I. An Evolving Partnership: A Historical Review of the U.S.–ICC Relationship

A. Orphaned at Birth: United States Cautious Protectionism and Non-Ratification of the Rome Statute

The United States, a patriarchal presence in the creation of international criminal tribunals such as the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg, the ICTY, and the ICTR, similarly found itself in a leadership role during the initial push to create an international criminal court and in the early stages of drafting what would become the Rome Statute establishing the ICC. As negotiations wore on, however, primary objections to the treaty by the United States could not be overcome, including opposition to the ICC’s authority, in specific situations, to assert jurisdiction over non-state party nationals for crimes, the ability of the ICC Prosecutor to independently initiate investigatory proceedings absent U.N. Security Council (UNSC) approval (proprio motu authority), and provisions related to the crime of aggression.10 Ultimately, the international community would move ahead without the support of the United States. As recalled by David Scheffer, then-head of the U.S. negotiating team in the United Nations talks leading to the creation of the Rome Statute, the United States “tried so hard for so many years to support the creation of the International Criminal Court and we had contributed so much to the text of the treaty. All that we had accomplished would be swamped by the global memory of…[our] vote against the Rome Statute.”11 President Clinton, in a lame-duck action just one month prior to leaving office, did sign the treaty, albeit with the qualification that it would not be submitted to the Senate for ratification due to outstanding and “significant flaws.”12

Conceptual, albeit qualified, support for the ICC during President Clinton’s tenure did not carry over into President George W. Bush’s first term. The Bush Administration took several actions aimed at disassociating the United States from the Rome Statute in anticipation of its impending entry into force in 2002. On May 2, 2002, John Bolton, then-Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, communicated in writing to the United Nations that “the United States does not intend to become a party to the treaty.”13 Presumably seeking to relieve the United States of its responsibility as a signatory to act in accordance with the treaty,14 Under Secretary Bolton asserted that “[t]he United States has no legal obligation arising from its signature on December 31, 2000.”15 From its position on the UNSC, the U.S. delegation to the United Nations later pushed through a controversial UNSC resolution exempting individuals from non-state parties from ICC prosecution for cases arising from UN authorized missions or operations.16 Perhaps most directly adverse to ICC interests during this period of increasing U.S. isolation from the Court was the passage of the American Servicemembers Protection Act (ASPA), signed into law by President George W. Bush on August 2, 2002.17 This legislation prohibited U.S. military aid to ICC States Parties,18 and continues to restrict U.S. cooperation with the ICC. The ASPA, vesting in the President the authority to “use all means necessary and appropriate” to recover U.S. nationals or other specified persons detained by or at the behest of the ICC,19 evoked images of the U.S. military storming the ICC facilities in The Hague, Netherlands, and came to symbolize a period of antagonistic relations toward the court.

B. A Politic Embrace: The Bush Administration Warms to the Court

President Bush’s second term, served as a turning point for U.S. recognition of the ICC, and was marked by increasing implicit and explicit acceptance of the “reality” of the Court’s role in holding accountable those responsible for the worst international crimes.20 Contrary to the United States’ historically rigid opposition to the assertion of ICC jurisdiction over nationals of non-states parties to the Rome Statute, on March 31, 2005 the United States abstained from voting against a UNSC resolution referring to the ICC Prosecutor the situation in the Darfur region of Sudan, a non-state party to the ICC.21 One year later, the United States supported the trial of former Liberian President Charles Taylor following his surrender by Nigerian authorities to the Court the Special Court for Sierra Leone which utilized ICC facilities.22 And in President’ Bush’s final term in office, the State Department acknowledged the U.S. Government would consider a request by the ICC for information related to the Darfur case.23 Although explanations of the causal factors behind President Bush’s increasingly public tolerance of the ICC range from practical to ideological, the shift was in line with domestic political realities. As President Bush reached his final year in office, the American public broadly supported the prospect of U.S. engagement with the ICC across party lines.24

C. Resetting the Relationship: The Obama Years

On June 15, 2010, State Department officials returned from participating at the first-ever Review Conference on the Rome Statute of the ICC (Review Conference) with a special press briefing announcing, “[W]e have reset the default on the U.S. relationship with the Court from hostility to positive engagement.”25 A range of direct and indirect support from the Obama Administration has accompanied the new U.S. policy of “positive engagement,” both diplomatic and material in nature. In late 2009, the Obama Administration initiated a formal review of U.S. policy toward the ICC, sent a U.S. delegation to participate as an observer at an Assembly of States Parties meeting for the first time since the ICC’s inception, and pledged in-kind support for “existing ICC cases and investigations, and for the development of States Parties’ judicial-system capacity to prosecute ICC crimes.”26

In the face of crisis in Libya, the United States leveraged its position as a UNSC member to lobby on behalf of, co-sponsor, and vote in favor of the UNSC resolution referring the situation to the ICC.27 In Congress, controversial statutory prohibitions on U.S. aid to States Parties were allowed to lapse by 2009.28 The Lords Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 was signed into law on May 24, 2010, accompanied by a statement of support by President Obama for bringing the LRA leadership to justice.29 President Obama later announced the deployment of 100 combat troops to support the apprehension of the LRA leadership.30 The State Department went on to expand its War Crimes Reward Program, “offering up to $5 million for information that leads to the arrest, transfer, and conviction of the top three leaders of the LRA.”31

Upon entering the White House, President Obama vigorously promoted a foreign policy agenda focused on maintaining international peace and security without sacrificing U.S. values, including a respect for universal human rights, personal dignity, and security.32 Consistent with these goals, and following a cascade of overt actions signaling a shift toward U.S. re-engagement with the ICC, it appears the U.S. has identified a number of mutually aligned interests on which to form a basis for improved partnership with the Court.33

II. Limitations on United States Support for Arrests Pursuant to ICC Warrants

The primary limitations on the ability of U.S. agencies and officials to cooperate with the ICC in securing the arrest of at large criminals are statutory, and can be found in The American Servicemembers Protection Act.34 The most relevant constraints include:

• A prohibition on the obligation of U.S. funds to directly or indirectly “support” the ICC.35 “Support” in this context is defined by statute to mean “any kind, including financial support, transfer of property or other material support, services, intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, the training or detail of personnel, and the arrest or detention of individuals.”36

• Prohibition on cooperation by U.S. Courts and government agencies with the ICC, including responding to ICC requests for cooperation and transferring individuals from U.S. territory to the ICC, among other proscriptions.37

Supplementing these statutory limitations are several qualifying provisions providing the Executive Branch a modicum of unilateral authority to act in cooperation with the ICC when serving U.S. interests, including:

• A provision otherwise known as the “Dodd Amendment”, stating that “[n]othing in this [Act] shall prohibit the United States from rendering assistance to international efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosovic, Osama bin Laden, other members of Al Queda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.”38

• A provision identifying the ASPA’s prohibitions on cooperative activities as inapplicable with regard to actions taken by the President on “specific” matters before the ICC in exercise of his authority as “Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces.”39

• Authorization for the President to waive ASPA prohibitions where they would “prevent United States cooperation with an investigation or prosecution of a named individual by the International Criminal Court.”40

Should the Executive Branch choose to interpret them as such, these provisions could provide adequate flexibility for federal, state, and local agencies to significantly and directly support efforts to arrest individuals pursuant to ICC warrants. First, the Dodd Amendment could be interpreted to limit the application of the prohibition on U.S. cooperation in investigations and prosecutions to cases involving American nationals, and thereby protect the U.S. Government’s ability to assist in efforts to secure foreign nationals accused of crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction.41 The final two provisions appear to grant the President wide latitude to exercise unilateral discretion in his capacity as Commander and Chief as well as to waive certain ASPA restrictions in cases involving an individual “named” by the ICC.42 The latter situation would appear to cover cases in which the Pre-Trial Chamber has considered and issued specific warrants for arrest.

The ASPA, as originally passed, included stronger, even punitive, prohibitions aimed at limiting U.S. relations with nations supportive of the ICC— a strategy which degraded the military-to-military relationships of the United States abroad and for which the many in the Pentagon ultimately dropped their support.43 Contemporary efforts to repeal or amend the ASPA, in whole or in part, would likely still face domestic political opposition but such legislative actions would not be without precedent given prior congressional modifications to the ASPA. Challenges by U.S. elected officials’ to the ICC’s authority persist, however, including repudiations of the ICC’s jurisdictional claims as well as blanket resistance to broader UN frameworks considered a threat to U.S. national sovereignty.44

The ICC must also be cognizant of the public perceptions that might accompany increased collaboration with the United States in light of persistent criticism regarding the selective nature of ICC prosecutions and the undue influence of powerful, mostly Western, nations.45 Such considerations might be of particular concern to the ICC amidst sensitivities surrounding the Office of the Prosecutor’s closure of its Preliminary Examination of potential war crimes in Iraq and forthcoming conclusions with regard to the ICC’s preliminary examination in Afghanistan. The ICC also faces the prospect of renewed U.S. tensions as a result of the ICC’s adoption of two new crimes at the 2010 Review Conference including a prohibition on the use of certain additional weapons in non-international armed conflicts and the crime of aggression.46 Although the United States could not vote on conference proposals, the U.S. did inform the process as an observer and appeared optimistic following the Review Conference, publicly asserting that the “outcome protected [the United States’] vital interests.”47

Because the United States has not yet ratified the Rome Statute, as a non-state party any assistance they provide to the ICC in securing the arrest of individuals pursuant to ICC warrants would be on a voluntary basis. The elective nature of U.S. support for the ICC makes it vulnerable to changes in political leadership within the United States, and any related decline in U.S.–ICC relations. Some argue that the ICC can actually compel non-states such as the United States to cooperate with the ICC on situations referred to the ICC under Chapter VII. It is doubtful, however, that the ICC, rather than allied states through the diplomatic processes, would attempt to compel the cooperation of non-state parties under these circumstances, especially given the ICC’s lack of meaningful authority to even hold those State Parties that have refused to cooperate accountable to their obligations under the Rome Statute.48 And in light of the U.S. veto power within the UNSC, this hypothetical would be irrelevant due to U.S. support serving as a prerequisite for UNSC referral under Chapter VII.

Lastly, it is worth noting that any future decision by the United States to ratify the Rome Statute, however remote in possibility, would also face several legal hurdles in addition to previously mentioned political resistance. U.S. ratification would likely be barred by the ASPA, and therefore require modification by congressional amendment or repeal.49 Further, questions regarding the constitutionality of the Rome Statute, which also prohibits unilateral treaty reservations by States Parties, would first need to be resolved.50 Primary concerns in this area relate to constitutional limitations on Congress’s ability to delegate judicial authority to a non-U.S. court, as well as concerns regarding the protection of American nationals’ constitutionally guaranteed due process rights.51

III. Opportunities for United States Support of Arrests Pursuant to ICC Warrants

Under Article 87(5) of the Rome Statute, “The Court may invite any State not party to [the Rome] Statute to provide assistance…on the basis of an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.”52 Formal ICC requests to the United States under this authority might trigger the ASPA’s prohibition on “responding to requests” and thereby limit the ability of the United States to consider and fulfill such a request. As detailed above, the several ASPA provisions may still allow for U.S. response and cooperation under certain circumstances involving foreign nationals or in the event the President decides to exercise his waiver or constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. Additionally, there is precedent from the Bush Administration for consideration of ICC requests, notably in the Darfur case in which the State Department publicly acknowledged the receipt of an ICC request for information as well as their policy to “consider” such requests.53

Normative and political support for the ICC as well as assistance in key areas such as witness relocation would greatly benefit the ICC, but “[b]y far the most critical area where the Court requires State support is in apprehending suspects.”54 The ICC has not shied away from welcoming U.S. support in securing the arrest of current and future fugitives. Staff within the Office of the Prosecutor has called on the United States to be a first-mover on this issue, arguing that “[t]he American government first has to lead on one particular issue, the arrest of sought war criminals.... [Other countries] will follow, but we need the U.S. in the lead.”55 High-ranking U.S. officials likewise point to improving the ICC’s track record in apprehending individuals subject to ICC warrants as one of the foremost challenges facing the court, and have encouraged states to take action to assist the ICC in securing arrests.56 Despite the high cost and delay associated with ICC trials to-date, the ICC still offers the United States a cost-effective mechanism for removing bad actors from the playing field— one which doesn’t require the use of force, insulates the United States from expending finite political capital, and advances its long-term peace and security interests.57

The ICC and the United States appear to agree on their mutual interest in apprehending those individuals who remain at large despite pending ICC indictments, but where can U.S. resources be most helpful to the ICC?

The United States can bring significant diplomatic pressure to bear on State Parties refusing to comply with their obligations under the Rome Statute. As a permanent member of the UNSC and a dominant economic power within the international community, the U.S. may be best situated to exert political and economic pressure, particularly where the ICC indicts a sitting head of state. In the case of President Omar al-Bashir, despite a pending indictment, al-Bashir was allowed to freely travel to State Party countries including Kenya and the Republic of Chad without consequence despite specific requests from the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber for the enactment of appropriate “responsive measures.”58 Situations in which the Assembly of States Parties or UNSC has refused to take collective action to enforce the obligations of States Parties to the Rome Statute illustrate the need for forceful, and unilateral U.S. pressure aimed at bolstering the ICC’s ability to improve reliability amongst States Parties and subsequent arrest outcomes.

Perhaps most importantly, the United States can ramp up cooperative military support, direct and indirect, to assist arrest efforts worldwide. The text of the Dodd Amendment to the ASPA specifically safeguards U.S. authority to assist “international efforts to bring to justice…foreign nationals accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.”59 The United States has already deployed combat-ready to seek out and capture individuals in the LRA leadership wanted for such crimes.60 Because these individuals are facing named indictments by the ICC, the President could conceivably exercise his waiver authority under the ASPA in order to facilitate their transfer to the ICC. Similar to Bosco Ntaganda requesting transfer to the ICC after turning himself in to U.S. authorities, once in the hands of U.S. military forces, the LRA fugitives may also opt to request relocation to The Hague as a preferable alternative to being placed in custody or facing criminal prosecution domestically. In such circumstances, the Obama Administration might also avoid ASPA limitations all together by arguing that the ASPA does not prohibit the United States from fulfilling an individual’s request for transport to the Netherlands, particularly if U.S. involvement is limited to placing the individual on the necessary mode of transport. The ICC would also greatly benefit from U.S. intelligence sharing, both in support of investigating potential violators of international humanitarian and human rights laws and in securing their arrest. Military assistance might also include U.S. technical advisors, military training, and equipment for states working to secure the arrest of ICC suspects.

Finally, U.S. officials have already promised direct support to improve States Parties’ judicial-system capacity to prosecute ICC crimes, most recently co-sponsoring a program with Norway to strengthen judicial capacity in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.61 Efforts to improve domestic legal systems will help to make the international community’s conception of the ICC as a “court of last resort” a reality. By enabling states’ to more effectively execute domestic prosecutions national governments may be emboldened to independently pursue and prosecute those responsible for violations of those crimes under the ICC’s jurisdiction. U.S. capacity building programs will strengthen the ICC as a system of courts working to end impunity, and although indirect in its support, will free up much needed resources for the ICC to expend in pursuit of those individuals that remain at large years after their indictment.

Conclusion

As a result of both parties having identified increasingly aligned normative and practical interests, the relationship between the United States and the ICC has shifted over time from distanced criticism to pragmatic partnership. In order to improve the ICC’s track record in apprehending those indicted for grave violations of international law, the ICC should capitalize on this period of renewed U.S. engagement by seeking to expand U.S. support, both direct and indirect, for arrests pursuant to ICC warrants.

Endnotes — (click the footnote reference number, or ↩ symbol, to return to location in text).

1. 1.

   The Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Background Information, available online. ↩

2. 2.

   Diana Jenkins, Terminus for the Terminator?, Huff. Post, available online. ↩

3. 3.

   Press Release, ICC, ICC Prosecutor welcomes news of Ntaganda’s transfer to the Court (Mar. 22, 2013), available online. ↩

4. 4.

   Especially following the unanimous acquittal of Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui by the ICC Trial Chamber just a few months earlier. Press Release, ICC, ICC Trial Chamber II acquits Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, available online. ↩

5. 5.

   Situations and Cases, ICC, available online. ↩

6. 6.

   Eric Posner, The Absurd International Criminal Court, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 2012, available online. ↩

7. 7.

   David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls: A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals at 165 (Princeton Univ. Press, 2012) (“[T]he United States has a tradition of leading other nations in global treaty-making endeavors to create a more law-abiding international community, only to seek exceptions to the new rules for the United States.”) ↩

8. 8.

   Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Jul. 17 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. ↩

9. 9.

   Id. ↩

10. 10.

    Tod Lindberg, A Way Forward with the International Criminal Court, 159 Pol. Rev. 28 (2010); William H. Taft et al., Am. J. Int’l L., Independent Task Force, U.S. Policy Toward the International Criminal Court: Furthering Positive Engagement, at iv (Mar. 2009), available online. ↩

11. 11.

    See Scheffer, supra note 4, at 224. ↩

12. 12.

    U.S. President Bill Clinton, Statement Authorizing the US Signing of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Dec. 31, 2000), available online. ↩

13. 13.

    United Nations Treaty Collection, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, note 11 (May 6, 2002), available online (last visited May 14, 2013) [hereinafter Bolton Letter]. ↩

14. 14.

    Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available online. ↩

15. 15.

    See Bolton Letter, supra note 13. The functional legal impact of this “unsigning” continues to be debated, with some experts concluding that U.S. obligations as a signatory to the Rome Statute were relieved but its status as a Signatory remains unchanged. See Taft, supra note 10, at 30-31. ↩

16. 16.

    S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (Jul. 12, 2002), available online. Some legal experts argue this resolution is incompatible with the Rome Statute and the UN Charter. See Coalition for the Int’l Crim. Court, Res. 1422/1487, 2004, available online (last visited May 10, 2013). The immunity provision was not renewed in 2004, following controversy surrounding the actions of U.S. military service members in Iraq at Abu Ghraib prison. Stephen Eliot Smith, Definitely Maybe: The Outlook for U.S. Relations With the International Criminal Court During the Obama Administration, 22 Fla. J. Int’l L. 155, 163 (2010). ↩

17. 17.

    American Servicemembers Protection Act of 2002, HR 4775, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7421-7433 (2002), available online. [hereinafter ASPA]. ↩

18. 18.

    These punitive measures were accompanied by additional punitive measures, attached to related Appropriations legislation and referred to as the “Nethercutt Amendment,” all of which were later repealed or allowed to lapse by 2009. Emily C. Barbour & Matthew C. Weed, Cong. Research Serv., R41116, The International Criminal Court (ICC): Jurisdiction, Extradition, and U.S. Policy at 4 (Mar. 16, 2010), available online. ↩

19. 19.

    ASPA, supra note 17. ↩

20. 20.

    Jess Bravin, U.S. Accepts International Criminal Court, Wall St. J., Apr. 26, 2008. ↩

21. 21.

    S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005), available online. ↩

22. 22.

    See Taft et al., supra note 18, at 15. ↩

23. 23.

    Id. ↩

24. 24.

    See Smith, supra note 16, at 165. ↩

25. 25.

    Special Briefing, Harold Koh & Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Engagement With the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference (Jun. 15, 2010), available online. State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, contrary to the Bush Administration’s purported “unsigning” of the Rome Statute, has since repeatedly and publicly re-affirmed the United States commitment to the “object and purpose” of the Rome Statute. See Jennifer Trahan, U.S. Affirms that It Adheres to Rome Statute Signatory Obligations: It Should Put This In Writing, Opinio Juris (Feb. 27, 2013, 7:30 PM), available online. ↩

26. 26.

    Id. ↩

27. 27.

    S.C. Res. 1970, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011), available online. ↩

28. 28.

    See Barbour & Weed, supra note 18, at 15. ↩

29. 29.

    U.S. President Barack Obama, Statement by the President on the Signing of the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (May 24, 2010), available online. ↩

30. 30.

    Joe Sterling, Obama Orders U.S. Troops to Help Chase Down African ‘Army’ Leader, CNN, Oct. 18, 2011, available online. ↩

31. 31.

    Press Release, U.S. Department of State, Secretary Kerry on Bringing War Criminals to Justice Through Expansion of the War Crimes Rewards Program (Apr. 3, 2013), available online. ↩

32. 32.

    See generally U.S. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on a New Beginning (Jun. 4, 2009). ↩

33. 33.

    Barbour & Weed, supra note 18; see also Douglas Dunbar, AMICC, The Obama Administrations Evolving Policy Toward the International Criminal Court (2011); See also Office of the President of the United States, National Security Strategy 48 (2010) (noting U.S. active engagement with States Parties to the Rome Statute and support for “the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that advance U.S. interests”). ↩

34. 34.

    ASPA, supra note 17. For a detailed discussion of the legal restrictions presented by the ASPA on U.S. cooperation with the ICC, see Taft, supra note 10, at 32-34. ↩

35. 35.

    Id. at § 7401(b) (emphasis added). ↩

36. 36.

    Id. at § 7432(12). ↩

37. 37.

    Id. at § 7423. ↩

38. 38.

    Id. at § 7433 (emphasis added). ↩

39. 39.

    Id. at § 7430. ↩

40. 40.

    Id. at § 7422 (emphasis added). ↩

41. 41.

    See Smith, supra note 16, at 187. ↩

42. 42.

    ASPA, supra note 17. ↩

43. 43.

    See Scheffer, supra note 4, at 198. ↩

44. 44.

    Republican Nat’l Comm., 2012 We Believe in America: Republican Platform at 45 (2012), available online. ↩

45. 45.

    David Bosco, Why is the International Criminal Court Picking Only on Africa?, Wash. Post, Mar. 29, 2013, available online. ↩

46. 46.

    Note that “any crime of aggression couldn’t become operational unless it were affirmatively adopted after another review by consensus or a two-thirds decision of all states parties no earlier than January 1, 2017.” See Koh, supra note 25. ↩

47. 47.

    Id. ↩

48. 48.

    Cf. Rome Statute, art. 87; African Union Opposes Warrant for Qaddafi, AP, Jul. 2, 2011, available online. ↩

49. 49.

    See Taft, supra note 10, at xi. ↩

50. 50.

    See Smith, supra note 16, at 180-86. ↩

51. 51.

    Id. ↩

52. 52.

    Rome Statute, art. 87. ↩

53. 53.

    Sean McCormack, U.S. State Department, Remarks at Daily Press Briefing (Jul. 14, 2008), available online. ↩

54. 54.

    See Taft, supra note 10, at 22. ↩

55. 55.

    Interview by Christiane Amanpour with Beatrice Le Fraper, Special Adviser to the ICC Prosecutor, CNN, Mar. 24, 2010, available online. ↩

56. 56.

    Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Remarks to the Assembly of States Parties of the International Criminal Court (Dec. 14, 2011) (“[I]t is a persistent and serious cause for concern that eight individuals who are the subject of existing ICC arrest warrants remain at large.... [St]ates can also lend expertise and logistical support to efforts to apprehend these fugitives.”), available online. ↩

57. 57.

    Marlise Simons, U.S. Grows More Helpful to International Criminal Court, a Body It First Scorned, N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 2013, available online. (“To use the court as an adjunct to soft power makes sense for the U.S....It’s cost-effective. If you can remove a warlord through the court, it’s a lot cheaper and more acceptable than using force.” quoting Courtenay Griffiths, defense lawyer for former Liberian President Charles Taylor). ↩

58. 58.

    John F. Murphy, Gulliver No Longer Quivers: U.S. Views on and the Future of the International Criminal Court, 44 Int’l Law. 1123, 1136-37 (2010). ↩

59. 59.

    ASPA, supra note 17 at § 7433. ↩

60. 60.

    See Sterling, supra note 30. ↩

61. 61.

    See Trahan, supra note 25; see also Barbour & Weed, supra note 18, at 19. ↩