSES that African States Parties to the Rome Statute introduce amendments to the Rome Statute to recognize African regional Judicial Mechanisms dealing with international crimes in accordance with the principles of complementarity.12

The only country that acted on this AU decision is Kenya, which proposed an amendment to Preambular ¶ 10 of the Rome Statute to read:

Emphasizing that the ICC established under this Statute shall be complementary to national and regional criminal jurisdictions.13

It would be possible in theory for the Prosecutor or the ICC to seek information or cooperation from the ACJHR. Article 46L(3) of the Amended ACJHR Statute also permits the ACJHR to “seek the cooperation or assistance of regional or international courts, non-state parties or co-operating partners of the African Union and may conclude Agreements for that purpose.” However, this would depend on the AU’s relationship with the ICC, which is currently strenuous. In 2010, the AU rejected a proposal by the ICC to open a liaison office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the AU consistently called on its members not to cooperate with the ICC.14

Following the Malabo Protocol would ensure complementarity because the Court would be a regional organization with jurisdiction to prosecute international crimes, thus easing the ICC and OTP’s workload. The burden would thus be shared as the Prosecutor and judges could engage in a particularized inquiry to determine which forum is most appropriate in a given case by looking at factors relevant to the interests of the communities each institution represents in adjudicating the case. A possibility would be to have a case transferred to a regional organization in the interests of justice, pursuant to Article 53 of the Rome Statute15 if it is decided to be a better forum to try the offence. The regional court should also have the ability to order states to prosecute, as is the case with the Inter-American Court, rather than merely recommending them to do so. In this case, the ICC would still remain present as additional back-up for whenever national courts are unable and/or unwilling to prosecute pursuant to Article 17 of the Rome Statute.16 The Inter-American Court has also implemented its mandate to include supervising the implementation of its ruling and the case remains seized until there has been full compliance.17 This would be a form of quasi-criminal jurisdiction, which, according to Huneeus, is defined as “the practice by an international body of ordering, monitoring, and guiding national prosecutions.”18 This could assist further in complementarity by enabling prosecutions at the domestic level, which would reduce the need for the ICC to get involved. Jalloh attempts to explore how complementarity might look like in the context of this African Court, by exploring the idea that complementarity would involve first, whether the national authority handled the case or whether it referred it to the regional African Court.19 Then, the ICC would assess whether the regional court had the type of genuine investigations and prosecutions that would be inadmissible to the ICC under Article 17.20 Under this interpretation, there would not be a need to amend the Rome Statute.

This, however, may be unrealistic21 especially since very few states have ratified the Malabo protocol. Furthermore, its immunities clause poses an issue. Article 46A bis gives immunity to serving heads of state or anybody acting in such a capacity. This contravenes Article 27 of the Rome Statute22 and, therefore, clashes with laws from nations such as Kenya and South Africa, which have adapted their internal legislation to the Rome Statute.23 On the other hand, Nel suggests that despite the challenge posed by the immunity clause, this may be circumvented by the principle of complementarity, with the ICC exercising its jurisdiction over serving heads of state where African states were unable to do so due to the immunity granted by the Malabo Protocol.24 Even then, however, the immunities clause is not the only hurdle faced by the Protocol. One challenge is that of funding. The Protocol lacks a funding breakdown, and it remains unclear where the money will come from.25 Furthermore, the African parties’ membership to both the ICC and the ACJHR would create a double burden in addition to domestic obligations.26 Even if the Malabo Protocol was to come to fruition, it is likely that it would want nothing to do with the ICC, particularly due to the recurring critique that the ICC has an African bias. The AU’s aim is to establish a regional criminal court which could keep the ICC out of Africa.27 The initial draft of the suggested court contained a specific reference to complementarity with the ICC, but this was removed from later drafts, likely due to the existing tensions between the AU and the ICC.28 Having an ICC for Africa would reduce the OTP’s workload since the ICC has mainly prosecuted in Africa. However, it could encourage African States, which constitute roughly 1/3 of the ICC’s state parties, to withdraw, which would, in turn, risk the ICC’s legitimacy. On the other hand, it could be argued that the threat to withdrawal may be quite far-fetched since there have been some African cases that have been self-referred (such as Uganda regarding Kony) which demonstrates that there is some will to cooperate with the ICC.29

Therefore, regional courts could be a solution to complementarity, provided they create an authority for individual criminal prosecution, which is at the heart of international criminal law. They could be a more suitable form to prosecute transactional offenses that are a particular issue within that region, in situations where the state and its neighbors face the same or similar challenges.30 Regional courts enable the sharing and implementation of common values that are region-specific. They are also more practical since they would be closer to the state where the conduct occurred, thus bringing justice closer to the people. In the context of Africa, regional courts would also enable a push back on the African bias criticism faced by the ICC. As mentioned by the Kenyan delegation:

[Regional complementarity] is not a way to oust the ICC. It’s the opposite. The regional jurisdiction gets just the first bite… Rather than spring-boarding [from national to international jurisdiction], the ICC would be what it was meant to be, the last resort.31

However, due to the novel concept of having a regional court having the same subject matter jurisdiction as the ICC, there is a need for statutory guidance that would resolve conflicts relating to overlapping jurisdiction,32 as well as an explanation on the relationship between both courts regarding complementarity.

III. Role 2: Regional Circuit Chambers

Another role regional courts could play would be to have circuit chambers established in those courts to facilitate more inclusive access to the ICC system and more effective implementation of a “localized version of international criminal law.”33 This could be useful since, rather than going to the ICC, the case can go to the regional court. It can then be taken on by the circuit chamber who would be more apt to not only apply the Rome Statute but also understand better the circumstances and challenges faced by the region since it would be closer to the state where the conduct occurred.34 This proposal was also echoed by Magliveras who argued that such a format would be based on the circuits/districts existing in the federal court system in the United States of America.35 In this case, the ICC’s judicial functions would be carried out by chambers, and having more chambers is required for the efficient management of the workload.36 Each regional branch would then have a dedicated bench and a dedicated Prosecutor, with each circuit following the current ICC institutional structure, with a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber, an OTP and a Registry, and would sit in one of the contracting parties in the region.37 The Prosecutor in each of these circuits would have the position of a deputy Prosecutor, entitled to carry out any of the acts required of the Prosecutor under the Rome Statute.38

As a result of this structure, the ICC’s role could be that of a Court of Appeal to accept appeals on points of law submitted from the regional courts. Under this framework, according to Jia, the current regime of the Statute under Article 13 will remain intact but may be augmented to enhance its efficacy so that the ICC would accept Article 13 cases but also appeals from regional courts.39 This would be more efficient since it would enable the ICC to conserve its resources by essentially remaining intact but only expanding its Article 13 provision to allow appeals from regional courts. In this case, there needs to be regional treaties signed and ratified that would enable states to confer jurisdiction to a regional court and intend appeals from this court to go to the ICC.40

An issue here is that it may be unrealistic to assume that the ICC would be able to implement circuit chambers in regional courts because doing so requires time, personnel to train in order to place them in those chambers and funding (which is one the ICC’s main recurring challenges). Furthermore, it could be argued that having a portion of the ICC in many regions will lead to a lack of uniformity, which could then hinder the development of international law. Also, for this change to occur, the Rome Statute would need to be amended under Article 17 since this would be a change of an exclusively institutional nature.41 The proposal would have to be accepted by consensus, which, if not attained, the ASP or a Review Conference must adopt them by a two-thirds majority of all contracting parties. Finally, having states sign and ratify a treaty conferring that jurisdiction to that regional court will pose a hurdle since it would be based on the states’ initiative to do so, and there could be some issues with uniformity of case prosecutions if some states in that region ratify the treaty but not others.

An advantage, however, is that it would ease the workload of the OTP. This arguably seems to be a promising solution to ending impunity since, rather than having one ICC handling 123 countries, this would be broken down by region. The ICC’s workload would be diminished because it would act as a court of appeal. Having a somewhat mini-ICC in many regions will ensure that regional systems are closer to the goals of the Rome Statute and will hopefully enable more prosecutions since the scope would be smaller. For example, having a regional circuit chamber for Africa would mean that there would not be any need to create the ACJHR, and instead that circuit chamber would be tasked with investigating, prosecuting, and holding trials for international crimes committed within the territory of African States that are parties to the Rome Statute. This would also have the advantage of pushing back the African bias criticism since the Court would take into consideration African traditions and values while understanding better the challenges faced by the region. It would also have a practical advantage since victims, witnesses and defendants would not need to travel as far as the Hague for justice to be served.

A. Which Regional Courts Should the ICC Cooperate With?

According to Sainati, the Prosecutor should only cooperate with courts that are supported by transnational social movements, which she defines as:

[S]ocially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious interactions with power holders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international actor, or a multinational economic actor.42

If the court is supported by transnational social movements, then the Prosecutor may make a decision about when a regional trial is more likely to serve the ICC’s larger goal of ending impunity and promoting compliance with international criminal law.43 This is because such regional courts would likely increase the likelihood of domestication of international rules.44 This would be an advantage because one of the issues faced by the ICC is that of enforcement. For example, Kenya’s noncompliance compromised the Prosecution’s ability to thoroughly investigate the charges.45 Using regional courts does not mean that the Prosecutor will always defer to regional courts, but rather, he would identify when regional courts are better positioned to domesticate international legal principles and secure compliance with international criminal law.46 Therefore, in this case, it could be possible to argue that the Prosecutor would then be transferring the court from the international to the regional level on the basis of interests of justice under Article 17.

IV. The Interpretation of Article 17 as Including Regional Organizations

Article 17 of the Rome Statute mentions that a case is:

[I]nadmissible where the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.

Based on the plain text of the provision of Article 17, complementarity thus focuses on states and makes no mention of regional organizations. The Court has not yet decided whether an investigation conducted outside of a state, for example by regional organizations, could satisfy Article 17.47 As mentioned above, the ACJHR contains no express insight into the relationship between this court and the ICC.48 It only mentions complementarity to national courts and to the Courts of the Regional Economic Communities49 but does not mention complementarity to international tribunals.

According to Jackson, a case being genuinely investigated or prosecuted by a lawfully constituted regional tribunal or court may be regarded as a prosecution by a State such that the case would be inadmissible before the ICC under Article 17.50 Tiba echoes this by citing CB Murungu’s argument that while the Rome Statute does not mention regional criminal chambers, it can be contended that regional courts have jurisdiction to try international crimes.51 This may be done through “a progressive interpretation of positive complementarity” which could “infer that even regional criminal courts could have jurisdiction over international crimes within the ICC jurisdiction.”52 Under this argument, Article 17 of the Rome Statute can be interpreted to extend to regional criminal courts. Kielsgard and Ip explore this relationship by explaining that the ICC has recognized the jurisdictional priority of other international tribunals such as the International Criminal Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda as subsidiary organs of the United Nations, as well as that of hybrid tribunals such as Special Tribunals for Lebanon, Sierra Leone, and Cambodia.53 Cases taken on by these tribunals would have been inadmissible if they were already handled by national prosecutions.54 A difference, however, is that these tribunals were established by the United Nations Security Council and were not regional courts.55 These tribunals are given priority under the Charter,56 but no such priority is given to regional courts. As mentioned above, the ICC and the ACJHR, as well as any other potential regional courts with the capacity to assist the ICC under complementarity, would need to determine how both courts relate to each other.57 The ICC assumes the power to determine questions of admissibility and jurisdiction under Article 19(1), and according to Article 18, the ICC also has the power to engage in “preliminary rulings regarding admissibility.”58 As mentioned by the Chamber in Prosecutor v. Kony, it has the authority to “interpret and apply the provisions governing the complementarity regime” once its jurisdiction has been triggered.59 This was mentioned before the rise of other complementarity regimes or regional courts and the decision did not involve any issues relating to the ICC and a regional court.60 However, this seems to be the most probable solution. Under this suggestion, the first step to achieving complementarity by collaboration with regional courts would be to have the ICC explain how regional courts relate to the ICC for complementarity to be of use.

The provision could also be interpreted as states conferring jurisdiction to regional courts.61 This argument would somewhat mirror the one used in the context of the Gaza conflict whereby the Palestinian National Authority, which has prosecutorial authority in some parts of the territories, conferred such jurisdiction to the Prosecutor.62 On the other hand, according to Oslo, they were handing over jurisdiction that they did not have. This counterargument then would not apply here since, in this case, the states would be handing over jurisdiction that they do have to regional courts.63 On the other hand, that is not what the Statute says, so the question would be whether, by interpreting it that way, we would be stretching its application. If, in the course of making those amendments, states make it clear that they are conferring jurisdiction to a regional entity with the intent to satisfy Article 17, then this could be a way to interpret the provision without amending the Statute.64 If Article 17 was to extend to regional courts, then they would be held to the unwilling or unable standard of Article 17(1)(b), whereby the ICC would only intervene and assume jurisdiction if the regional courts were unwilling or unable to prosecute.

V. Conclusion

Relativists argue that the ICC is doomed to fail for being too culturally distant from its intended beneficiaries.65 Due to the lack of proximity, there is a lack of understanding and, thus, alienation from the very communities it seeks to serve.66 A remote ICC will not be “informed by diverse perspectives” and will not be able to “promote post-conflict reconciliation or the rebuilding on the rule of law.”67 A solution to this problem would be to develop complementarity at the regional level, whereby courts are closer to the situation country and may understand the challenges faced by the region better.

However, when assessing this possibility, it is also important to analyze potential drawbacks, namely fragmentation of International Criminal Law.68 If there is conflict in the norms developed in Africa, for example, with those in the ICC, this would be undesirable especially for the development of a Universal International Criminal Justice system. The application of inconsistent interpretations to decisions adjudicating war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, crime of aggression, threaten unity. Without a high court, the decisions of any regional court, or at least of that court’s own appellate body, would be binding and not subject to review for uniformity.69 There is a major risk of having international crimes that are universal in nature lose their sense of universality and global condemnation as they come to have regional variation.

Therefore, while working with regional courts under the principle of complementarity might enable the OTP to reduce their workload, the involvement of the ICC at some stage of the process would be crucial to reduce potential harmful consequences of the regionalization of International Criminal Law.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   Xavier Philippe, The Principles of Universal Jurisdiction and Complementarity: How Do the Two Principles Intermesh?, Int’l Rev. Red Cross (Jun. 2006), available online. ↩

2. 2.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute], Art. 17, available online. ↩

3. 3.

   Id. Art. 87(6). ↩

4. 4.

   Currency Union Technical Expert Group, Draft Follow-Up Paper #6, IMF, available online (last visited Aug. 29, 2023). ↩

5. 5.

   Id. ↩

6. 6.

   Michael Masutha, South Africa Minister of Justice, Speech on ICC and Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir (Oct. 21, 2016), available online. ↩

7. 7.

   Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses Withdrawal From International Criminal Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 8, 2017, paywall. ↩

8. 8.

   Id. ↩

9. 9.

   Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, Art. 28A (2014), available online

   (adopting an amendment protocol on Jun. 27, 2014 by The African Union Assembly to forge ahead with the establishment of an international criminal section in the proposed African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights). ↩

10. 10.

    Id. ↩

11. 11.

    Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Place of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in the Prosecution of Serious Crimes in Africa, in The African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights in Context: Developments and Challenges 57, 93 (Charles Chernor Jalloh, Kamari Maxine Clarke & Vincent Obisienunwo Orlu Nmehielle eds., Jul. 13, 2020), available online. ↩

12. 12.

    The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission of Kenya, African Union Documents—Draft Decision on Africa’s Relationship with the ICC (Oct. 12, 2013), available online. ↩

13. 13.

    Fabrice Tambe Endoh, African Union and the Politics of Selective Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court, 2020 AJICJ 3, 31 (2020), available online, doi. ↩

14. 14.

    Jalloh, supra note 11, at 104. ↩

15. 15.

    Rome Statute, supra note 2, at Art. 53. ↩

16. 16.

    Charles Chernor Jalloh, The Place of the African Criminal Court in the Prosecution of Serious Crimes in Africa, in The International Criminal Court and Africa 318 (Charles Chernor Jalloh & Ilias Bantekas eds., 2017), paywall, doi. ↩

17. 17.

    Alexandra Valeria Huneeus, International Criminal Law by Other Means: The Quasi-Criminal Jurisdiction of the Human Rights Courts, 107 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, 9 (Jan. 2013), available online. ↩

18. 18.

    Id. ↩

19. 19.

    Jalloh, supra note 11, at 98. ↩

20. 20.

    Id. ↩

21. 21.

    Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Unpublished Remarks to UCLA Law School Class Attended by Author (Nov. 16, 2022). ↩

22. 22.

    Rome Statute, supra note 2, at Art. 19. ↩

23. 23.

    Jalloh, supra note 11, at 61. ↩

24. 24.

    Michelle Nel, Can a Regional Court Be a Viable Alternative to the ICC in Africa?, The Conversation (Aug. 7, 2018), available online. ↩

25. 25.

    Sarah P. Nimigan, Exceptional or Exceptionalism? The Malabo Protocol and “Regional Complementarity”, 11 (Working Paper, 2017), available online. ↩

26. 26.

    Id. ↩

27. 27.

    Sasha Dominik Dov Bachmann & Eda Luke Nwibo, Pull and Push—Implementing the Complementarity Principle of the Rome Statute of the ICC within the African Union: Opportunities and Challenges, 43 Brook. J. Int’l L. 457, 466 (2018), available online. ↩

28. 28.

    Jalloh, supra note 11, at 97. ↩

29. 29.

    Id. ↩

30. 30.

    Jalloh, supra note 16, at 318. ↩

31. 31.

    Nimigan, supra note 25, at 4. ↩

32. 32.

    Kristen Rau, Jurisprudential Innovation or Accountability Avoidance? The International Criminal Court and Proposed Expansion of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 669, 677 (Dec. 2012), available online. ↩

33. 33.

    Bing Bing Jia, The International Criminal Court’s Relations with the United Nations, ICC Forum (Jun. 28, 2018), available online. ↩

34. 34.

    Id. ↩

35. 35.

    Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Two Key Reforms: Break Up the ICC Into Regional Chambers and Allow the ICC to Impose Monetary Fines on Recalcitrant Contracting Parties, ICC Forum (Jul. 9, 2018), available online. ↩

36. 36.

    Id. ↩

37. 37.

    Id. ↩

38. 38.

    Id. ↩

39. 39.

    Jia, supra note 33. ↩

40. 40.

    Richard H. Steinberg, Private Conversation with Author (Dec. 5, 2022). ↩

41. 41.

    Id. ↩

42. 42.

    Tatiana E. Sainati, Divided We Fall: How the International Criminal Court Can Promote Compliance with International Law by Working with Regional Courts, 49 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 191, 215 (Jan. 2016), available online. ↩

43. 43.

    Id. at 243. ↩

44. 44.

    Id. at 197. ↩

45. 45.

    Id. at 200. ↩

46. 46.

    Id. at 214. ↩

47. 47.

    Kaveri Vaid, What Counts as “State Action” Under Article 17 of the Rome Statute? Applying the ICC’s Complementarity Test to Non-Criminal Investigations by the United States into War Crimes in Afghanistan, 44 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 573, 575 (2012), available online. ↩

48. 48.

    Id. ↩

49. 49.

    Id. ↩

50. 50.

    Miles Jackson, Regional Complementarity: The Rome Statute and Public International Law, 14 J. Int’l Crim. Just. 1061, 1061 (May 4, 2016), available online, doi. ↩

51. 51.

    Firew Kebede Tiba, Regional International Criminal Courts: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 17 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 521, 545 (Jan. 10, 2016), available online. ↩

52. 52.

    Id. ↩

53. 53.

    Mark D. Kielsgard & Ken Gee-kin Ip, Prioritizing Jurisdiction in the Competing Regimes of the International Criminal Court and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights: A Way Forward, 35 B.U. Int’l L.J. 285, 294 (Apr. 2017), available online. ↩

54. 54.

    Id. ↩

55. 55.

    Id. ↩

56. 56.

    Id. at 294–95.

    (Failure to comply with international tribunals established by the U.N. Security Council would violate U.N. Charter Article 41 and Chapter 7. No such priority is given to regional courts). ↩

57. 57.

    Id. at 295. ↩

58. 58.

    Id. ↩

59. 59.

    The Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony, Vincent Otti, Okot Odhiambo, Dominic Ongwen, ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Under Article 19(1) of the Statute, ¶ 45 (PTC II, Mar. 10, 2009), available online. ↩

60. 60.

    Kielsgard & Ip, supra note 53, at 295. ↩

61. 61.

    Steinberg, supra note 40. ↩

62. 62.

    Emily C. Barbour & Matthew C. Weed, Cong. Research Serv., R4116, The International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy 17–18 (Mar. 16, 2010), available online.

    (In 2009, the PNA lodged a declaration pursuant to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, accepting ICC ad hoc jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed in December 2008/2009 between Israeli and Hamas forces in the Gaza strip. The ICC’s jurisdiction would come from the PNA’s declaration since neither Israel nor the PNA are State Parties to the Rome Statute. The issue was that the PNA has not been recognized as a state which means it cannot confer jurisdiction).

    See also Should the ICC Investigate War Crimes in Gaza?, ICC Forum (Sep. 1, 2010), available online. ↩

63. 63.

    Steinberg, supra note 40. ↩

64. 64.

    Id. ↩

65. 65.

    Sainati, supra note 42, at 210. ↩

66. 66.

    Id. ↩

67. 67.

    Id. ↩

68. 68.

    Jalloh, supra note 11, at 105. ↩

69. 69.

    William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 Tex. Int’l L.J. 729, 756 (Jul. 1, 2003), available online. ↩